The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Hughes]

Q: Today is the 10th of September 1996. This is tape one of an interview with Ambassador G. Philip Hughes. What does the G stand for?

HUGHES: Gary.

Q: To begin with can you tell me when and where you were born?

HUGHES: I was born in Dayton, Ohio, on September 7th 1953.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your family and early education?

HUGHES: My dad was a retired major league baseball player. He was a high school educated man who grew up in Cincinnati in sort of a working-class neighborhood. After his baseball playing career, which lasted all told about 20 years between time in the minors and the majors and time coaching, he had a couple of jobs in sales and then he founded a little paving company that did driveways, parking lots and construction and things like that. That was his second career, his small business for the next 20 years until he retired in about 1965.

My mom was also from Cincinnati, partially educated in university until the combination of the depression and the voice of her parents forced her to withdraw from the university about a year or two from completion. She was sort of the main cultural and intellectual influence in my life. She was a doting housewife who, having been herself previously divorced, considered the fact of having me at the age of about 41 or 42 to be a near miraculous occurrence and that probably shaped her whole approach to raising me.

Q: Where did you go to school?

HUGHES: I went to parochial school in Dayton Ohio, our parish school at Our Lady of the Rosary, and then I went to an all boys' Catholic high school, Chaminade High School in Dayton. There isn't a theme to this but then I graduated university from the University of Dayton also in Dayton, Ohio. It turns out it's a Marianist Catholic university although not very self consciously so. I then went to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for the Master of Arts [in Law and Diplomacy].

Q: I want to go back a bit. Growing up going through Catholic schools particularly in the '60s I suppose and '70s, the Catholic Church and education has changed very much. What sort of things were you getting? Were you getting what you and I would probably consider the traditional Catholic education or had the influence of the reforms of the church hit? Were you getting rather strict nuns?

HUGHES: I would say that my elementary education was about half lay teachers and half nuns, almost exactly half and half. I should say that I spent seven years in elementary school and then went to high school. In elementary school I had three nuns and four lay teachers. Two of the three nuns were what you might call rather strict and old school and they taught you a very hefty dose of religious doctrine. They also instilled a very disciplined, work oriented, accomplishment oriented, excellence rewarding, sort of approach to living. They gave frankly a very good education on fact and material of content. I was blessed, I think, also with really excellent lay teachers as well. Thinking about the seven teachers I had in elementary school, only one of them was I think a weak teacher.

I wouldn't say so much reforms of the church but reforms of the approach to education began to take hold about my junior year of high school or maybe my senior year of high school which would have put us at about 1968 to 1970. We had a very structured high school curriculum where boys came to school in coats and ties. There were tracks at our school for honor students and academic students and basic students, where honor students were prescribed to take certain things and honor roll was taken very seriously. Extracurricular activities were taken very seriously. There were Latin clubs and Greek clubs and classics clubs and chess clubs and things like that, and math clubs and so forth for the more academically talented students.

Much of that started to be erased in junior and senior year with more self-guided study, unstructured study, fewer curriculum requirements and so forth, and less emphasis on grades, excellence, honor roll and stuff like that. Those were the influences of my last two years of high school, influences that I very much resisted. I hated it with a passion and opposed it strongly with a clique of my friends.

Q: In high school you were there during the Vietnam years.

HUGHES: Yes, I was in high school from '66 to '70.

Q: How did that affect you? Was your area sort of what you might call a more working class area?

HUGHES: Not really. Our home was in a modest suburban area outside of Dayton. We happened to have a somewhat large piece of property, as did our immediate neighbors. There was what I would call a professional class subdivision that bordered our group of homes where houses were on quarter acre tracts. The kind of people that lived there were professional office workers from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base or accountants, insurance salesmen and people like that from those sorts of professional lives with families in these tract homes. I would say that, in home life, events like the Vietnam War and the disturbances of Vietnam had no influence.

What was very perceptible in my high school was that we started out in coats in ties in 1966 with very strict requirements on attendance and so forth. By 1969-70 coats and ties were thrown out the window and students were running around with long hair and shabby clothes. With the connivance of the faculty we were having traditional and content oriented education replaced by literature courses focusing on the poetry of Lawrence Ferlinghetti and sort of protest-era poets and things like that. It was a very pronounced transition.

Q: Why did it hit there?

HUGHES: I don't know. I suppose it was just the tenor of the times.

Q: What was sort of the general attitude at the high school towards the Vietnam War?

HUGHES: I think by and large my sense was that all the young men, because it was an all male school, were concerned about being drafted. Because college deferments were, I believe, still available at that stage, the more academically oriented people weren't overly worried about being drafted because everybody knew they were going on to college. My immediate circle of friends weren't people who were particularly concerned about being drafted.

I would say that the prevailing attitude was one of a fashionable protest. What I mean to say is that I'm not sure how authentically morally offended any of these young men were by the conduct of the war or how really closely they were following it. I think rather than following the war they were probably following their elders: the Abbie Hoffman era of radical student movements and also it all sort of comes together, doesn't it? The typical adolescent rebellion against orthodoxy, parental authority and convention and so forth combined with a very fashionable, sort of free spirited, fun loving Woodstock generation alternative lifestyle approach to living combined with, infused with, the political excitement of opposing the government and opposing the war and all of the sort of righteousness that comes with that. To me what you get when you mix those three elements with a bunch of high school kids who are 17, 18 or 19 years old or something like that, is not sincere morally convinced protest but rather what I would call fashionable

protest.

Q: Sometimes I say it is the moral equivalent to a panty raid.

HUGHES: In a way. That trivializes it a bit but I would say it's sort of fashionable protest. Everybody is doing it, everybody is wearing jeans, everybody is wearing long hair, everybody is running around pretending to be flower children and pretending to be morally outraged about the war - whatever is going on over there. I am not sure how many of these people really knew frankly very much about it. For me I was much, much more concerned with the sort of assault, if you would, on conventional authority and the assault on conventional societal values. Obviously I wasn't very sympathetic to that. I and some of my friends represented the decidedly conservative faction in the class.

Q: Did you find it difficult at that time to be sort of in the conservative thing because everybody else is having a good time?

HUGHES: Not at all. I had an absolute ball. I had a ball in high school and that's why I thought this protest nonsense was all so silly because while these folks were busy being hippies or pretending to be hippies or whatever they were doing, I was making a lot of money at a job that required almost no effort. I was a church organist for a couple of hours of work, less than an hour's actual work a day and I made more money than any of my colleagues. I bought my own car, with a little help from my parents. I tooled around in a sporty yellow and black sports car, went to sophisticated adult-oriented entertainment like concerts at the art institute and things like that, already black-tie kind of functions as a very, very young person. I was sort of already moving toward the adult world that I wanted to get ready for while these people were, as far as I was concerned, basically wasting their time.

Q: You graduated from high school when?

HUGHES: 1970.

Q: So by that time the Vietnam War was beginning at least to be pushed over towards the [inaudible].

HUGHES: Draft deferments had ended by 1970 as I recall and I believe that I was theoretically eligible then to be drafted in my first year or two of college but as it turned out my number was a high number and then the lottery was ended.

Q: You were in college from '70 to '74?

HUGHES: No. I was in college from '70 to '72.

Q: This was where?

HUGHES: I started out at Wright State University which was a local university and then transferred to the University of Dayton. I spent two-and-a-half years in college and finished.

Q: What were you taking then?

HUGHES: Political science/international relations and economics. My major was political science and my minor was economics.

Q: What pushed you off in this direction? You were a musician obviously.

HUGHES: I was just always interested from earliest days -- I guess maybe from fourth grade geography which is when we introduced geography in our elementary school -- in the outside world, and always interested in politics and governments. I decided to study that in school without frankly very much thought of where this was likely to lead professionally. That thinking process came along only later. I decided not to pursue music because I wasn't sure how I could make a living at being an organist. It would be different if I played some instrument that you could really concertize like a piano or something like that. But also to make a decent living as a musician you have to be absolutely excellent.

Q: There's only room for one E. Power Biggs.

HUGHES: I wasn't sure that I wanted to take such a big gamble on a career.

Q: What were the politics of Dayton and Cincinnati, Ohio, at that time that you were exposed to it or where you at all interested in the local politics?

HUGHES: Not very much interested in local politics. Frankly, funnily enough, not very much interested in national politics for a long time. My parents were what you would call Depression era Democrats, New Deal Democrats, the best kind of Democrats because they've never voted.

I suppose that my own disaffection with the Democratic Party really began sort of looking at the policies of Lyndon Johnson, his particular approach to the war on poverty. This sort of general liberalization if you would, that was going on in our high school at the time and what that represented. I suppose also a conviction that ultimately middle class people were only going to be able to better their condition economically if they would be relieved from some of the burdens of taxation and regulation by government that were obviously already beginning to escalate.

To come right down to it, it is obvious that I am a Republican and a conservative. I sort of reckoned that to get from where I started out in life to where I wanted to get to which was rather a better station in life, the only way to achieve that would be for government to get out of the way. Not to tax away what earnings I had, not to limit the opportunities for advancement and achievement that I might have. I had a set of convictions about politics.

I wasn't sure that government would actually take me anywhere that I wasn't going to go so the main thing was to make sure that the path was as clear as possible.

In terms of the politics of Dayton, Dayton is a very democratic labor town. It is an automotive town with lots of GM plants, fewer now than there used to be. It was a cradle of invention. I learned in my later years how many inventions of the industrial age came from people who lived in or settled in the Dayton area. There were several major industries: National Cash Register [NCR] and things related to that industry; the automotive industry; the aircraft and aviation industry with Wright-Patterson field and all of those installations. As a result there was a heavy union influence in politics. When I was growing up there were a lot of strikes, labor unrest and disruptions and also some big fights over labor representation.

One celebrated fight was the United Auto Workers [UAW] insisting to displace the NCR employees union. The National Cash Register Company had a long history of very cooperative labor management relations and had its own employees' independent union. The United Auto Workers, who of course were a more militant union and represented most of the GM plants around Dayton, wanted to move in, if you would, on this lucrative source of union dues and at the same time make a case for NCR workers that their union was basically a tamed patsy for management. There was a major battle with the NCR employees union over representation of NCR.

Just as an aside by the way, as a reflection of the kind of management-labor relationship that had traditionally characterized this company, the NCR buildings which occupied something like eight square blocks of downtown Dayton had in the brick work of the buildings slogans for the benefit of workers about labor-management relations: labor and management working together, that sort of thing.

In any case, eventually the UAW prevailed and began representing NCR's unions and immediately began negotiating contracts with NCR that would then apply auto industry scale wages in the cash register business. Within a handful of years the 20,000 manufacturing jobs in Dayton disappeared. NCR ceased manufacturing anything in Dayton and was only barely able, before their take-over by AT&T, to work out with the city fathers an arrangement that would have kept the headquarters of the company in Dayton for sentimental reasons. There is no reason why the headquarters needs to be there. I guess from my upbringing I can say that I don't have particularly sympathetic views about labor unions because as far as my own observation and experience was concerned, I watched them destroy thousands of jobs in Dayton.

Q: What sort of a world were you seeing from your education as a political science/economic major?

HUGHES: You mean the outside world?

Q: Yes.

HUGHES: I was seeing an outside world dominated by of course the Cold War and the struggle with the Soviet Union. From my perch in Dayton Ohio it certainly appeared that the United States did face a mortal danger from expansionist, hostile, ideologically motivated countries like the Soviet Union and its client states. I guess you would say my interpretation of the Vietnam War therefore would have been a very conventional interpretation, a very official, if you would, interpretation that this wasn't an agrarian peasant uprising or nationalist movement. This was at least partly fomented by expansionist Communist countries.

I was probably insensitive at that point to the rifts and fissures within the Communist world. Particularly the Sino-Soviet split was probably not very much part of my consciousness at that stage. It was a world where the central dominating features of the international landscape would have been our contests with the Soviet Union and fending off the threat that the Soviets posed both in nuclear terms and in expansionist terms to our interests.

Our relationship with our closest allies particularly focused on Europe, that part of the world. When you grow up in Dayton, Ohio, you tend to think about Europe a lot. You don't necessarily tend to think a lot of Latin America or Asia or Africa or the Middle East.

I was also seeing the restiveness of Third World countries and in those days the sort of Non-Allied Movement, Third World demands on the industrialized world. Or a better break if you would, some sense that the industrialized world had done them wrong and that those wrongs needed to be righted somehow.

Those were I guess my two or three guiding elements in my consciousness about the outside world in the '60s and early '70s.

Q: You graduated from Dayton in about '72?

HUGHES: Yes, December of '72.

Q: And then went to Fletcher?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University is one of the three or four preeminent sort of foreign relations focused graduate schools. Why did you do that?

HUGHES: Because by the time I had come to what would amount to junior year studies in college, even though I was going through it at a bit faster clip, I had to think about what I wanted to do for a career. I clearly wasn't going to become a musician now. I stayed in my hometown to study partly because I wanted to keep my job as an organist

and to keep my options open musically. Without having gone to a music program as undergraduate school, I wasn't going to go on to the College Conservatory of Music or something like that. I had to decide what I wanted to do for a living and I hadn't frankly given it a great deal of thought.

I will tell you exactly how this came about. I was thinking more and more that I wanted some kind of an international career -- a career like in diplomacy or in the Foreign Service or something like that. When you are a kid growing up in Dayton, Ohio, and you want an international career, about the only thing that you can think about is the Foreign Service because it is about the only thing that has a structure to it that you know how or can find some way of plugging into. So I began thinking about that kind of career and typically associating it with the Foreign Service and then the question was how to get ready for it? I was coming out at a very young age. I'd be coming out of college at 19 so I didn't think anybody would hire me frankly at such a young age for a professional career so graduate school was in order. The question was what graduate school?

My wife, or the person who is now my wife, came to me (we'd been dating since 1970) and said "you know, I talked to some guy in my class today and he mentioned a graduate school you might be interested in, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He said, 'has your boyfriend checked into the Fletcher School?'" Neither of us had ever heard of the Fletcher School and so I took myself to the library and looked up the catalog and it looked real interesting. I decided that I would apply there. In the process I did a little bit of research and applied to all the professional graduate schools of foreign affairs that there were except Denver. I didn't apply either to the Thunderbird School because I was quite sure I didn't want a career in business.

Q: Thunderbird is in where?

HUGHES: Arizona.

Q: So it would be Georgetown...

HUGHES: It was Georgetown, AU, GW, SAIS, Columbia, Princeton, Harvard and Fletcher and I got into all of them except Harvard and Princeton. I was also offered a rather generous scholarship from the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. I think that was the first or the second year of the Master of Public Policy program in the new Kennedy School and they accepted certainly under two dozen students. I didn't make it into that class. I was not accepted to Princeton's Woodrow Wilson's school either although I was told if you want to take a job for a year and then reapply, you will be accepted because we like to take people who have had a little bit of experience before coming rather than coming straight out of school. I didn't want to do that. I wanted to get school over with and start earning a living so I evaluated the schools.

In fact the guiding influence here was Vince Davis who was a former member of the Foreign Service and in those days dean of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and

International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He had offered, as I mentioned, this rather generous scholarship to attend Patterson School. He lived across the street from my sister as it turns out in Lexington. I was quite sure that with the opportunity to go to a Georgetown or a Fletcher or a whatever that I would not want to go to the University of Kentucky but he was somebody who was knowledgeable in this area.

I asked him what he thought of my options and what he said was this: "The way I would rank those schools is I would say that Fletcher, Columbia and SAIS are at about all the same level and the rest are just sort of a tier down." The MSFS program at Georgetown he didn't rate as well because in those days it was just restarting after a period of not operating. He said "Among those schools here is how I would sort them out. Columbia probably has the best academic record and if you want to go the academic teaching route you might be best advised to go to Columbia. SAIS is of course right in Washington and if you want to go the sort of professional Foreign Service route, that might be the best bet but it has two limitations. They use a lot of adjunct faculty, particularly Foreign Service officers who might then be re-posted to some other place, so that at a later stage if you decide you want a doctorate or if you decide that you want to go for an academic career, you might find getting references and references that mean anything to anybody a bit difficult at SAIS."

Is this all relevant to you?

Q: Yes it is.

HUGHES: Further he said that "It's in an urban environment and everybody sort of lives in apartments and comes together in this office building. It is not very much a campus environment. Fletcher is kind of between those two worlds. It is ivory tower enough so that if you want to do the academic route you can do that but it is professional enough that if you want to do that, you can do that. It is away from Washington so it has the essence of being away from Washington and in Cambridge, and it has a lot of young and up and coming faculty who are going to be something some day." That was frankly what sold me on Fletcher so I chose Fletcher and it worked out wonderfully.

Q: You were at Fletcher from when to when?

HUGHES: '73 to '75.

Q: What was your major or your specialization?

HUGHES: You have to have distributions in that curriculum and my concentration was in international security studies with international trade and economics as one minor concentration and Soviet studies as another concentration.

Q: What were you picking up from Fletcher? This was sort of a difficult time in both the body politic in the United States as Watergate, Nixon administration was sort of

floundering and Congress and the President were at loggerheads over Vietnam. What were you getting from the faculty and maybe your fellow students about whither the United States and also for a profession, what sort of whetted your interests?

HUGHES: You are right it was a time when there were several momentous events. The Yom Kippur War as I recall happened.

Q: October '73 between Israel and Egypt.

HUGHES: Within a month of my arrival the Yom Kippur War occurred. While I was at Fletcher, Nixon resigned in the summer of '74 and the next year we watched the helicopters being pushed off the decks of the aircraft carriers off of Vietnam as we pulled our last people out and the Vietnamese overran the south.

What was I getting from the faculty and so forth? I would say the kind of thing that you are looking for was sort of the Zeitgeist, the connection of politics to all of this. It wasn't there as far as I can tell. I didn't feel it anyway. I felt like I was getting prepared in a professional education for what as I look back on it now was a career as a Cold Warrior. I was preparing myself in military and defense studies to probably go to work somewhere either in the Foreign Service or in the Pentagon or in a national security establishment to work for probably the rest of my career on trying to keep the Soviet threat at bay from the United States. It would be life-long occupation and if we did our jobs right the world would be no more dangerous a place when we got to retirement than it was when we started.

Q: The Soviet Union wasn't going to go away.

HUGHES: Yes, it wasn't going to go away and there were going to be probably two or three areas of continuing problems in the international environment, in the international arena. One of which would be the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict which would be a permanent fixture of our diplomacy. Another of which would probably be that same restiveness in the Third World. A combination of vying with the Soviet Union for influence there and somewhere between populist and socialist leaders and politicians, depending on how cynical or how harsh you are in your judgment, either looking to scapegoat their problems on the West or looking to distract their peoples' attention from their miserable conditions by attacking the West or whatever. But anyway, this sort of anti-western current through the Third World was probably also going to be a permanent fixture and perhaps maybe the black-white cleavage in southern Africa would be, if not a permanent fixture of the scene, at least a long term irritant in international relations.

I don't think the faculty were teaching us any particular thing, or that we as students were necessarily picking up or spreading among ourselves any particular thing or message about national politics, about the United States role in the world, about the world and its impact on the United States. I think, at least my mentality was, I was preparing for a professional career here and in the process it appeared from the environment around me

and everything I was studying that there were going to be some permanent fixtures that were going to be part of that professional life forever and ever. One of them was keeping the Soviets at bay. The second was dealing with these permanent irritants if you would in the world.

Q: Did Latin America cross your radar particularly?

HUGHES: No. First of all I didn't study it. I never took a course on Latin American affairs, ever. I wasn't very much interested in it because it was sort of a backwater in academic circles and in professional international affairs studies it wasn't a front burner issue, it was a back burner issue. It was sort of a backwater place with some rather underdeveloped backward countries very close to our borders over which the United States, I guess, held a certain thrall.

This was our backyard so to speak and an area of traditional influence so why would you spend your time studying and worrying about that? That wasn't where the main threat was. That wasn't where the main action was, it was a side show and often a side show where the people who were interested in studying it were people who had some ethnic or personal tie to the region: Hispanic Americans, or people who had lived in the area with parents and were raised in the area. So I hadn't frankly any interest at all in Latin America and it figured in only a minor way in my American diplomatic history courses in college.

Q: What were you getting out of American diplomatic history?

HUGHES: There is a text I think by a guy named Bartlett, "Out of American Diplomatic History?" Of course I took it 22-23 years ago, what was I getting out of it? If you want me to go back and say how would I interpret what I learned in American diplomatic history today I would say that United States diplomacy has gone through several very distinct phases.

The biggest phase shift in U.S. diplomacy probably occurred in the first half of the 20th century when we stopped behaving like just any other country, except with this moral mission, and began to behave like a world power. American diplomacy began to take on larger purposes than just protecting this little infant republic from menaces and threats from traditional European powers and preserving our options for continental expansion and growth of the nation.

There has always been a missionary quality in American diplomacy even from our earliest days. It comes partly from our revolutionary tradition, it comes partly from our constitutional democratic tradition of fostering and propagating democracy and freedom in other parts of the world, and particularly in our own backyard in Latin America which also happened to nicely coincide with our self-interest in preserving a safe space for the gestation of the infant republic.

In the first half of the 20th century, with the growth of American economic might and

military might and especially the role that we played in World War I, even after the immediate post-World War I period of isolation, we began to act like a world power. That is we began to attempt to shape international events to not just our particular preferences but I would like to think in a sense to what's in the general interest of the planet. All of a sudden, what had always been a missionary element in American foreign policy became a gigantic mission for American foreign policy and for America in the world. When I was studying American diplomatic history, that was the stage at which we were playing.

I think frankly now the question is, are we going to still be the world power in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet threat stage, or are we going to go back to having a foreign policy just like every other country -- just like France, or just like Britain or just like Germany -- which is very self-interested, very focused on just what we need to do in the world to get by for 50 states.

Q: While you were doing this, what were you beginning to see that interested you? I mean at Fletcher obviously, people think of the Foreign Service but they also think of business, they think of other things?

HUGHES: You mean like what was I going to do for a profession? Once again I had absolutely no thought of going into business. I don't know why. Either I didn't understand it or I wasn't particularly motivated by money or it didn't have the sense of a larger contribution to the public good that public service has, I don't know. But in any case, I didn't give any thought at all to going into business or frankly in going into a profession like practicing law or practicing medicine or something of that sort.

My thinking about this has changed somewhat, but in those days I had a very linear idea of how one developed a career: you studied and prepared for one thing. All of my studies were very concentrated on this one path so coming out of Fletcher my ambition was frankly to join the Foreign Service. That was what I thought I was going to do. I passed the written examination twice and I failed the oral examination twice. When I failed the oral examination the second time it was in my second year at Fletcher and it was sort of like "oh damn it now, what am I going to do?"

Q: If I recall about that time there were three persons sitting in and giving the oral exam because I was giving the exam around that time. They usually sat down and kind of talked to you. Was it age?

HUGHES: No I don't think it was. To be quite honest I don't really know. I knew some people who passed it and some people who didn't pass it. I knew some people who were very talented and proved to be very high fliers later who for some reason or another didn't pass.

I believe, at least in respect to my second examination, that I gave an answer to one question that was just regarded as simply impractical, insensitive, and I guess youthfully naive. The question had to do with you're the senior officer in an embassy and you're told

that you have to get rid of one of three employees. Then they give you a set of structured choices and the question is designed to elicit several different things. It is designed to first of all see just how you do with the structured choices. Are you perfectly ruthless and hardheaded, are you more sophisticated and worldly-wise about who is more easily replaceable than whom and who actually has value for the organization, and what are the impacts of making certain decisions on the whole organization and morale and things like that?

It was also designed obviously to give it another question which was do you accept questions within the parameters given or are you willing to go out and think outside the box? I wasn't thinking outside the box and I was taking a very youthful and kind of naive approach to answering the question. With 20-20 hindsight I would have formed probably exactly the same impression of me that the examiners did. I know why I answered the question the way that I did and frankly at that stage of my own personal preparation and mental development I couldn't have conceived of answering the question any differently, but I see now that I would have answered it very differently.

Q: I was giving those exams in '74-'75.

HUGHES: You probably weren't on the panel.

Q: No, but I know the question. It was one of a number that we do and of course we are just sitting back and relaxing to see how you handle it. I think part of it was how mature is somebody at that particular stage and you were how old at that point?

HUGHES: 21.

Q: I think probably the feeling was "go grow up".

HUGHES: In any case, I had to figure out what to do and it was probably a good decision. I have to say in 20-20 hindsight that the best thing that ever happened to me was never entering the Foreign Service because nothing that then happened in my career would probably have occurred or would have even been possible, I think, had I entered the Foreign Service. What happened then was nothing quite like having to think. My parents also tended to think in the same linear way about careers that I did.

Q: I think it was part of the times too.

HUGHES: I came home and said that I had not passed the test. I had never not succeeded at anything before. I graduated first in my university class, did quite well at Fletcher. I got some scholarship money along the way and stuff. My parents were disappointed. I think that's probably the only time my parents were ever disappointed in me. And confused, like now what are you going to do. I began to think. There are lots of other ways to pursue international and national security oriented careers than through the Foreign Service. There is the Defense Department, the CIA, and so forth. I began the process of applying

for other jobs. I applied to the Agency, and to the Defense Department through one of my professors. He got me connected up somehow with Air Force Intelligence so I applied there. These were places to which young people like me went straight out of school. I also applied to the Congressional Research Service. I got an offer from the Agency and I got an offer from Air Force Intelligence and I had some promising contacts at the Congressional Research Service that might develop into something eventually.

Somewhere along the line I ran into a classmate of mine, actually she might have been a year behind me; I don't actually recall. A young girl who suffered a tragic fate with an illness that she is now afflicted with. As I remember, I ran into her in a bank I think here in Washington but maybe it was in Medford. I asked what she was doing and she said "I've just signed on at a new place, the Congressional Budget Office [CBO] and we're hiring some people. If you don't have a place you might want to apply." I asked her to tell me a little more and she did.

I applied to work at the Congressional Budget Office in the national security and international affairs division. It was just organizing, with Alice Rivlin being named the first director. They had just moved their offices from the old Senate Arms Hotel, where they were housed, over to House Annex I, the old FBI records building. I got an interview right away and I went in to interview with the new director of that division, a young economist that had come out from Rand named John Coller and his deputy, Robin Peary. Lo and behold, I was hired as an assistant analyst to work on nuclear weapons programs!

Great, I've got my first job in Washington. My wife and I married almost immediately thereafter and we moved to a little apartment on Capitol Hill. For the next two years I was at CBO as a national security analyst. I was writing papers and it was the greatest first job I could imagine in Washington. I've counseled innumerable young people after my own experience: if you're looking for your first job in Washington, you want to go into public service and so forth, try to find something with the characteristics of that job at CBO because it was just terrific.

I had almost unlimited foraging rights in the Executive Branch and with Congress to go, if you would, investigate. To go interview people, learn about things. I had access to at least certain levels of classified documentation for studies we were doing. I got to research and write in my own name under a Government Printing Office sort of label. I got a fair amount of public visibility out of it with a few press articles about things that I had written, and I was on my way to becoming a minor expert in the area of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

When the Carter administration took office, they confronted the Euro-missiles dilemma: what to do about the SS20s that the Soviets were deploying in the western Soviet Union. They also faced some decisions about things like the neutron bomb. Lynn Davis, who is now the Department's Undersecretary for International Affairs, was the deputy assistant secretary for policy plans and NSC affairs at the Defense Department. Lynn convened a group of outside experts to gather advice about this. As a 23 or 24 year old analyst at

CBO I was one of the people that she called on to come over and hold forth at this day long conference. How is the Carter administration going to tackle these new policy problems in Europe? I was very complimented and very flattered. Lynn at a later stage offered me a position and I didn't take it.

I was at the CBO for two years. As I mentioned the Ford administration gave way to the Carter administration. The CBO is rather a Democrat-oriented organization. Alice was a Democrat and many people came from Brookings or places like that. Most of the people who were working around me were more or less sort of identified with the Democrat Party but really they weren't highly partisan people. They were more foreign affairs and national security professionals who just happened to be bright as hell and the kind of people that the Carter administration would want to attract into its ranks. So our division sort of split up. Several people went into the Carter administration. A few of us went back to school.

I went back to school because I was working in an office where three-fourths or more of the people were Ph.D.'s and I didn't have a Ph.D. I had gotten a place at Oxford before I left Fletcher to do my D.Phil. there, because I thought D.Phil. from Oxford, prestigious degree, distinguished, England. My parents hated the idea that I would be both away and that this would probably cost more money still. The person who hated it worst was Vicki, the woman whom I married. When I told her I was thinking about going to Oxford, we were then at Schoenbrunn Palace outside of Vienna one summer, she literally broke down and cried. I mean like, "When is this courtship ever going to end? Are you going to get serious or not?" I decided instead that, no, I'm not going to go to Oxford; I am going to get married. So that's when I left Fletcher, got married, took a job.

But then I decided that I really wanted to work for my Ph.D. I really wanted that Ph.D. I was not going to be a second class citizen at a place like CBO. But I can't go to Oxford now because I've got a wife. Now what do I do? Well what is the next best thing to Oxford? Harvard is the next best thing to Oxford, so I got a place at Harvard. I went back to the Kennedy School to do a doctorate. I did a year's course work, finished my doctoral work requirements and was lucky enough to win, under very curious circumstances, one of the research fellowships in national security studies at Brookings Institution. It was a dissertation fellowship program that they had. They gave me a chance to come to Brookings. In those days there were two or three really prestigious fellowships that people who were training in national security could win. One was a CFR fellowship but another was the Brookings, and I got a Brookings fellowship. I came to Brookings to work on my Ph.D., to write my dissertation. I spent the year writing my dissertation and writing a lot of other things too. I wrote for part of a Brookings book, I did some case studies for Harvard and so forth.

At the end of the year my fellowship was up and my dissertation wasn't finished and I wanted to go back to work. My whole approach to education had been to collect credentials quickly but get on with it, move on with working. I was determined I was not going to become one of these perennial students. I said fine, I will stitch my dissertation

together by nights and weekends but I am going back to work. The next thing I want to do after my Congressional Budget Office experiences, I want to collect some experience in the intelligence field. I had worked with a guy named Robin Peary who is now I believe Undersecretary of the Navy, who was our deputy director at CBO. He had come out of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon and he had a background in intelligence systems and intelligence collection.

Q: Before we go further, what was your dissertation on?

HUGHES: There was a fad I guess in public policy studies about studies in decision making, particularly on weapons programs. I got rather far along on it and published part of it actually in public policy Harvard's Journal. I was going to write a dissertation on decision making in the development of the F-16 combat aircraft. It was a program where there was an effort to make the Air Force and the Navy use the same plane and there was an effort to get all of our allies to use the same plane as the Air Force. There was a question of what roles and missions the Air Force plane would have. Was it just going to be a cheap, simple, lightweight fighter that we would crank off the line in large numbers or was it going to be a much more complex multi-mission aircraft? Lots of interesting things to explore in this decision and lots of politics involved in which aircraft were chosen. It was a fascinating subject for study and I kind of like that thing. Anyway, that is what I was going to write about and I did manage to publish part of it and I never finished it. If I go back to do my dissertation, it will be on a totally different topic.

I worked with Robin Peary and Robin had this background in intelligence collection and things. When I would come to him and we would have discussions about nuclear weapons related issues, he always had insights and knowledge and there was always sort of something that I didn't know and that he did know that made all the difference in the world in how the results of the analysis came out. I wanted to know more about how he knew that because I thought it made him so much better an analyst than me. I wanted to get some experience in intelligence management. Where was I going to get this? Well there were only two places that I could find: the intelligence community staff, if you know what that is?

Q: No, I don't.

HUGHES: In those days when Stan Turner was Carter's DCI, he beefed up the intelligence community staff. At one stage it was just sort of a coordinating and communications mechanism between the director of central intelligence and the operating intelligence agencies: DIA, CIA, NSA, what we can now publicly say is the NRO and so forth. In Stan Turner's time, he wanted to centralize management of intelligence resources much more and so he created within the intelligence community staff a resource management staff and a collection management staff I think they called it. Resource management was to pull together a consolidated intelligence community budget and really make tradeoff decisions among agencies and systems on a community wide basis. The collection management side was supposed to do collection management somehow

better: tasking and collecting of information and consumer satisfaction and all of that.

In any case, it turned out that my boss from CBO had become the deputy DCI for resource management so I applied to him logically. But I also learned again from another friend from CBO in a conversation on a subway train that there was a guy at the Pentagon named Admiral Dan Murphy whose responsibilities for Harold Brown in the Carter administration were somewhat similar. Harold Brown was the Secretary of Defense at the time. Murphy's responsibilities for Harold Brown were somewhat similar to John Coller's responsibilities for the DCI, for Stan Turner. I also applied to Dan Murphy's shop and I applied to some other places as well. Lo and behold, I got offers from both places, the intelligence community staff and what was the then called the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Review, a nice euphemism for the intelligence policy staff at the Pentagon. Murphy's offer was for a lot more money and a higher position, so I took it.

Initially I didn't get to work on intelligence matters in Murphy's organization but after about two months there was a reorganization and I did. I ended up doing exactly what I wanted to. That went along for about 12 or 15 months and then Admiral Murphy, abruptly, about a week after the election of President Reagan, convened a staff meeting. It was a very brief staff meeting in which he said "I've been asked to become George Bush's chief of staff and I'm leaving. Good-bye. It's been nice knowing you."

I was in a very awkward position. First, I had stayed with Murphy through the reorganization some months earlier. During the reorganization he called me in and said, "You can either go with this office that is being detached from me or you can stay with me in which case I will put you in the intelligence office where you wanted to be originally." I said, "I came here to work for you," a very gutsy thing to say, it happened to be true, "and so I'll stick with you." He gave me the opportunity that I wanted in the intelligence office. Wonderful. Well now where was I going to go because he was leaving and what was my future in this thing? I was a fledgling civil servant adrift in a Carter administration Pentagon with the Carter administration voted out of office and the Republicans coming in, and not knowing what was going to happen. Although I was Republican sympathetic and somewhat privately Republican identified, I wasn't a campaign activist or anything. The Hatch Act was in force and so forth. What was this going to mean for me?

I went immediately to Murphy's office to see his deputy, who had really been responsible for bringing me on board, and said "now what?" While I was waiting to go in, Murphy beckoned me to his office with his finger down this long corridor. I went down to see him. I didn't know what he wanted. He shut the door behind me and said, "How would you like to go to the White House?" I was absolutely thunderstruck because I was the most junior guy on the staff. I was the least deserving guy because the junior guy always does the ash and trash projects. I said, "of course". He said, "I don't know what your politics are" -- it turns out they were Republican -- "well, it doesn't matter to me. In any case I am going to need some people over there who are my people and I would like to

know if you'd like to come. I will be in touch."

I didn't hear anything for the next three or four months. The inauguration came and went. I was crestfallen. I had been in some fleeting contact with him and done a couple of things for him. Finally I gave up and I said I'm not going to the White House. I've got to figure out what I'm going to do next because I'm either going to stay here or move to another job or something, but I've got to have a plan. He calls on a Thursday afternoon and says "Will you come over to the White House?" I almost jumped out of my skin. I went over for my interview and I was to start the next Monday, three days later. I finished up a study that I was doing and I went to the White House and became -- with some little changes of title along the way but basically -- George Bush's deputy foreign policy advisor for the next four-and-a-half years.

Q: He was the Vice President at the time?

HUGHES: He was the Vice President and Dan Murphy was his chief of staff. I'll stop talking now and let you ask some questions about all this.

Q: I would like to catch the atmospherics. When you arrived you were in the White House doing this job from when to when?

HUGHES: From January/February 1981 until September 1985.

Q: What was the role of the Vice President as you saw it from your perspective? Where did he fit in particularly in the foreign affairs field?

HUGHES: In the beginning of the administration President Reagan had brought on Al Haig to be the Secretary of State. Even as a young staff member who didn't have access to the president's daily briefing or his daily national security meeting or things like that, but just watching what Dan Murphy did, hearing the conversations that went on in his office and phone conversations with the West Wing of the White House and so forth, it was plain to me that there was a lot of mistrust among the Reagan insiders on the White House staff. Maybe Jim Baker, maybe Mike Deaver, maybe Ed Meese, the Reagan boys. It was a triumvirate at the top of Meese, Baker, Deaver with Baker as chief of staff, Meese as Counselor to the President and initially the overseer of the National Security Council staff though that didn't work out, and Deaver as Deputy Chief of Staff and sort of chief image manager for the president. There was great mistrust of Al Haig, great mistrust of the institutional State Department and great mistrust of the foreign affairs establishment, if you would, of the government.

It was plain to me in the early days of the Reagan administration that the State Department were regarded as not red-blooded patriotic Americans who really stood up strongly and assertively for our country's interests, who really stood up strongly and assertively in the face of menaces and threats from Russia or Russian surrogates, whatever. They were suspect and Al Haig was suspect for different reasons. Not that he

wasn't a full red-blooded American but that he either wasn't a team player or he wasn't a player on Reagan's team or he was too egotistical and too uncontrolled for his own, or the nation's, or the administration's good. In any case there was a desire to, I don't know exactly the right word, but to box Al Haig I guess and that George Bush as Vice President was supposed to play a role in that.

It was never plain to me how much of this was Mr. Bush's own personal doing and how much of it was simply people in the West Wing around Reagan saying "How can we keep this from being Al Haig's responsibility? Let's give it to the Vice President." Nobody can complain about that because he is the Vice President and besides he has all this foreign affairs experience and so forth. It was plain to me that George Bush as a Vice President was going to be the most loyal, the most thorough going team player Vice President that you could get. But at the same time because of who he was and what his background was and his extensive foreign affairs experience, that he was going to be interested in finding somehow a role that President Reagan would be comfortable with that wouldn't upstage or trample on the President's prerogatives. It would be a role in which he could complement Reagan and make a contribution to the administration in the foreign affairs field, but delicately, not trying to upstage the Secretary of State, not trying to trample other departments of government, not trying to upstage the President but to play a useful role. Clearly this would be something that Bush would be thinking about.

In the early days of the Reagan administration the whole issue of how the crisis management structure of the White House should be set up was a topic. I don't know if it was in response to a proposal from the State Department. I should say by the way that in the initial days of organizing the Reagan administration, I believe that Secretary Haig generated a lot of suspicion and maybe hostility at the White House from the way he went about staffing the State Department. Clearly he was a Washington operator and an insider who really knew how the game was played.

Q: He had been with the NSC and worked at the White House.

HUGHES: He had been Chief of Staff for Ford.

Q: He and Kissinger had sort of presided over the last days of Nixon and the whole Ford administration.

HUGHES: And so he clearly knew how the game was played or considered that he did. In the very beginning of the Reagan administration, once Haig was named as Secretary of State, I have no idea how that came about, he moved out faster than any other cabinet officer who had been named to announce his lineup of subordinates at the State Department. It was apparent even to somebody who read the newspaper that his strategy was to get his team on the field faster than everybody else and make up as much yardage as possible, to use a football metaphor, before the other teams could even get organized. He described himself as the vicar of foreign policy for the Reagan administration, making a lot of people wonder what it meant to be a vicar of foreign policy.

I think all of this excited a certain reaction inside the Reagan loyalists who came with Reagan from California. In that process George Bush could be very useful.

When the issue of setting up the crisis management structure in the White House came up, there was a discussion (I happened to be around for part of it in Dan Murphy's office as Chief of Staff) when the West Wing of the White House called to ask if Mr. Bush would be willing if in the structure of the National Security Council [NSC], a subcommittee under the NSC was set up called the Special Situation Group [SSG]which would be the crisis management group that would be presided over by the Vice President which would make recommendations to the President on what to do in certain crises so the President himself wouldn't have to chair the NSC to actually thrash out different opinions and so forth. People might speak perhaps more freely before the Vice President than they would before Reagan himself and then they could recommend to the president via the Vice President rather than the Secretary of State. The SSG was to try to find a way to perhaps compensate for what some people thought of as Mr. Reagan's limitations as a chair of a crisis management NSC session, and maybe account for what were already perceived as some of the limitations of his initial National Security Council staff and particularly Dick Allen and Ed Meese, who were regarded as unable to move paper and unable to reach decisions and unable to get things done, and certainly though to box out Al Haig, to make sure Al Haig was not running the show on major foreign policy crises.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been a natural affinity between Al Haig and Vice President Bush in how they looked at the world. Bush had been head of our liaison mission in Peking, had been a director of CIA and had been around. Haig had also been around whereas the people you mentioned, Ronald Reagan, Baker, Meese, and Deaver were really sort of the typical things that come with an awful lot of presidents, including Carter and all. They were boys from the home state coming in and were suspicious of the foreign affairs establishment which is usually dealing with the crisis. The situations don't change from administration to administration but a new administration seems to feel this. I would have thought that Bush was an old hand at this, Haig was an old hand at this and almost that he would be considered by the Deavers and company to be in the enemy camp.

HUGHES: I think there was in the initial days in the Reagan administration a certain suspicion of Bush and of the people who were around Bush as not being really conservative and not being really with the Reagan agenda. I mean after all the "voodoo economics" slogan from Bush's primary campaign still rang in people's ears, referring to Reagan's economic policies. After all Reagan had done a very brave thing in bringing his primary opponent in as Vice President and a representative of what you might call the more establishment or east coast or Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party. That even spilled over sometimes to us members of the staff. I remember once being introduced to a very conservative member of the presidential personnel staff by another good friend of mine who happened to be on the presidential personnel staff at the time. The information was of the form "he works for Bush but he is very hard core conservative" because that is

what it took to establish your bona fides.

Q: Did you find yourself having to almost, it's probably the wrong word, but almost to posture a bit in order to maintain your credentials: I'm tougher than you are?

HUGHES: No, not really. I don't think so. I think that the people in the White House figured out quickly who [inaudible]. It was once you got in there and we were all pitching together on a whole range of policy issues for the next five years inside that Old Executive Office Building, the National Security Council staffers from Dick Pipes and Paula Dobriansky to Norm Bailey, a whole bunch of people who were very identified with Reagan policies, as I'd like to think I was identified with Reagan policies, we all figured out who was playing on the same team. If there were people who were thought of as not really being with the program so to speak, people figured out who they were, too, and then you sort of worked around them or you didn't collaborate very closely with them or whatever.

In any case to go back about Bush and Haig, I don't remember ever being in the same room with the two men, to be honest, at the same time. After all, Haig was only Secretary of State for about 18 months or less. What I do recall is that Mr. Bush had a sort of delicate problem because in his conception of government and his conception of the role of the Vice President, he had a very, very complicated game to play so to speak. His conception of the role of the Vice President was it was to be a loyal deputy and do whatever the President wanted and whatever would help the political fortunes best of the ticket once he was Vice President. His conception of his institutional role was that it was a role that had lots of potential but only to the extent that he could carve a space and carry out a role without trampling, as I mentioned, on the other cabinet departments and secretaries and their proper responsibilities.

He had a third problem in that there were those in the Reagan administration, but probably not Mr. Reagan himself or his wife I suppose, but certainly advisors who must have wondered, especially with Jim Baker, who had been after all Bush's campaign manager, becoming Reagan's Chief of Staff: was Bush going to try and to take over this presidency? Was he to somehow play a super role in the presidency? He had to establish that he wasn't a figure of suspicion and that he also was with the program, he was with Reagan, not publicly espousing but secretly undermining Reagan's policy, but he was with Reagan. This is entirely speculation on my part, but I would say that even if he had been some kind of a foreign policy guru establishment of Al Haig, the last thing in the world that he could have afforded to do would have been to appear to be the ally of Al Haig, even if he thought Al Haig was completely judicious and completely even-tempered and completely balanced and completely sort of calm and deliberate in his reaction to all sorts of things.

Q: You're exaggerating because Al Haig was not...

HUGHES: He was the antithesis of all those things in his public image.

Q: Intemperate from time to time was not an inapt word.

HUGHES: Yes, and of course an early defining moment I think for Mr. Bush came in March, as I recall, of 1981 when the assassination attempt on President Reagan occurred and Mr. Bush was at that time traveling in Texas. Al Haig came to the White House and he convened a meeting of the NSC to go over the situation with Reagan's advisors. There was of course great public anxiety, and someone had to go up and make a press statement. Either Haig nominated himself or someone nominated him but in any event he walked into the press room breathless. I remember watching this on TV from my office. He walked into the press room breathless. He looked perfectly flushed and frazzled.

Q: He had a heart condition hadn't he at that time?

HUGHES: Possibly. I don't really know. I think that is right. He announced that the situation was normal and there was no cause for alarm. The Vice President had been notified and he was flying back from Texas and in the meantime Al Haig was in control at the White House. A particularly infelicitous choice of words which, I think, already in the minds of many Reagan supporters and staff, for Al Haig to come up and say that "I, Al Haig, am in control here at the White House," just convinced many people that, first of all he was intemperate and injudicious and not suited for the role, and further that he had vast ambitions of power in the administration which were not in keeping with the way that Reagan cabinet secretaries were expected to behave. So frankly then there were a whole bunch of battles after that and Mr. Haig passed from the scene.

Q: What was your role during this time? What were some of the things that you did?

HUGHES: The role of the Vice President's Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor is a hybrid role. It is a lot like the role that you might perform on a professional staff on Capitol Hill. Briefing your principal for his next meeting with a foreign dignitary, helping prepare his public remarks on a foreign policy topic, representing him at meetings or briefing him for meetings of the National Security Council or other cabinet level meetings that might pertain to foreign policy. In our office we had a National Security Advisor, myself, a couple of military aides, and then some enlisted personnel. We sort of divided up the world between us. I drew Europe and the Soviet Union, Latin America, and then bunches of other functional topics: the intelligence portfolio, the international economic and trade portfolio, human rights and international organizations oriented portfolios. I typically didn't work on Africa. I worked a little bit on Africa in the beginning. I typically didn't work at all on the Middle East and typically didn't work on Asia.

What was my job? Mr. Bush in those days was receiving sometimes as many as three or four foreign leaders a day visiting Washington. I had to brief him for most of those meetings. I had to prepare his briefing paper and his talking points. Liaise with the State Department or other agencies that had an interest in this meeting to make sure that points that they wished the Vice President would get across would be gotten across. I had to

minute the meetings in many cases. Just producing three or four briefings a day and doing the logistical coordination of the meetings, greeting the foreign visitors at the door, taking them to the Vice President's office and taking them back out again, that takes a lot of time. There is a lot of writing involved.

Why was he meeting so many foreign leaders? President Reagan's schedule was very tightly controlled and he did a very limited number of meetings a day. The emphasis was on quality versus quantity. Especially in the early years of the administration when governments all around the world wanted to get to know the new leadership in Washington in the White House, they were clamoring for President Reagan to meet with their visitors. He wouldn't do many of them. He only did those that were most important at the advice of his staff. Mr. Bush basically handled the overflow.

There is another perverse aspect of working for the Vice President, and in dealing with the State Department you get a fair dose of this, and that is he also ended up sometimes at the behest of the Department handling the overflow from the Secretary of State. That is, if the Transportation Secretary of Ghana is coming to the United States and he wants a meeting with the Secretary of State but the Secretary of State can't see him, the enterprising desk officer is likely as not to think, who could we get him to see? How about the Vice President? We ended up with all these sorts of odds and ends meetings that were recommended to Mr. Bush, many of which he did cheerfully until we got wise enough to ask questions like "is the Secretary of State seeing this person?" "Well no actually he is too busy." "Well, if he is too busy, then why do you think he merits the Vice President's time?"

Meetings of the National Security Council. Briefing the Vice President for those and keeping abreast, working closely with the National Security Council on what are the issues.

Q: I would like to grab one thing at a time. Visitors. Somebody is coming from Ghana or somewhere, what would you do and what would be the sort of the things, how would you get information?

HUGHES: It is pretty straightforward. You want me to describe how a visit is handled entirely for the Vice President?

Q: Yes.

HUGHES: For the Vice President, the idea of a visit might arise in several ways. A foreign government might request the visit through our embassy overseas or directly to the State Department through their embassy in Washington and then the State Department would contact the Vice President's office. Once they get comfortable with who are the new crew of people in the White House, officers will contact the Vice President's office directly by phone otherwise they will send over a formal request from the Executive Secretariat. It proposes a meeting between the Vice President and the Defense Minister of

Germany who is coming, that is a fairly common kind of thing. That is a way it might happen. Another way it might happen is that as the Vice President's office, once the administration settled in, develops wider and closer relationships with the embassy community in town, the German embassy might call directly and say the German Defense Minister is coming and can we arrange for him to meet the Vice President?

There are certain countries and certain officials that you know are so important that the Vice President is certainly going to meet with them if at all humanly possible. There are certain people that you may come to know over time that the Vice President doesn't particularly like and he is not going to meet with them in any case. You just have to find a diplomatic way of saying so. There are other people that are really marginal calls and then especially if the request doesn't come initially from the State Department, you may have to go through an elaborate consultation first about whether we are even going to recommend this to the Vice President. Mr. Bush wanted to approve all of his own appointments so the next thing was to make sure there was time on the calendar and send a memo to Mr. Bush urging him to meet with this person and explaining why. It was usually very short and he usually checked off on it in his night reading and sent it back to you saying set it up.

We would then set it up with the scheduling office and that involves determining which office we are going to use: the West Wing office, the Old Executive Office Building office, or sometimes, rarely but sometimes, his office in the Senate. Who is going to come with the foreign leader? Who is going to come from the State Department and the National Security Council? The State Department would then prepare a briefing paper on a schedule that we'd set up. There is a standard arrangement that we worked out with the secretariat. The briefing paper would come over in a specified format. We evolved the format over time so that it was more suitable for the Vice President. Then we would rework it into our own briefing paper basically for the Vice President. Oftentimes meetings would happen on such short notice that we wouldn't have time for the State Department to generate a briefing paper.

Once upon a time at the beginning of the administration when everybody was struggling to do a great job and to show off their staff expertise for the Vice President, Dick Allen decreed that the National Security Council should prepare a briefing paper for every Vice Presidential meeting and the State Department would prepare a briefing paper for every Vice Presidential meeting. Of course the Vice Presidential staff, not to be outdone, was going to prepare a briefing paper for every Vice Presidential meeting. The upshot of it was that Mr. Bush, for a 20 minute meeting with the transportation secretary of Ghana was going to get about eight or ten pages of written prose, much of which would repetitive. A State Department paper covered by a National Security Council paper, covered by a Vice Presidential office paper with all this supposed information in it. We got that all streamlined into something much more workable so eventually Mr. Bush pulled a set of talking points off the back of his briefing paper and he just went through the meeting with a few points. There was then participating in the meeting, minuting the meeting, and doing any follow-up from the meeting. So that's how a meeting happens.

As I say over time you learned some things. You learned who are really important to the Vice President or to the agenda that we are trying to evolve. The German Defense Minister comes to town at the height of the Euro-missiles crisis, there is no question that the Vice President is going to see him especially since the president will not see defense ministers for the most part. We have to make sure that the Vice President is primed in what to say. Usually that involved liaising with the State Department, liaising with the NSC and sometimes liaising with the intelligence community often over the phone, sometimes over the secure phone, to gathering information about what was currently hot with these countries. Although on the staff we are following the daily traffic and reading the NID [the National Intelligence Daily] and other daily intelligence publications, if you are covering Europe, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Latin America and Canada and all of those functional portfolios, nobody can be absolutely on top of every development in every country at the rate of three briefing papers a day, or three meetings a day, or two meetings a day, or one meeting a day. That is a big part of the job.

Another part of the job is briefing the Vice President for meetings with the National Security Council or other cabinet level meetings in which foreign policy related topics are going to be discussed. Once again there it is working closely with the NSC. You will have been participating probably in inter-agency deliberations representing the Vice President's office for weeks or months in advance of the NSC meeting, as options and issues and ideas and recommendations for the president are developed. From all of that participation you will sort of know where the bodies are buried, what agencies are taking what positions, what cabinet officers are probably going to argue what positions. You'll have a sense of what you think is the right thing to do. Both the right thing substantively and what comports with what you know to be the positions of the Vice President from things he has taken or said or done in the past.

You write him a briefing usually in close consultation with the NSC because in those days we were trying to make sure that the president and the Vice President were together in these meetings. Our briefing paper would cover the president's briefing paper for the NSC so the Vice President would see what the president was given by the National Security Advisor. On top of it would be a spin paper, if you would from us, from myself and my boss when I was involved in these briefings, to say this is how we think the meeting is going to unfold and this is what we think this cabinet secretary and that cabinet secretary are going to want to say. This is where we think the NSC staff wants this to come out, and this is what we think would be a good posture for you to take in this meeting. You might want to make these points or you might want to ask these questions or you might want to concentrate on these issues. And brief him for the meeting. Usually my boss would go along with him to the NSC meetings, or Dan Murphy, the Chief of Staff. Usually Dan Murphy would go with him to NSC meetings. Then we would learn about what happened and there might be some role for the Vice President in implementing the follow-up, i.e. if the NSC decides the Vice President needs to take a trip.

Preparing the Vice President for his visits abroad, Mr. Bush began traveling slowly and somewhat reluctantly. He didn't take his first trip abroad until as I recall June of 1981 when he went to meet Francois Mitterrand at Mitterrand's installation as President of France. He stopped in London on the way back, meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He didn't take another trip abroad until I think September of that year when he went to Mexico for the Mexican independence day celebration. Each time the Vice President traveled abroad, he need to be briefed for the travel. The travel needed to be arranged. The countries that he was to visit and the reasons for visiting, the agenda, the purposes of the trip and the expected accomplishments of the trip all had to be outlined and discussed. When those trips happened in my part of the world, that was part of my job.

Representing as I mentioned the Vice President's office in inter-agency deliberations was another important part of the job and having the opportunity to staff and support the Vice President for crisis management responsibilities. My most memorable experience in that regard was the Grenada rescue operation in 1983.

Q: This is tape two, side one with Philip Hughes.

HUGHES: As I was saying my most memorable crisis management experience was in the planning of the Grenada rescue operation in 1983 so that was another aspect of that.

Q: I want to come back to that but first I want to go back to these visits. It may be a small matter but I was wondering, were any visits, people calling on the Vice President, particularly notable either from a serious, humorous or annoying matter that sticks in your mind?

HUGHES: There were lots of visits that were memorable or humorous or annoying. I remember several visits where various funny things happened. On one occasion in the early '80s we had been trying very much to continue pursuing the policy of differentiation vis-à-vis Romania compared to the rest of the Eastern Bloc because of their more independent minded and intractable sort of policy with respect to the Soviet Union. You might say it was a way of wedge driving in the Eastern Bloc. Although we had our difference with the Ceausescu Government over certain human rights things and Mr. Bush had particularly crusaded for the release of certain families from Romania whose cases had been brought to his attention particularly after he visited Romania in 1983, we nevertheless did attempt with Romania's ambassadors in Washington and by meeting with Romanian officials, Vice Presidents and other people when they came to call in Washington, to maintain a very cordial set of relations with Romanians. I remember on one occasion where this was totally thwarted. A Romanian ambassador was brought to see Mr. Bush as a courtesy introductory call soon after coming to Washington and presenting his credentials. The ambassador's job of course was to maintain good relations with the United States and he proceeded to get into a fight with Mr. Bush over some issue of how policy was being handled in Romania.

I remember a Hungarian ambassador who did the same thing. The outgoing Hungarian ambassador had been regarded as just sort of sweetness and light, a fine representative of his country even though it was then under Soviet domination. His successor was brought to the White House and there was every hope that he would strike off a good relationship with the Vice President. Once again the Hungarian ambassador took on a very pugilistic approach with the Vice President and they ended up getting their relationship off on rather a sour note.

The Vice President had, I remember, a discussion with Helmut Schmidt in his OEOB office once Schmidt had ceased being chancellor. It was one of the most far ranging and visionary discussions between two statesmen about the panorama of the world that I can recall. Just sort of a wonderfully visionary discussion.

Some of the Vice President's meetings that for me were the most memorable in terms of the witticism that came out of them actually were meetings that he had overseas rather than in his Washington office. I remember once he was meeting with Franz Joseph Strauss in Bonn in connection with a trip he made there in '83 or '85, I don't recall which one. It was at a time soon after Gorbachev had taken power so we can date it. Mr. Bush was asking Franz Joseph Strauss's views about Gorbachev and whether Gorbachev could be successful in achieving reform of the Soviet system. Strauss said to Bush that reforming the Soviet system was like trying to make roasted snowballs. There were a number of other funny meetings like that. We can go over more of them. They will come back to me as we talk along I am sure.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point. I would like to put at the end that you were talking about maybe there were some other incidents of meetings, overseas travel and all. We can talk about the role of the Vice President as you saw it and what you were doing on Vice President Bush's overseas travel. Also I wonder if you could comment on the fact that more than most, George Bush seemed to be collecting names of people that he could call on in the international field which he certainly did in spades during the Gulf War crisis when he was president. Was there a sort of plan or was he building up a repertoire there? Also some comments again from your perspective, did you see particularly after George Shultz came in, the clash between George Shultz and Casper Weinberger? Did the Vice President play any role in trying to keep these two people, who apparently couldn't stand each other, apart? And then more about Ronald Reagan and the field of foreign affairs and various people on the NSC. Again, all of this from your perspective and any things from the White House. Of course we will come to Ollie North and that whole thing too. Whatever you can talk about and then we will keep going from there.

Today is the 28th of January 1997. You heard that list of things. Let me ask first about Bush and collecting names. Were you involved in this?

HUGHES: To the extent that I was right in the middle of Bush's foreign policy operation, yes. But I think that it would be not quite the right view to think of what the Vice President did during his time in the foreign affairs field as just amassing Rolodex. That

was sort of a byproduct of the other things that Bush was doing in his foreign policy role as Vice President. As I was reflecting on the last story that I was telling you about, sort of funny episodes from the Vice President's travels, it reminded me that Bush was in contrast to some Vice Presidents whom, the legend was anyway, the President stuck on a plane and just kept them flying. This was something supposedly that was a famous pitfall of Vice President Agnew, that he was sort of put on a plane and kept flying. Mr. Bush traveled a great deal but the overwhelming majority, I think, of Mr. Bush's foreign travels had behind them some central mission that he was on for the administration. Sometimes that mission was the initiative of the President, or the President's staff. Sometimes the idea was Bush's own idea and sometimes it was an idea that his staff, I or my colleagues, got up with others in the administration.

When I think back over those travels, there are certain trips that are sort of hallmarks for me. Things Mr. Bush was doing to carry water for the administration on foreign policy and in the course of doing those, he interacted with a lot of people, he formed personal friendships. He introduced into his travels and also into the visits of foreign dignitaries to the United States, a special personal touch and I think part of that was his own personal graciousness. Part of it was going the extra mile to invest in personal capital that would pay off for the United States in our dealings with a country, with these leaders over the long haul and part of it was probably also cultivating relationships that, if he became President, would serve him in good stead.

Q: You are quite right to mention this. It is not a Rolodex of gathering names but more than almost anyone I can think of, he seemed to both go out and make the contacts and obviously get the name, but I mean make the contacts which he was able to pull in as President which was a very important element.

HUGHES: I think there is another element of Bush's style that is probably important to bear in mind and that was his penchant for doing special personal things for visitors. Later on in the vice presidency, particularly in the second term of President Reagan and then this carried over into Mr. Bush's presidency, he took to the idea of extending personal invitations to leaders with whom he felt special friendship to visit him in Kennebunkport at his family home. I can't remember offhand the names of all the leaders that he invited to do this. After he became president he invited President Mitterrand of France for example up to Kennebunkport, I recall. Every one of the those evolutions in Kennebunkport was an investment in relationship building and personal capital building that would pay off later.

Q: Let's talk about some of the trips that you were involved with because I also want to keep it from your perspective of how you saw this, what some of these particular trips were doing?

HUGHES: In 1982 we had a major challenge in Europe to keep the allies together in support of INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) missile deployment in order to be able, we felt, to bring the Soviets to the INF negotiating table and to get an INF control or

reduction agreement. Mr. Bush undertook a mission in 1983 to visit all the capitals of countries that would be key to INF deployment and other capitals that would be important, like Paris, to persuade the allies to back the administration's position on INF deployment, to go forward with INF deployment, so that we could credibly represent that NATO was not going to be deterred by the Soviets from deploying intermediate range nuclear forces to counter the Soviet SS-20s. And the only way that Russia would be able to deal with this would be to come to the bargaining table. He made that trip, he made that case, and it was quite successful.

His very first trip was to welcome President Mitterrand to the family if you would of western leaders. The first socialist president of France in the post-war period who had a couple of communists in his first cabinet, something that was very worrying to the allies. Mr. Bush went to reach out to Mitterrand and there began a long and close relationship between Mitterrand and Bush, and the Reagan-Bush administrations and France. On that same trip he visited Margaret Thatcher in England as well, our closest friend in Europe.

Mr. Bush made a pair of visits to Geneva as I recall in 1984 and again in 1985. In 1984 laying down the U.S. position on a Chemical Weapons Treaty before the United Nations Disarmament Committee. A very controversial position which called for any place, any time inspections as the centerpiece of the verification provisions of the treaty. A provision that some people thought was a sort of killer amendment and that other people thought was frankly necessary in order to be able to have any assurance of verifying something where you are dealing with essentially chemical compounds that could be put anywhere. Weapons that could be small enough and have low enough signatures that they could be put or hidden anywhere. The difficulty with verifying this sort of thing is pointed later in Iraq.

The next year in 1985 he went back and laid down the text of the treaty. First the position, then he presented our draft treaty. This was at a time when he had been in the position of having twice cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate on binary chemical weapons production in the U.S. -- something he joked publicly that his mother called him about and sort of gave him a "shame on you" for. I am not sure what his personal commitment to chemical weapons arms control was, as a sort of deep seated personal belief, but clearly it helped balance, if you would, his image on this issue to be the administration's most visible spokesman on chemical weapons arms control in Geneva in those two outings.

Q: I want to come back because this is focusing on you. What were you doing and what were some of the pressures when say Bush would go out and take a trip? You had a rather peculiar White House at that time, I am talking about the staff and lots of jealousies, lots of stuff going on. What were the pressures on you and all?

HUGHES: Let me just mention one other trip that I would like to mention, then I'll go back to your question. That trip was the Vice President's trip to Central America in 1983 as I recall in which the central mission was the trip to El Salvador. The central mission was to lay down the law to commandants of the Salvadorian military that death squad

activity had to stop or we wouldn't be able to sustain aid to the Salvadorans and the whole effort would collapse. He went and made that case to the Salvadorian military commanders and there were subsequently important changes in command, important reform, death squad activities substantially did stop. We were able to not only continue assistance to Salvador but began a lethal aid program to the Contras partly as a result of that.

What was I doing in the midst of all of this? Each of his trips I was involved in preparing and on some of them I accompanied the Vice President. In preparing each trip, each was slightly different. Let's take the case of the Vice President's trip in support of INF deployment in 1983. We recognized that we had a problem on our hands in Europe. Not just a publicity problem but a policy problem in which the commitment, the backbone of our European allies was being tested and where we needed to do something but what something wasn't entirely clear. I think that the idea of the trip emerged from an initiative of the staff, either myself or in consultation with the Vice President and my boss, that perhaps it would be a good idea for the Vice President to visit a number of capitals in Europe. It might even have been suggested by the President's National Security Advisor at the time, probably Bill Clark, to the Vice President and it may have filtered back to us that way.

But in any case, I'm trying to remember the rough timing of the trip, I believe it was early 1983. We were clearly preparing in late 1982 for this visit or thinking about the idea. The question came up, when should it happen? There was as I recall an election or a set of election events in Germany that some people were sensitive to and felt that the Vice President should go later. I don't remember the exact event but there was a politically sensitive event in Germany and it appeared the Vice President should go later. This was, I think, the view of the State Department. There was a different view on the NSC from Bill Clark and an officer that I worked with at the time a great deal, the number two guy on the European account, Dennis Blair, who was working then under Dick Pipes, the senior director for European and Soviet Affairs - he was really a Soviet specialist. Dennis and I were consulting about this and it was very much Dennis's view, and I very much concurred, that we should not wait to do something to shore up the support of our allies for INF deployment. There were many pressures and stresses on them. The Russians were being very energetic in trying to bully the allies into, in a salami slice fashion, one-by-one, dropping out of their commitment to deploy especially since the German commitment to deploy -- had been made contingent on a couple of other countries, including Benelux countries, committing to deploy.

We felt that the Vice President should travel earlier; so Dennis with the connivance or the cooperation of Judge Clark sent a back channel message to then Chancellor Kohl's National Security Advisor who I believe was Wolfgang Schaeuble. It was 13 years ago so I am a little bit hazy but I think it was Wolfgang Schaeuble. Clark sent this message to Schaeuble asking how would the chancellor feel about a Vice Presidential visit earlier rather than later in 1983? We got back from the Germans that there would be no problem going forward. So we informed the State Department, and did go forward with planning

the trip.

What did the planning involve? It involved first of all selecting what capitals the Vice President would visit. It was pretty obvious that it had to be the main deployment capitals of NATO: Germany, Britain, France because of France's overall importance in NATO, and Brussels and The Hague because they were the two Benelux countries in this mix. I am trying to recall whether it was on that occasion or on a later occasion that the Vice President visited Luxembourg. I think we did not visit Luxembourg on that occasion. In any case that was the trip that was got up and the Vice President made those visits and managed to keep the allies together. We selected the capitals.

Of course in every case there is a pre-advance visit which goes out and I did all of them in my areas of the world that I was responsible for. These involved basically going with some advance people to do essential advance things. On the substantive side I basically went over what would be the agenda for discussion and set some limits on what we would do in the way of events and what sequence of events we would accomplish to try to project the image or project the agenda or mission that the Vice President was on. When should a press availability take place? What should be the ground rules? Do we want to have joint press events? Those sorts of things were things that I and the press folks would work on. Usually that mapped out pretty much what the Vice President was going to do, I don't recall there being a great deal of pulling and hauling over the substance of the trip.

From there on it was a matter of putting together the Vice President's briefing. Usually there were a series of oral briefings that were given to the Vice President beforehand and I would orchestrate those -- what would be the topics, who would be the briefers. You think there would be a lot of controversy or a lot of pulling and hauling over who got in to brief the Vice President but I don't remember receiving many appeals that these people are getting in and we also want to brief the Vice President. As I say, beforehand there was usually a series of pre-trip briefings and I don't remember anyone really second guessing or appealing the lineup of briefers. And then there was preparing the Vice President's briefing package which meant all of his substantive remarks, his talking points for meetings, a trip book with background material on every issue that he could read along the way and then either sending him off, if I wasn't going on the trip, or going with him on the trip and then doing a bunch of support things along the way. That gives you a sense of what that was like.

For the two outings on the Chemical Weapons Treaty in Geneva, there was an important policy issue at stake. What was going to be the U.S. position on verification? What was the Vice President going to say and eventually what was the treaty going to contain? Leading up to that there were a series of inter-agency meetings, some of them formal, some of them informal get-togethers up in the NSC staff offices on the third floor of OEOB, one floor above mine. I participated in those for the Vice President's office and in those kinds of meetings the approach I think that I took to performing my role was to try to figure out where the administration's center of gravity was on these issues. What was likely going to emerge because you had a very conservative White House with quite a

number of people who were politically and ideologically identified with Ronald Reagan in the White House, both with the senior staff and in the ranks of the NSC, often standing off against federal bureaucracies. I mean, that is, permanent government staff with career civil servants or career public servants in them. That was usually the cleavage I found between where does the permanent bureaucracy stand and where do people in the White House want to go. I was trying to figure out what's the center of gravity here -- both what are the equities at stake, and which positions seem to have the most merit and also the most chance of winning. There is an element of advising the Vice President on what we think is right or what might you think is the right position and what's safe for you. What is safe for you, where should you be? Should you take sides or is it safer to stand aside until the dust clears?

Q: Did you have the feeling that you were both trying to carry out obviously the President's policy but protect your principal, being the Vice President, against the inevitable jealousies, egos of others in the White House?

HUGHES: Yes, and also to protect him sometimes from what might be positions of the administration. I remember on another matter, it was a speech that the Vice President was supposed to give, some remarks that he was supposed to give on the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. This was actually later on in 1985 but it speaks to the point that you were just raising. In collaboration with the NSC, the Vice President's speech writers (and I had some role in this) had to come up with a draft set of remarks for the Vice President to make on SDI. These remarks echoed what the president and others in the administration said about building a defense system that would stop Soviet missiles from an attack on the United States. Our Chief of Staff then, himself a retired admiral, read these remarks. I remember, I was standing in the Vice President's outer office in the West Wing and we were waiting to go in to see the Vice President. He was reading these remarks, again echoing the standard line of the administration. He turned to me and said, we can't have the Vice President say this. It is fine if Ronald Reagan says this. Everybody knows that he doesn't know what he is talking about, but people assume George Bush knows what he is talking about so he can't say this.

Q: This is the thing that I find absolutely amazing about the Reagan administration in that in a way the President was deniable but the other people around him weren't. He would set the course but then sort of the staff would kind of take over from there and then all of a sudden you had all the various elements playing on more in the staff side than really on the President. Maybe this is unfair.

HUGHES: No. I don't think it is unfair but I think it's actually maybe not a bad way to run the railroad. The President set the general course; he left it to the staff to work out the details. Sometimes the staff disagreed sharply about the details. Sometimes the details they disagreed about were fundamental to whether you could achieve the stated course or not. Sometimes I think those who didn't like the destination we were headed for came up with essentially detailed procedural kind of disagreements that were really disguised disagreements about fundamentals. The President was sort of left above the detailed fray,

but he was there to adjudicate the differences and if necessary say "look, I said I wanted to do this. We are not achieving that so let's do this."

Back to your question, were we there to protect the Vice President from cabinet battles and so forth? Yes, you are always there to protect your principal but sometimes you are looking at what is the substance of policy that he is going to be associated with and you are not making administration policy. To some extent you are in a position to say, well, if we put it that way or if we go quite that far, this may be difficult for the Vice President to do. But in that sense it constrains a little bit more what the people around the President might be willing to do but it doesn't drive them. Then you try to figure out what is safe for your principal.

I remember another instance where two senior officials, an Undersecretary of the Treasury and an Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs came over to see my boss. They came up with this great idea that the Vice President should go to one of the UNCTAD meetings in Yugoslavia; it was a pledging conference. They came up with this brilliant idea that the Vice President should go to this UNCTAD meeting and he should present the U.S. position because it would mean so much to the UN to have an official of his level. It would make such an important statement for an official of his level to go to UNCTAD about our seriousness and our commitment and our devotion to the underdeveloped world and so forth. My boss -- I don't mean to be critical of him -- but he rather naively took this all in and seemed to be thinking more about another trip and how Mr. Bush would like that.

Q: Your boss being the admiral?

HUGHES: No, my boss was Don Gregg, Bush's National Security Advisor. So he seemed to be receptive to this. For my part I saw it as nothing but a can of worms because it was plain that we were not going to be coming up with any meaningful financial pledge for UNCTAD and many in the administration had serious problems with both UNCTAD and UN organs in general as reliable vehicles for American foreign policy interests. I was right away calculating as I heard about this, well if this is so important, why aren't these senior officials who are going to talk to us about this also going? Perhaps they know that something unpleasant is going to happen and they are not eager to be there to watch. Should the Vice President be eager to be there to watch and be on the receiving end of blasts from the third world about the U.S. parsimoniousness and stinginess and so forth?

Anyway the key thing was, from my point of view, to see if these gentlemen's approach really represented an inter-agency viewpoint or were they basically just fishing for some high level official to get out there to take the flag so the Secretary of State wouldn't have to go or they wouldn't themselves have to go. I made a quick call to Rick Burt, who was then the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and said this has been proposed to the Vice President, what do you think about this? I knew perfectly well what he thought about it. The idea was shot down in flames within about 48 hours and that was protecting your boss. How to keep something that was just going to embarrass him

publicly from embarrassing him publicly. To keep him from blundering into that. So yes, we were sometimes protecting our boss, but I don't remember protecting Mr. Bush so much from inter-agency battles as I remember protecting him from bad ideas, just dumb ideas that would not enhance his image or his substantive role in the foreign policy process. Ideas that would not advance administration policy, and that would get him associated with things that he might later live to regret in his political life. Those were the things I remember trying to be a bit protective about.

Q: How about on a trip, what sort of things did you find yourself doing? Were there any particular problems on any trip?

HUGHES: No. Actually there was a funny episode that happened with respect to Ollie North that I can tell you about, but on a trip it is pretty cut and dry. The first thing is don't miss the airplane when it takes off from Andrews Air Force Base. Everybody needs to be aboard. On the flight over to wherever the destination is, at some point typically Mr. Bush would have his briefing in his sort of the onboard air force office. The planes we dubbed Air Force II in those days, 970971 to 72 were the tail numbers. Old presidential aircraft that had been retired to the Vice Presidential and other dignitary fleet. There was a central lounge with a sort of boomerang-shaped desk and a banquet and a central swivel chair for the Vice President. He would gather his press advisor, his chief of staff, his national security person, the NSC person who was along for the trip, the State Department person who was along for the trip. He always invariably took someone from the State Department and from the NSC. It was a very consciously coordinated inclusive sort of thing, and from other agencies when it was important to the purpose of the trip, maybe someone from Defense if that was important, maybe someone from the EPA if that was important. But anyway, those core people would be invited up and they would brief and discuss with the Vice President, but it wasn't so much in the form of a briefing. Sometimes it was a bit moderated by the chief of staff but it was more in the form of a roundtable discussion. Those would happen not only on the flight over but typically in between stops if we were flying on the airplane.

Once on the ground, basically you fit into a schedule that has been worked out by the advance team. It is what is called the line-by-line schedule and it controls every movement of the party. The Vice President may arrive and he might go straight to the ambassador's residence to be lodged and the rest of the staff go to the hotel. On the trip the duties of a foreign policy guy are pretty straight forward. You are to accompany the Vice President to his meetings. In the Vice President's office when I did this, I always took the notes. On other trips, I know sometimes my boss, the Vice President's National Security Advisor Don Gregg, or others left it to the State Department to take notes. If there was an embassy person who was permitted to be in the meeting, that person might be the note taker. I considered it though to be my job to take the notes so I took notes on each of the Vice President's meetings and did the memcons. I thought it was very important that the Vice President's staff have control over how the official records of those meetings were made and what they said or didn't say, again from the standpoint of not just the judgment of history but people riffling through the files in future years. Then I

typically did the minutes that day as soon as I had a free minute. I remember on one occasion in Brussels, I kept my secretary up until about 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. We just did all the memcons from that day that night. I'd do very voluminous ones, almost verbatim ones.

You would attend the Vice President's social functions. You would be called upon if a problem came up in the course of the trip, a question and a demand for something to be put on the schedule. Someone who has tried to pass the Vice President a message. A problem about a future stop that is upcoming where there is a hiccup in the schedule. You would be called upon to maybe sort it out. Sometimes we were working on multiple projects at once. I remember coming back from Ecuador on one occasion, we were preparing the text of a speech the Vice President would give in Baltimore about 48 hours after our return to try to put pressure on congress to achieve support for an MX missile appropriations vote. Once again the Vice President was called upon to articulate the administration's message and do it in a public place that would be a little bit away from Washington where we would be able to get some national press and do it in a very forward leaning, forthright way.

Q: Speaking of this, on the foreign affairs side, the Vice President has another job which is to be president of the Senate and there are foreign affairs votes and all. Did you get involved in that?

HUGHES: When it came to votes and vote counting in the Senate, the Vice President has a legislative affairs assistant. That person typically works and lives up on Capitol Hill. He or she were the people who were mainly responsible for the liaison with Congress.

The Vice President's national security affairs staff got involved in selected issues in this way. If the administration thinks a key vote or there was a key congressional consideration of some matter where the Vice President was going to be called upon to intervene with members, say make calls to members and try to persuade them to support the administration's position or oppose legislation the administration opposed, that would usually be deliberated between the NSC staff and sometimes most often the relevant agency. That agency might be the State Department, it might be the Defense Department or the CIA or the intelligence community. On occasion when the Vice President's help was needed, the pull that those agencies would use to approach the Vice President, the Vice President's national security staff, was we need the Vice President if he is willing to make calls to these members or to make representations to members. If the Vice President was needed to say stay up all night to provide the tie-breaking vote on binary chemical munitions production or some other issue like that, that would usually come to him through his legislative affairs office. But if on the other hand we faced key opposition to say a major intelligence collection program and the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] and his staff wanted to get the Vice President involved with key members to ask them to (again these things aren't publicly discussed it's all inside this select committee on intelligence or the House Permanent Select Committee on intelligence) support the program, then the approach would be made typically either from the DCI staff or from the

NSC's intelligence unit, to me or to my boss. We would work up a little briefing package and in coordination with the chief of staff or with the chief of staff's approval, run it in to the Vice President to see if he would be willing to do this. Similarly on a defense matter. I don't remember too many foreign affairs per se matters where this happened but I do remember some defense procurement items. I do remember some intelligence community concerns where the Vice President was brought in.

Q: Did you find yourself involved at all, or the Vice President, sort of between the Defense Department and the State Department? Relations weren't great between the two leaders.

HUGHES: I know that and you sort of heard the tensions between Shultz and Weinberger inside the administration and sometimes saw the effects of those tensions. I myself can't think of an instance where the Vice President was himself sort of torn between these two, or mediating between these two men. I think first of all in order to see those instances you probably have to be in the room with them when this occurred or you would have to be in the room privately with him immediately after some discussion in which Shultz and Weinberger may have sharply disagreed with each other before the president and Mr. Bush reflected on that after the fact. I don't remember, there may have been some episodes like that, but I don't remember them.

I don't believe that Mr. Bush would have sought to insert himself in the middle of that. It was not his style in the vice presidency to try and mediate inter-agency disputes much less to mediate inter-personal disputes between cabinet members. It was much more his style in my judgment to take the posture of you guys work it out and once we've got a policy that I am supposed to sell so to speak in the world abroad, then I will take it to the world abroad and sell it as long as it's something that I can sell. As long as it is something that is not either harmful to me personally or politically or intellectually, so unsaleable that I can't really do it.

When Shultz came to the State Department one of his first challenges was to unwind the frayed, the skein of terribly strained relationships between the U.S. and its European allies over the Soviet natural gas pipeline. I don't have a lot of detailed commentary on this to offer you but this was clearly a case where the Defense Department was strongly of the view that the pipeline needed to be stopped at all accounts.

Q: We're talking about a Soviet gas, natural gas pipeline?

HUGHES: The Buringori gas pipeline through Eastern Europe to Western Europe which would have made certain Western European countries importantly dependent for energy supplies on the East Bloc, at least that was the concern. The Reagan Administration had sought to use our export control laws and policies to block the construction of the pipeline including forbidding subsidiaries of American companies operating in Europe from participating in the pipeline project. This led European countries to essentially enact legislation or issue orders forbidding American subsidiaries operating in their territory

from complying with U.S. law, insisting their own sovereign law was governing.

Shultz arrived and he needed to sort this out. It's pretty plain that in doing so he faced major opposition from the Pentagon to just wind down the level of conflict and rhetoric and do away with the temporary denial orders that had been issued against U.S. companies. Try to get behind the campaign that certain firms had launched against the U.S. government, Dresser Industries was such a firm I remember. I am sure there was a clash with the Pentagon. From what I recall, it was my boss's, Don Gregg's view and I think therefore probably also Mr. Bush's view that we had gone too far in trying to, in a very muscular way, stop the Buringori pipeline almost unilaterally. I think it was an occasion on which probably in substance he sided with what Shultz was trying to do but I don't recall seeing any evidence of him therefore clashing with Weinberger or maneuvering in conjunction with Shultz to outflank Weinberger or anything of that sort. That is not really his style.

Q: Were you with the NSC part of the time?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: What were the dates?

HUGHES: From 1981 until toward the end of 1985 I was with the Vice President as his deputy foreign policy advisor. In the fall of 1985 until the spring of 1986, a rather short period, I went to the National Security Council staff as director for Latin America Affairs. Then from there I went to the State Department as deputy assistant secretary for Political Military Affairs, technology transfer and arms export control.

Q: Let's talk about the NSC and Latin American affairs. Where stood the Central American problem at that particular time?

HUGHES: We had been, as an administration, engaged for five years in a very contentious policy of opposing what we saw as the advance of communism by proxy battles I guess in several Central American countries. What were we trying to do? We were trying first of all to directly aid the Salvadoran government in its battle to keep the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, the FMLN, from toppling the government through revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside and installing what we presumed to be a Marxist government of some sort. At the same time we were trying to work with that government to both democratize with free open elections, get beyond interim governments and to an elected government. By the time we are talking, 1985, Jose Napoleon Duarte had been elected as the president of El Salvador. Also we pressed to curb human rights abuses in El Salvador which I mentioned previously in connection with the Vice Presidential visit in as I recall 1983.

We were attempting to do the same thing in Guatemala, that is to the extent that we could. The Guatemalan government was probably even more deeply implicated in human

rights abuses than the Salvadoran one and not moving nearly as rapidly toward democracy. We were dealing with a series of military dictatorships in Guatemala. Rios Montt and Mejia were two of the generals that were in power at that time. We were trying to support them in their struggles against the Marxist rural movement. We were trying to support the fledgling elected government of Honduras in its efforts to control rural movements through its territory and to avoid having this same kind of insurgent problem crop up in Honduras.

We were trying to oppose and pressure the government of Nicaragua to knock off the support for these guerrilla movements in neighboring countries. It's hard to believe that we actually went through this now but at the time there was a lively debate about were the Nicaraguans really involved in supporting the leftist guerrillas in neighboring countries? The administration insisted that they were and we thought that we had conclusive evidence to prove it. Many on the left insisted that they weren't. As it turned out the conclusive evidence later showed that they were.

In the early 1980's we got up the idea, and I don't recall exactly how the idea was got up, that really the way to get the Nicaraguans to give up their support for guerrilla movements in neighboring countries was for them to face their own guerrilla problem. There were those in Nicaragua who opposed the government, some of them were Miskito Indians who spoke English and were in the northeast of the country. Some of them were people who were disaffected because their lands had been appropriated or whatever. So a group of rebels called the contras developed and we decided to support them.

There were then almost annual legislative battles over whether we would provide lethal aid to the contras or whether we would be restricted from providing lethal aid to the contras under the various editions of the Boland Amendment. In 1985 when I went to the NSC staff, as I recall, we were operating under, I believe, Boland Amendment number two. I may be wrong about that but I think it was Boland Amendment number one. It restricted lethal aid to the contras.

We were engaged in a process called the Esquipulas process of trying to negotiate for a peace of some sort in Central America. Phil Habib was making a series of regular trips through the region to negotiate or discuss with leaders how could we achieve these multiple goals that I was describing simultaneously. The parameters of his discussions in that whole Esquipulas peace process I must say I was never much of a theologian of this because I did not think that it had much significance except for sort of political window dressing. At the same time we were fighting with Congress to try to restore authority and funding to resume lethal aid to the contras.

We were at the time able to carry out a certain kind of limited humanitarian assistance as I recall. There was this guy, Ollie North, who worked across the hall from me. He was formally charged, and had been for a number of years, with monitoring whatever private support the contras got and monitoring their military progress on the battlefield. He was kind of the point man contact in the administration on these contra matters. It wasn't until

much later that I came to understand that North was not just involved in monitoring a series of things that were happening with the private sector support that was happening for the contras but was actually fomenting it.

There was one episode as I recall in about 1984 or 1985. President Reagan was invited to speak at, and I believe did speak at or appeared by remote via TV hookup, a fund-raising function, dinner, luncheon or something like that, for humanitarian relief to the contra families. These refugee communities on the southern border of Honduras lacked basic medical supplies, basic food, basic clothing and so forth. This fund-raiser was supposed to provide this sort of thing. I had no evidence to support it, but I had the distinct feeling at the time that there must be more to this private support for the contras than met the eye. As it turned out, there was -- as we learned in 1986 when the whole thing came to light and Attorney General Meese gave this press conference exposing what North had been up to.

How was the NSC in those days? I would say Latin American functions in the NSC were divided and badly managed. That's not a complaint but it was like there was the Latin America cell at the NSC, Ray Burkhart and myself and Jackie Tillman. We had divided up the turf in a somewhat odd way. Ray was going to do Central America. He had been the political counselor in Honduras previously. I did Mexico and the Caribbean and some other odds and ends perhaps, and Jackie did all of South America. South American issues occupied our attention very, very little because frankly all of our attention was absorbed in Central America.

Caribbean and Mexican issues revolved to some extent around what was happening in Central America because we had strong disagreements with the Mexicans over policy towards Central America and policy towards Cuba. The Caribbean countries were part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. They seemed to sort of group together at least conceptually -- the democracies of the Caribbean islands with what we hoped would become democracies of Central America and get up an aid scheme for the region which would legitimize -- I don't mean it to sound completely cynical, but it had the effect of legitimizing our aid to the more controversial regimes in Central America. Regimes that were, we hoped, democratizing but were either at the stage of interim government or fledgling democracy or just plain military dictatorship but hopefully a better military dictatorship than what it had been before. Ray Burkhart, the senior director and my immediate boss, mainly concerned himself with the Central American negotiating process with Phil Habib's trips with the Esquipulas process. He did not deal with the Contadora process. I guess there was another set of meetings with regional leaders to try to find some negotiated framework for the Central American conflicts.

Then across the hall there was this guy, Ollie North, who had his own office and who had his own involvement with Central America. His involvement fundamentally extended to and revolved around the contra program. To give you an idea, very soon after I signed on to the NSC staff, Ray was gone on some trip. I was told by Ray Burkhart that National Security Advisor John Poindexter was going to go on a familiarization trip to Central

America. I did not have the impression that this was Ray's or our office's initiative, though I was too new to have been part of it. Ray was going to be away and I was to go with Poindexter on this trip. I was pretty well briefed on Central American issues overall but not quite at the level of operation and detail that this trip was going to involve.

Then very strange things started happening. The trip was going to be a 24 hour trip. We would fly down to Panama and overnight at Quarry Heights. The next morning Poindexter would have a meeting with President Noriega in which he was to read the riot act to Noriega. His script was to tell the Panamanian military that they needed to get back in the barracks and stop running the government, hold elections and open the political process to democracy again. He was pilloried for that meeting because the press made out that he was conspiring somehow with Noriega and that the agenda of the meeting was to somehow solicit Noriega's cooperation in funneling aid to the contras. Quite the contrary was true as my understanding of the meeting was. Though I didn't attend, I know what he was briefed to do. I know what the purpose was and I know what he reported after he came out of his private meeting with Noriega.

Then we were to fly in sequence to Costa Rica, Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and home all in one day. We spent a couple hours on the ground in each place. We did that agenda. We followed that script. In Costa Rica we had a meeting with the U.S. embassy and some people from the government at the Gariari Oerra Rua Hotel on the outskirts of town. In San Salvador we met at the airport. In Honduras it took place at Palmerola which was an air base that we had put up for the contra supply effort. In Guatemala it was also at the airport with General Kia and then we came home.

Ollie North did the trip book for this. It turned out Ollie North had planned the agenda and lined up the CINCSOUTH's plane to take Poindexter all along the way. Ollie North had worked out with his military all the logistical details. Ollie North had picked the people who would be seen in each country. He had set this whole thing up. He had also orchestrated with CINCSOUTH that in-between each of the short hops from one country to the next, 30 minute flights or whatever, a different CINCSOUTH briefer came up to brief Poindexter on some aspect of Central America from a very what I would call military one-sided, sort of military slant, intelligence community point of view. I would say even not just a military point of view but a CINCSOUTH point of view which was different even than the viewpoint that you found in the Pentagon.

What struck me about all of this was both how far Ollie was operating, how wide his brief was, how wide his ambit was, how far he was operating, I thought, outside of the ambit of his responsibilities and how in a sense unfair it was. Not to appear naive, but I really believed that the role of a staffer was to present to his boss, if we're talking about an orientation briefing and that's what this was supposed to be, John Poindexter's, the brand new National Security Advisor's orientation briefing.

Q: This was when Poindexter was going to take over, so he was taking Gregg's....

HUGHES: He was taking Bud McFarlane's place. Bud resigned as I recall in December and John took over then. So this was in January of 1986 as I recall that we did this trip. Maybe it was not January of 1986, maybe it was earlier. I'd have to go back and check. In any case, I always thought that the role of a staffer, especially an NSC staffer, was to make sure that a relevant range of view was presented to his boss so that his boss could make his own evaluation. It was also the staffer's job to tell the boss what he thought. Making sure that the State Department's view, the intelligence community's view, the military's view or viewpoints and all were reflected to my boss was part of the job. And also it was an obligation to tell him what I thought. Whether I thought this person was right or why I thought that view was wrong. In this case it was just a one sided sort of single viewpoint briefing. At least that was my interpretation. It was got up entirely by Ollie and run, in the way it was prepared, completely around the Latin American staff of the NSC. We literally were along for the ride.

Q: You were sucking your thumb most of the time.

HUGHES: Exactly. It was sort of emblematic of how fractured the NSC's approach to Latin America was and how out of control Ollie was.

Q: When you were there, were you sort of told "don't mess with Ollie" or people shrugged their shoulders and saying "he's doing his thing and don't ask"?

HUGHES: It was more like the latter. People shrugging their shoulders "he's doing his thing". Ollie was extremely entrepreneurial. He just took it upon himself to do certain things. He was the hardest working, burning the most midnight oil, was probably the most creative, was probably the most imaginative, was probably the most aggressive, probably wrote some of the best paper, produced a huge amount of material, was constantly in meetings and I think had a very full sense of himself: "I am playing a very important role on the national stage here." And he was playing a very important role but in the course of that, my sense of the feeling was a little bit like he had a protector or sworn confidant or soul mate or something, on the other side of west executive avenue in the West Wing, mainly the National Security Advisor, whether that was Poindexter or McFarlane. He made himself so valuable to them through the volume of work and everything that they trusted him implicitly. When it became clear that some of the things that he was involved in were risky to say the least, Poindexter began to move to rein him in; to disassociate him from the Central American portfolio and put him on a counter-terrorism portfolio with Bob Earle and these other guys that Ollie brought into the NSC. Nevertheless he just never gave up his Central America portfolio. He just held onto it. He had all the contacts and had been working with these people. He was very interested and I think he had a real missionary sense about the fight in Central America and he wasn't going to let go of it. So that was sort of how it was.

Q: You had both the Caribbean and the Mexican portfolio. What was our view of Mexico? There has always been a troubled American relationship with Mexico. What were the concerns that we had at that time?

HUGHES: We were in those days dealing with the Mexican government of de la Madrid. De la Madrid's administration was I think regarded in Washington as more honest by the standards of Mexican governments than we were accustomed to. And as reform minded and as interested in trying to improve the climate of relations with the United States as had been true of the Lopez Portillo administration. To some extent de la Madrid was sort of a product improvement on Lopez Portillo in that respect. It was a serious, technocratic administration.

We had a couple of serious foreign policy differences with Mexico. Cuba was one. The Mexicans of course opposed our embargo policy. From time to time, anytime they wanted to tweak our noses, they would always be able to do something with Cuba. Central America was another area where one of our main concerns was that Mexico not be a troublemaker in this process through Contadora meetings of other Latin American governments with Central American governments to try to solve the Central American problem around or without the United States. Diplomatically we had the challenge of how to keep the Mexicans from being troublemakers or spoilers so to speak in Central America.

Then of course we had concerns about Mexico itself. Its internal politics, the one party domination of the system at the time which gradually had been weakening. In those days the Partido de Action de Nacional, the National Action Party, PAN, had just begun to win elections in the northern states and now begun to be taken as a somewhat serious political force. We wanted to see Mexican economic liberalization. In 1985 to '86 we were just in the stages of recovering from the 1982 Mexican economic crisis and didn't realize that another one was right around the corner in 1987. I don't think we realized that.

During the brief period that I was on the NSC staff in connection with Mexico, my main activities were planning a trip that Nancy Reagan made to Mexico and accompanying her to give a symbolic donation of a million dollars to the victims of the September 1985 Mexico City earthquake. Dealing with a presidential phone call between de la Madrid and Ronald Reagan. De la Madrid initiated it after Reagan's Geneva summit meeting. I also was involved in being at, and doing all the staff work for the January 1986 Mexicali summit between Reagan and de la Madrid. It was actually technically supposed to happen in 1985 but during the calendar year '85 we somehow didn't get in all of our annual visits so we made it in January '86, piggybacked on one of Reagan's trips to California.

Q: How did the Nancy Reagan and then the Ronald Reagan visits go?

HUGHES: Nancy Reagan's trip was I think her first foray into a foreign policy role. It was something she very much wanted to do. It was all got up in a few days as you might imagine right after the earthquake. The day after the earthquake I was called at the NSC and asked how do you think the Mexicans would react to the First Lady coming to Mexico? I said that the last thing in the world the Mexicans need is the First Lady coming to Mexico right now. She is not going to be able to do anything material. She is not going

to be able to put back a building or dig out civilians or something like that. Any aid that we gave would be only a symbolic gesture, a drop in the bucket. Financially, we had already offered the Mexicans a variety of technical assistance from sniffer dogs to special jacks and engineering gear to try to rescue people from collapsed buildings. The Mexicans were proudfully dilatory about taking us up on our offers of help, and she wasn't going to solve that problem. What could possibly be achieved by the First Lady's going to Mexico except inconveniencing the Mexicans at a time of national disorder and stress and grieving and all the rest of it and getting some photo-ops for Nancy Reagan. That was my view.

I was quickly told that this was probably going to happen so it's not a question of whether it is desirable or not, it is a question of making it happen. Within a few more hours I learned that this was probably going to happen so we turned to and set up the visit. I liaised with the office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and we got a check cut for a million dollars. This was an administrative decision and Nancy Reagan was going to take a million dollar check to Los Pinos. We coordinated with the embassy. There was no time for an advance visit or anything. We just sent advance teams directly to Mexico to get this set up on about 48 hour's notice and coordinated with the embassy to work out a schedule which mainly involved the first lady arriving, going to Los Pinos, meeting with de la Madrid, giving him the check, touring some sites of devastation around the city, meeting with the embassy staff and saying some words with them and then flying on to California.

We got on an Air Force I airplane. Elliot Abrams went from the State Department, I went from the NSC, Jim Rosebush was then Nancy Reagan's chief of staff and Elaine something or other was the First Lady's press secretary. We all flew to Mexico in this nearly empty plane spending a lot of hours in the air. Nancy Reagan's briefing was very brief and not deeply substantive and she mainly spent the flights both to Mexico and California closeted in her state room. She didn't mingle with people in the way the Bushes did typically on their airplane.

We landed in Mexico and went through this program which involved going to Los Pinos, giving the check, having a little talk with de la Madrid, and going around touring a number of sites. It was pandemonium. People were all over the first lady. There was one very frightening sight at, I know well the square in Mexico City but I'm not calling its name to mind, where a large high-rise apartment building, probably a 15 story building, had just collapsed into a pile of bricks. These was a great crowd of people milling around. The First Lady's motorcade pulled up and it looked actually very frightening. She was surrounded by this mob of people. They weren't evidently hostile but something could have happened to her in such a large crowd. The Secret Service had great difficulty with the Mexican authorities maintaining any kind of crowd control around her. Then we went to the embassy and she gave a speech. We got on the plane and flew to California, utterly uneventful.

The President's trip to Mexicali was a funnier thing. We were trying to set this thing up and towards the end of 1985, after the Geneva summit, we got a call. De la Madrid

wanted to speak to the President. We didn't know what he wanted to speak about. We hadn't set up the Mexicali meeting yet. I was called by the West Wing and asked to get up some talking points right away and the President would return the call. We would book a time when the President would return the call. We had three or four hours to get some talking points over to the West Wing. Presidential calls in those days were much more orchestrated than they were later in the Bush Administration.

I consulted with the State Department Mexico experts on the desk to see what could de la Madrid possibly have on his mind that we could tell the President. So we put up some talking points saying that we finally agreed that the summit would be in Mexicali on a certain day, wasn't that nice, I'm so looking forward to seeing you. We put some talking points about Mexico having decided to join the GATT and that was very nice. And we put up some talking points about Mexico's astronaut being about to be launched on the space shuttle and wasn't that nice. All this sort of bi-lateral Mexico fluff and it turned out that that wasn't what de la Madrid wanted to call about at all. He wanted to hear from Ronald Reagan about the Geneva summit.

Q: The Geneva summit was with Gorbachev. This was the first meeting wasn't it?

HUGHES: That's correct.

Q: That was quite a change.

HUGHES: It was really an important first meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev and de la Madrid wanted to congratulate him on the summit and hear about it. Our talking point didn't cover the Geneva summit so we finessed those things but somehow in the middle of this conversation he managed to work in all of these non-sequitur talking points that we had put up for him on these silly bilateral Mexico issues that were quite off the point of de la Madrid's real call.

Then we got up the summit in Mexicali. It was a one day affair. There was a private meeting with Reagan and de la Madrid in which we had an ambitious agenda for Reagan. He was to talk about Central America, Mexican political reform, Mexican economic reform, and some bi-lateral trade problems we were having. By his account after their one-on-one meeting, he mainly talked about his observations about how much economic development potential there was in Baja California for resorts along some of the lovely deserted beaches. Mexico could really increase its prosperity if resort development in Baja were significantly advanced. And a bunch of other personal stuff. While that was going on Secretary Shultz chaired a meeting of the Mexican delegation and the U.S. delegation. Shultz was the U.S. chair, Baker was there for Treasury, and the National Security Advisor, Poindexter at the time, was there. Nobody went to Reagan and de la Madrid's meeting but Reagan and de la Madrid and their interpreters. What we know about that meeting came from the interpreter's notes and what Ronald Reagan told us about it afterwards.

In the delegation meeting the Mexican opposite number was Bernardo Sepulveda, who was formerly ambassador in Washington and was then Mexican foreign secretary, Jesús Silva-Herzog, who was then Finance Minister and is now ambassador in Washington; and assorted other ministers. That was an extremely contentious meeting in which the Mexicans beat us up about our Central America policy and our Cuba policy. They were unhelpful on virtually everything that we raised. Sepulveda was nationalistic, argumentative, uncooperative, accusatory. I did a big memcon on this after the fact and I don't remember all of the features of the discussion, I just remember it as a thoroughly dissatisfying meeting in which Shultz and Baker went out of the meeting basically furious, just wagging their heads and angry at the Mexicans.

Then we had a luncheon. The Mexicans served some wine that had been specially bottled on the occasion and Jack Gavin, our ambassador, said that it tasted like some animal's piss, well anyway. Then I think there was some kind of press availability and some kind of ceremony or despedida [farewell]. Then we got on the helicopters and flew back to California and then on to Washington. That was pretty much it for that meeting.

Q: I have been told, I've never served in Mexican affairs, that in a way the relations between Mexico and the United States are so terribly close in almost everything that foreign affairs is sort of almost handed over to the nationalists or to the left to beat up on us. We are cooperating very closely at the state, the county, whatever level, departmental level, finance, security, everything else.

HUGHES: Jesús Silva-Herzog reportedly was as mad as anybody in that room about the way that Sepulveda conducted the meeting because he had serious business to do with Jim Baker and we didn't do any serious business because we were too busy tied up in these ideological fights over democracy, Central America, communism and who's on the left. Frankly that meeting was a living, vivid demonstration of the degree to which in those days, not so much today and not at all I think during the presidency of Carlos Salinas, the Mexicans placated the left and sort of farmed out their foreign policy to the left.

Q: It didn't matter in a way.

HUGHES: Exactly.

Q: The next time we will pick this up, you have not talked about the short time you were on the NSC on dealing with the Caribbean. We will talk about the issues that concerned us there and then we will move on to the State Department.

Today is 13th of March 1996. Where are we now?

HUGHES: We're in 1985-86. I had moved in September of that year to the National Security Council staff from the Vice President's staff and my particular responsibilities were Caribbean and Mexico, backstopping on Central America as needed. That was I

think where we left off.

Q: Let's talk about during this '85 to '86 period, this is high Reagan, about the Caribbean as we saw it at that time. By this time the Grenada business was over so what were our concerns in the Caribbean?

HUGHES: The Grenada rescue operation of 1983 had pretty much put paid to left-wing agitation in the eastern Caribbean. Our main concerns at the time with respect to the smaller islands were to carry out a stabilization and economic build-up program in Grenada and provide support to the other democratically elected governments in the eastern Caribbean. Support in the way of security assistance for the so-called regional security system that was put in place there to give the islands some capability to defend themselves against a domestic insurgent threat or a small group of people coming ashore, something like that. Also to provide them economic assistance. Of course containing Cuban influence in the region, both Caribbean and Central America, was always a fixture of our policy.

In Jamaica at that time Prime Minister Seaga was in power. Just after the Grenada rescue operation, he had gotten himself reelected by an overwhelming majority in an election in which the opposition refused basically to participate because they had been caught with their pants down. They claimed at the time that they weren't participating because the election rolls hadn't been properly updated, but in fact they had been simply caught by surprise and, when compared, Seaga won overwhelmingly.

In the Dominican Republic we had in power at the time, as I recall, the administration of Jorge Blanco from the PRD, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, the revolutionary party of the Dominican Republic that was later to become very scandal ridden and Jorge Blanco was basically found to be highly corrupt. Joaquin Balaguer who later came back to power in the Dominican Republic, was out of power and came calling at one stage in Washington while I was at the NSC.

And of course the Caribbean Islands were in our concept of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, linked in with Central America which we were all dealing with as the Caribbean Basin at that time. We were very concerned just two years into the Caribbean Basin Initiative to try to find ways to enrich that initiative for the recipient countries. It seemed to be working but the payoff wasn't quite as rich for the islands and for the Central American countries as we had hoped, so we were looking at what we could do to enhance CBI.

Q: At that point, how committed did you find the administration to the CBI?

HUGHES: The Caribbean was I think very high on the administration's radar screen. The leaders from the region had ready access to the White House. When they appealed to the White House for attention, for assistance, for enhancement of the CBI, they were taken seriously. Beginning around 1984 or 1985, the government of Puerto Rico particularly

with the involvement of Tito Colorado, who was then the head of Fomento in the island and later became Secretary of State and then later still Puerto Rico's delegate to Washington to the Congress, felt that Section 936 of the IRS code should continue. Section 936 essentially gave tax breaks to companies that invested and built plants in Puerto Rico provided that they invested a certain amount of their revenues in Puerto Rico's development bank development program. The Puerto Rican authorities felt this program very much under threat from the Treasury Department.

They began scrambling around to try to find ways to save the program. One of the approaches that was suggested was that they could basically build a pro-936 lobby among all the other island nations of the Caribbean and Central America if they made Fomento loans for development purposes available outside of Puerto Rico to the other Caribbean Basin Initiative nations. The Puerto Ricans got up this scheme and began to promote it in about 1984 or 1985. The other countries of the Caribbean, particularly the island nations, fell in behind them and appealed to Washington, to the Reagan administration, to go along with the idea of continuing Section 936 in the tax code as long as Puerto Rico would broaden its lending to the other countries. That appeal was heard and the fact that it was taken so seriously is a reflection of the Caribbean's importance and access at the time.

Q: How did you find relations, keeping it from your perspective, with the State Department at that time because between the NSC and the State Department they wax and wane over the years? I am just trying to capture this period of time.

HUGHES: George Shultz was then Secretary of State and by this time Elliott Abrams was the Assistant Secretary for Intra-American Affairs. On the NSC Constantine Menges, who had been the senior director for Latin American Affairs had been sort of moved to another portfolio, and Greg Burkhart, myself and Jackie Killman were the NSC staff there, with Ollie North who was working in another part of the NSC deeply involved in Central America. I would say that relations between the State Department and the NSC were pretty good. As far as Latin America was concerned, much better frankly with Elliott in the chair than they had been on some previous occasions because Elliott was regarded as someone who saw eye-to-eye with the White House on the issues. There was a free flowing, comradely exchange of views and inclusion of the NSC staff in deliberations at the State Department. A much more thoroughgoing inter-agency kind of approach to dealing with Caribbean and Central American issues. Caribbean issues had never been as controversial and contentious as some of the issues in Central America so in a sense, that part of the NSC staff/State Department interchange had never been as problem laden as some of the Central America exchanges.

Q: Have you had any reflection when you took over this portfolio, of the role of the man who was there before you but I've heard quite a bit about, Constantine Menges? Where he was coming from, how he operated within the NSC?

HUGHES: Constantine is a very good friend of mine and someone for whom I have a

great deal of personal regard.

Q: This is tape three, side one with Philip Hughes. You were talking about Constantine Menges.

HUGHES: Constantine had come from the CIA where he had been the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Constantine had a particularly strong view, a particularly strong interpretation of the sort of thoroughness and all enveloping character of the communist threat if you would, or communist menace, posed by Cuba and behind Cuba, the Soviet bloc to the region. He carefully monitored and followed the inner workings of the Nicaraguan government, as much as we could tell about the Sandinistas, their interactions with Cuba, Cuban activities and Sandinista activity on behalf of the FMLN in El Salvador, FMLN incursions and use of Honduran territory as a conduit to El Salvador, Guatemalan insurgency and the Guatemalan insurgents ties back to Cuba and so forth. I think Constantine believed that the State Department did not take the threat nearly seriously enough, and that they did not understand or appreciate the magnitude of the communist threat to Central America as he did or its geo-strategic significance as he did. He was therefore inclined to take a much, much harder line toward the communist, if you would, countries of the region, toward the guerrilla movements, than I'm sure he regarded the State Department as willing to take.

That having been said, Constantine I think in his approach was much more of a thinker perhaps than a doer. I don't mean to suggest that he wasn't effectual but he was much more prone to write long memos perhaps for NSC meetings or otherwise, analyzing the situation and recommending courses of action whereas a guy like Ollie North, who also did a good deal of writing, rolled up his sleeves and got into implementing actual policy. Constantine's views were well known when Judge Clark brought him from the CIA to the NSC. I think they found a lot of favor when Judge Clark was the National Security Advisor, but I think once Bud McFarlane took over as National Security Advisor, Constantine's view seemed to be less in favor. In any case, Constantine was sort of moved on to other responsibilities toward the end of 1985 which actually created the opportunity for me to move to the NSC staff.

Q: Did you while you were there feel the interest of Senator Jesse Helms and his wing of the Republican Party in the Caribbean or was it pretty well focused on Central America?

HUGHES: I didn't see that there was any particular meddling or particular involvement of Senator Helms or his staff in Caribbean issues at the time. I don't remember any specific episodes of that. I don't remember them taking let's say any particularly strong interest in how the development assistance program was carried out in Grenada or anything of the sort. There was a group of members in Congress who were quite interested in the Caribbean at that time. They had been organized under the banner of Caribbean/Central American Action as it was called then. They were sort of known as the Friends of the Caribbean and they included a number of prominent members from Florida like Sam Gibbons, Bob Graham, as well as members like Phil Crane who had a long

interest in trade in the region. Although you didn't so much see them taking initiative vis-à-vis the region, you knew that their interest was an asset that could be called on when we, in the administration, needed support for some initiative for the Caribbean.

Q: Did you find that our policy was to strengthen the economies of the Caribbean in order to have a more tranquil and a more politically democratic area? As we were trying to work on the economies, did you find that you tried to do something with an island only to find out that you are stepping on the toes of a producer in Omaha or something like that?

HUGHES: That was a problem when the Caribbean Basin Initiative was originally put together. It was to assemble a winning coalition that didn't falter because there was some domestic interest that was being affronted. I was going to say that for the most part this was not such a big problem but let me explain in a little more detail. When in the early '90s CBI was put together there was a lot of political support for it in the administration. It wasn't un-controversial on the Hill but it was fairly feasible to build political support for it on Capitol Hill. There were some powerful constituencies that needed to be appeased or mollified and so some exceptions were built into CBI for footwear, leather flat goods. Textiles were handled separately. Sugar was out of the CBI. Rum was made duty free but the excise taxes were rebated to Puerto Rico just as they are for Puerto Rican rum sold in North America.

By the time 1985-86 had rolled around and the 936 program, the Puerto Rico tax program, was being salvaged through the broadening of the Puerto Rican development lending to the Caribbean and we were questing for ways to enrich the initiative, already political support was weakening a bit and special interests were coming more to the fore. As we searched about for ways to make the initiative a little bit richer for the countries in question, you found more things that you couldn't touch because there were domestic interests involved. The opposition to changing the rules on footwear had hardened. The opposition to changing the rules on leather flat goods had hardened. What we were able to do in time for President Reagan's 1986 visit to Grenada was to modify the textile program of the CBI to provide guaranteed access limits still with duties on the garments, but guaranteed access limits which were quite high. In fact they could be almost as high as you wanted. They could always be increased just by application as long as the textile products coming from the Caribbean were made of fabric formed and cut in the United States. The so called 807A program was created then. The other thing we were able to do was to announce that the administration would drop its opposition to continuing 936 as part of the tax code and permit it to continue provided that Puerto Rico started this lending program in the rest of the Caribbean. There was some hardened opposition from domestic groups that prevented us from making the initiative more generous than it originally was. That problem has become I think progressive really over the last 15 years but you could see it already in '85-'86.

Q: Did you have a Treasury representative on the NSC?

HUGHES: I'm trying to recall if we had a Treasury officer. There were times when we had someone from Customs for example but I can't remember a specific Treasury officer.

Q: I would have thought with this, you alluded to it, that Treasury is always the one who gets nervous when you start making tax exemptions.

HUGHES: This all had to coordinated with Treasury and they were the folks who basically called the shots. They had to be prevailed upon to agree and they finally did agree.

Q: Did you find yourself, in effect, sort of negotiating down at the working level of the Treasury Department.

HUGHES: This was a battle that was carried on at several different levels. My involvement was only one part of it. There were high level contacts between the government of Puerto Rico, the governor and his office, and the secretary of the Treasury and his senior-most aides, senior-most assistants. There was a lobby firm that was engaged to work on 936 at the time. I didn't know it but I later learned that Mike Deaver who had left the White House by this time, was part of the lobby team that was working on 936. It wasn't apparent to me from where I sat at that moment. There was a lot of activity going on here to influence the Treasury, not just the NSC alone. In the NSC as we worked on this, it was the economic shop and the Latin America shop working together. A guy named Doug Wig on the economic side and I suppose myself from the Latin America side were the two main guys who were working on this problem from the NSC standpoint.

Q: The Caribbean has been always a major source of emigration to the United States which hasn't abated. Did you find both the emigration problem of visas but also ethnic politics in the United States with Jamaicans wanting stuff for their people or what have you? Did this play much a factor?

HUGHES: I don't recall that being a very significant factor in policy making on the Caribbean at the time. If you are talking about immigration problems, there had been the experience of the Mariel boat lift from Cuba at the end of the Carter Administration which had helped sink his administration. From the beginning of the Reagan Administration, this had been I think one of the mental fixtures of the administration. We were not going to allow another Mariel boat lift to happen no matter what and we were not going to be blackmailed by Fidel Castro in such a way. There had not been at that stage as I recall a significant problem of boat people arriving from Haiti but then the Duvalier government was still in power and Baby Doc actually fell during the time that I was on the NSC staff. Preventing or avoiding situations of illegal emigration to the U.S. was a major obsession. I don't recall that visa matters or legal immigration or the quantities of legal immigration from the Caribbean was a significant factor, nor frankly very much was domestic ethnic politics except on the issue of Cuba where the Cuban American community really guards the train in Florida, New Jersey and a few other

pockets.

Q: Let's talk about Haiti a bit because you said Baby Doc fell when you were on the NSC. I have interviewed Clay McManaway who was our ambassador there at the time. It was a pretty hectic time while the second Duvalier regime was collapsing and the United States played a major role in getting him out, easing him out and all of that. How was it seen and what was happening from the NSC perspective?

HUGHES: From my desk, it all happened rather suddenly. I had arrived at the NSC in September. I am trying to remember the exact month in which Baby Doc fell from power but I think it was before December of '85 so perhaps October or November. I arrived and was immediately engrossed in a trip that the First Lady wanted to make to Mexico because of an earthquake that had happened there and she wanted to go and deliver a relief check. When that was over the first thing that came to my attention on Haiti was a report of public disturbances in the town of Gonaives as I recall. The disturbances became more persistent and widespread and it seemed like within a very short time, and again I can't reconstruct the diplomatic to-ings and fro-ings but without a lot of involvement as I recall on the part of the NSC, it became apparent that Duvalier's regime was just getting weak. I don't think that we in Washington and the White House were paying particularly close attention to Haiti at the time.

As I remember, it sort of came to pass one night that Baby Doc left. Clay's account would be more thorough than mine and he was there on the scene and would know. As I recall Clay did urge Duvalier to step down or to get out of the country, I don't know with how much sanction from the White House. I wasn't involved in that. It may have been done around me or it may have been done with the State Department or with the National Security Advisor directly, I'm not sure, or perhaps it was on Clay's own authority. In any case, one particular night, the situation room contacted me and said that it looks like Duvalier is going to leave the country and we are sending a plane to take him out. I didn't get involved in arranging for the plane. I later learned that somehow Ollie North had gotten into the middle of this and represented or claimed that it was he who had arranged for the plane to go to Haiti and pick up Duvalier. He might indeed have done that. If so, as far as I was concerned, he was operating out of his area of responsibility. I don't recall receiving a request from the post for the plane. I don't recall myself being personally involved in getting approval for the dispatch of the plane. It may indeed have been handled between the ambassador, the National Security Advisor or Elliott or Elliott's deputies or some combination of the above. During that night of Duvalier's evacuation, I got repeated calls from the situation room at home explaining and keeping me posted on what was going on.

The next day we kind of came into the office and surveyed where Haiti was and tracked the developments of Haiti over the next several days. In the weeks that followed it became my task to write the administration's first sort of decision directive on Haiti: what are we going to do, now that Duvalier is out and there is a transitional military government which as I recall was only Namphy immediately after (I may be wrong about

the guy but I think it was Namphy), and where we went from there. Haiti was to my way of thinking at that stage a distinct side show. In my experience on the NSC staff it was one of those things that came up from almost out of nowhere, fairly short notice, evacuation decision, interim government afterwards, and it was a sort of tracking problem from the White House perspective.

Q: So the interim government didn't give us trouble in as far as we did not see that we had a deteriorating situation in Haiti?

HUGHES: No, and I think everybody was quite gloomy about Haiti and so whereas today if this had all transpired, post Cold War in our sort of flush of enthusiasm for democracy, we might have been rapidly questing around for how exactly can we move from this situation to early elections. We were in fact pressing Namphy to set a time table for early elections and things like that, but I don't think that in their hearts, many of us in the government believed that you could get from Baby Doc to a democratic Haiti in a few months or weeks time. It is not to say that the administration was prepared to condone a military dictatorship for a lengthy period of time, but I think that there was just a sense of realism or a sense of caution about how fast you could get to a democratic government, or any semblance of democratic government in Haiti.

Q: Particularly since after all Haiti is Cuba's nearest neighbor, was there a concern that this was presenting an opportunity for Cuba? This was still at the time of Cuban expansionism. Cuba was not a spent power at that point.

HUGHES: Yes, but I don't recall specifically other than again monitoring via Agency assets for example on the island, whether there was any specific Cuban or specific leftist activity. There was a potential opportunity but I don't think that we found any evidence that Cuba was exploiting it. I think we concluded that Cuba didn't want to dirty its hands with Haiti and that this was not a place where they were going to get a great deal of mileage out of mischief making. That is my recollection.

Q: Let's talk a little about Cuba. Was Cuba on your plate?

HUGHES: No it really wasn't. Ray Burkhart tended to handle Cuba as much as we were involved in it from the White House. So no, not really.

Q: Were you monitoring Cuba? After all we keep coming back to Grenada, were you sort of looking at every one of your islands there and saying "what are the Cubans doing here?" Was there sort of a checklist?

HUGHES: Yes. We were keeping mental track of that although by the time Grenada had come down, Cuban activity in the region pretty much went to ground, it pretty much ceased. Seaga had thrown the Cubans out of Jamaica. Tom Adams' government in Barbados and then later Brie St. John's government that followed were strongly pro-U.S. and anti-Cuban. He had ejected what he thought were left wing professors from the

island. John Compton was back in the saddle in St. Lucia, Eugenia Charles in Dominica. James Mitchell had won election in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and looked like a pro-U.S. guy. The Byrds were still in power in Antigua. Jorge Blanco's administration was friendly to us in the Dominican Republic. The only, in a sense, problem child in the island mix was Trinidad and Tobago, where the Chambers government had alone among the Caribbean governments taken a sort of critical posture toward our Grenada operation and ended up with a public demonstration against the government on their hands. There wasn't a lot of room frankly for Cuban activity and mischief making in the region.

Forbes Burnham had died in Guyana just at the time that I went to the NSC staff so one of the leaders of the left wing or socialist tendency in the Caribbean had passed from the scene. There were two power figures who came behind then: Desmond Hoyt and a guy named Hamilton Green. Hamilton Green was taken as the more left wing ideological of the two, but it was Desmond Hoyt who ended up on top in the struggle for power post-Burnham. He was taken to be the less socialist and less ideological and more pragmatic. Of course we were always looking for evidence of Cuban activity but it was pretty hard to find.

Q: Let's turn to the recurring thing, narcotics, drugs.

HUGHES: Narcotics was in these years a persistent feature of our work in the Caribbean. It tended by the way to be dealt with as a law enforcement and a military issue and not so much as a diplomatic issue, at least in my experience. The folks who worked on the narcotics problem tended to be in a different part of the NSC staff and the main objectives were interdiction and monitoring and control of cultivation.

What were our main problems? Different countries posed different problems. In the Bahamas there was a major transshipment problem. In Jamaica it was partly a marijuana production problem, partly a cocaine transshipment problem and partly a cooperation and interdiction problem. In the windward and leeward passages, we were trying to erect barriers to both the seaborne and airborne smuggling of drugs using tethered aerostats which we had in Puerto Rico, and in the Turks and Caicos and a couple of other places around the region, and deploying our naval vessels and E2C and P3 airplanes to surveil.

Those interdiction operations had I suppose their origins in the Vice President's south Florida task force which began in about late 1981, early 1982. By 1985-86 the Vice President's drug responsibilities had been amplified to the creation of something which was called NNBIS, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. To my mind it was something of a fantasy because the whole idea that we were going to be able to interdict drug smuggling all around the borders of the United States more or less with existing assets just by redeploying them, seemed a bit optimistic. Concentrating in south Florida, a concentrated push on the Caribbean to really make a dent in drug trafficking seemed realistic even if the drug trafficking would probably then just shift to other routes which is what we saw happening. We were working in those years, and had been doing before and continued to do subsequently, with the Bahamas on Operation BAT which was a

deployment scheme to get police to the out islands and to get aerostats as I mentioned, permission to tether them and operate them.

Q: An aerostat is essentially a balloon?

HUGHES: It's a balloon with a radar. We had to figure out where to put the balloons. There was one in the Keys, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos, and there was one as I recall in Puerto Rico. I don't know that we even proposed to put one at Guantanamo Naval Base but I can't honestly remember. I don't believe that there were ever proposals to put balloon radars in Jamaica or on Hispaniola or on any of the smaller islands in the Eastern Caribbean.

Q: Was that for political problems or for technical problems?

HUGHES: I'm not entirely sure. After all, radar coverage is a sort of a cookie cutter circle and I think that the object was, where can you place enough of these cookie cutter circles to get the coverage that you need from the least politically difficult places? Places like Turks and Caicos, Bahamas, Key West, Puerto Rico, some of that being within our possession (Key West and Puerto Rico) would be less problematical than other countries. I think that we also really did not see, from what evidence we had, a lot of trafficking in those years through the smaller islands of the eastern Caribbean. It was a long way out of the way so to speak from Colombia. It's a lot straighter shot to head basically north towards the passages or west toward the Yucatan.

Q: How comfortable were we, in regards to narcotics, with the government of the Bahamas at that time?

HUGHES: Prime Minister Pindling was in power at the time as I recall and we had a sometime rocky relationship with his government. We got formal cooperation from them but we suspected that there was a considerable measure of corruption and that obviously in many out islands, officials could be bribed to look the other way and so forth. We put a lot of pressure on the Bahamian government to cooperate with us in a wide range of narcotics areas and I think we got the best cooperation that we could manage but always with an element of suspicion: just how honest are they?

Q: Did Ronald Reagan make a visit to that area, to Grenada or somewhere else while you were there?

HUGHES: He made a visit to Grenada in as I recall about February or March of 1986. It was just a one day visit and he was not able to stay overnight. It seemed that the First Lady insisted that he get back by a certain time at night. I hadn't any idea why the First Lady should take such a particular interest in how long the President was away and so forth. I later learned after I left the White House that it may have had something to do with this astrologer advice.

Q: This was sort of one of the bizarre elements to things at that time that you had an astrologer whom she knew from California. The major effect was there were dates that were bad and times to do things I think. It was something like this.

HUGHES: Yes. It influenced the President's schedule. This particular day, I understood, the First Lady insisted that the President couldn't stay out beyond a certain time at night so that constrained the schedule for Grenada. The day's activities on Grenada really consisted of the President going to the Government House, meeting with the Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, who had been Governor General during the invasion and was the person who gave the legal authorization for the rescue operation to proceed. He had been hiding during the fighting in the Government House and was rescued by U.S. Navy Seals. President Reagan also met with the then Prime Minister who is now deceased, Herbert Blaize. Following those meetings he had a meeting with prime ministers from all around the Eastern Caribbean. The Eastern Caribbean prime ministers were all there as I recall though there may have been one who was absent. Following that meeting there was a photo-op of the group on the steps of the Government House. He also had an event that dedicated a monument or something like that to the rescuers of Grenada on the campus of the medical college.

The President then went to Queens Park, which was a soccer stadium, where he gave an address to a crowd that probably represented a third of the population of the island. He gave a speech which substantively soared over the heads of the audience. They didn't really get what the significance was of the announcements he made about the enhancements of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, but the day was as close to the Second Coming of Christ as we're likely to see on earth because the Grenadians just turned out in throngs to cheer the President and express gratitude for the rescue operation. It was one of the most moving things that I have ever seen.

Q: Were there any other developments in the area that we haven't discussed?

HUGHES: We didn't talk very much about Mexico and the President did make a visit to Mexico in January of 1986. It was actually sort of a make-up visit for the annual exchange between President Reagan and President de la Madrid that was supposed to have happened in '85 but because of the pressing schedule and other things we barely got it in after the first of the year in '86. Relations with the de la Madrid administration were improved over the Lopez Portillo Administration and those relations had in turn improved over the previous Echeverria Administration. We were concerned of course about Mexico's economic management. We didn't see eye-to-eye with Mexico on policy towards Cuba or towards Central America and we were trying to encourage the Mexicans to at least moderate their public differences with us and we were seeking always to explain our view of Central America. The Sandinistas represented a threat in that they were backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and that they were not harmless agrarian reformers.

The Mexicans along with some other countries in the region, Colombia, Venezuela as I

recall, maybe Panama and perhaps Ecuador, had involved themselves in a process, the so-called Contadora Process, in which they were trying through diplomacy with the Central American countries to find a solution to the problems with civil war in Central America. We monitored this process and its various meetings closely because we feared that Mexico and the other countries would be trying to broker solutions that would not very heavily constrain the Nicaraguans from continuing mischief making toward their neighbors and might well end up handcuffing the governments of Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, even Costa Rica which was ostensibly neutral but where the northern part of their territory was frequently being used by the Nicaraguan Contras as a safe haven in the so-called southern front. That it would end up placing more constraints on our friends than it would on our adversaries. These were the kinds of topics that were on discussion with de la Madrid in January.

As I mentioned Nancy Reagan had made a trip to Mexico in September because of that serious earthquake. It was kind of a nice gesture to the Mexicans though it didn't necessarily amount to a whole lot in terms of substantive outcomes. When Reagan met with de la Madrid, their private conversation in which we were hoping that the President would strongly get across the U.S. point of view on Central America and so forth, really involved, as the President briefed us later, more of a personal exchange between the two men. President Reagan talked a lot about his experiences traveling through Baja California and all the undeveloped tourist potential there and how Mexico's economy could really benefit from a great deal of opening up to commercial and private development particularly of the tourist assets of Baja.

In the delegation meeting that George Shultz headed with then Mexican Foreign Secretary Bernardo Sepulveda, the meeting was extremely difficult and contentious on the topics of Central America, Cuba, Mexican voting patterns and behavior in international organizations. It was quite a polemical meeting and it was evident that the Mexicans, Sepulveda in particular, really irritated their American counterparts. The current Mexican ambassador to Washington, Jesús Silva-Herzog, was the finance minister and among the Mexican team in his dialogue, what dialogues he was able to have with Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, he alone was sort of reasonable and accommodating and not as I recall highly polemical or defensive about Mexico's policies.

That was the highlight in my relatively brief time in this assignment on the NSC staff. There were three episodes in which Mexico popped up: Nancy Reagan's trip, a private phone call between the President and de la Madrid just after the Geneva summit which would have been about November of 1985, and then the January trip. The February trip to Grenada was in preparation even while we were taking the president to Mexico. While all of that was happening, I got a call that I had an opportunity to go to the State Department as deputy assistant secretary. After getting back from the Grenada trip, my attentions were devoted to the Haiti NSDD (National Security Decision Directive), sort of policing up some other things around the Caribbean, dealing with more routine matters in my patch, and getting ready to go over to the State Department which I did a couple of months later.

Q: One final question on your time in the NSC. Was there on the NSC and maybe with the State Department in your estimation, a sort of write-off of Mexico as far as foreign affairs goes? A feeling that the Mexicans are going to be like this and they are going to stick it to us every time they can? This is where they show their sovereignty and so we go through the motions but we have a lot of other things we're doing with the Mexicans and almost let them have this foreign affairs.

HUGHES: No, I don't think it was that way. I think there may have been those in the State Department who took the view that Mexican foreign policy is going to be ritually and habitually left wing and more sympathetic to Cuba, to the forces of the left and to forces that are more anti-American than we would like. Therefore let's just let it be that way but focus on material cooperation in other spheres of importance, counter narcotics for example or trade problems or immigration problems or border pollution problems or things of that sort.

I think that an element of the thinking of the Reagan White House was that we ought not to take that for granted. That we ought not to accept what at the time was regarded as almost deliberate unhelpfulness in the field of diplomacy, but that we ought to contest it. We ought to be out there explaining our point of view to the Mexicans endeavoring to persuade them either intellectually or otherwise that they should knock it off, or at least tone down their critical-of-the-U.S. left wing oriented foreign policy. That's what we tried to do. I don't think we took it for granted and I don't think that we wanted the State Department to take it for granted that Mexico was foreordained basically to not be a helpful force diplomatically and just write them off.

Q: In 1986 you went to the State Department as a deputy assistant secretary. Where?

HUGHES: In the Bureau of Political Military Affairs [PM] with responsibility for technology transfer and control, so called. It was basically an export control kind of job.

Q: You were there from '86 until when?

HUGHES: Until June of '88.

Q: Who was in charge of Political Military Affairs and what was it's role in the Department as you saw it at that time?

HUGHES: My boss, the Assistant Secretary, was Allen Holmes, who had formerly been ambassador to Portugal and formerly Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the European Bureau. A fine professional diplomat and someone who was out of the mold that had been established in the previous two directors of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs where it seems that George Shultz had a preference for a time of having military people be the chief of PM, as we called it. Allen was a career diplomat and I am not sure whether it was in a deal with the Defense Department or Shultz's preference, but since Allen would mean a civilian would head PM, there was a desire to have a military guy as

principal deputy and hence Major General Bill Burns came over from the Pentagon, an arms control expert, to be the number two guy in PM.

PM was really, some people say, the State Department's Pentagon or the State Department liaison with the Pentagon. It was the part of the Department that worked most deeply on issues of arms control and security policy in NATO, military deployments abroad, and really anything that connected with the military. My part of PM was responsible for a portion of our policy of tightening the high technology embargo against what were then the Soviet state and Soviet bloc states, and for licensing all of our commercial arms exports.

Q: Somebody who's dealt with this at one time was saying that the Department of Commerce never met a weapon that wouldn't sell, or technology that wouldn't sell and the Pentagon wanted to almost prohibit everything from getting into anybody's hands of a technical nature. State Department sort of ended up in between the two.

HUGHES: Not entirely inaccurate. The Commerce Department was certainly more pro-commerce. The Pentagon was certainly very skeptical about sales that might get into the hands of the wrong people, whether they were bloc destinations or not. They were very emphatic about tightening the embargo. It did sort of leave the State Department in the middle but the State Department was very, very poorly organized in my judgment to handle these issues. The State Department's poor organization only exacerbated its discomfort at this predicament.

Q: During this '86 to '88 period, let's talk about your relations with the Pentagon.

HUGHES: In that time Richard Perle was the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy at the Pentagon and under him there was a protégé of his named Steve Bryan, who was the director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. This was a large organ of the Pentagon housed outside the Pentagon that was created to give the Pentagon a stronger voice, some might say a dominant voice, in decision making about what sensitive technology would be exported to where and under what conditions so that we could tighten the economic embargo against the Soviet Union and its allies. To my way of thinking, the way this was run was that Richard Perle, who was sophisticated and brilliant, tended to be a bit removed, or removed himself, from a lot of the day to day action. He was always a powerful force in the background who might be appealed to by the guys at the Pentagon. Sometimes he was also a powerful force of reason, that is you could spin up an Assistant Secretary of State to have a conversation with Richard and work something out that was being really hotly contested at lower levels. Richard had Steve Bryan as kind of his attack dog to be single-mindedly determined to clamp down on anything that smacked of high technology export leakage to the Soviet bloc or to rogue states such as Iran, Libya, whatever. The working relationship with the guys in the Pentagon was always civil and comradely. The professional civil servants kind of tended, I thought, to shrug their shoulders and say "we see the logic of what you are trying to do here but those guys want us to be tougher."

The Pentagon, I think, deeply suspected the State Department in this whole area as just being a bunch of wimps. People who didn't have any particularly fixed view, or strong view of what we were trying to accomplish here, and who weren't particularly dedicated to actually tightening down the restrictions on Soviet access to sensitive western technology. They felt that State people didn't really understand the military strategic implications of the Soviets acquiring certain technology, didn't have to cope with any of the consequences of the Soviets acquiring any of this technology, and were mainly interested in getting along with other countries. Where the simplest way to get along was to log-roll deals. I think that was probably a fair characterization of what the Pentagon guys thought of us and probably also that we weren't very well informed. We didn't follow the intelligence or didn't have access to the right intelligence.

I sought to carry out my role at the State Department in such a way to make it clear that we were indeed as committed as anybody to carrying out what was an administration policy of tightening this embargo, but that we wanted to do it in an effective way. Therefore the diplomatic tactics and the strategy of how we pursued this diplomatically, particularly with non-COCOM countries, was a major part of my responsibility. COCOM was the Coordinating Committee in Paris through which we vetted proposed sales of sensitive equipment by ourselves or our allies and where each of us had the opportunity to veto basically other sensitive sales. Anyway, I sought to carry out my responsibilities in such a way that they would be proof from the Defense Department criticism that the State Department was just a bunch of wimps.

The other weakness of the State Department was that some parts of it tended to become kind of lackeys of the Defense Department, just pushed around by DOD, told what to do and when to do it, and surrendering responsibility for the way we conducted our policy in this area basically to Steve Bryan and Richard Perle because we didn't want to fight with them. This was dumb because Richard Perle and Steve Bryan didn't have a monopoly of wisdom. They weren't necessarily the most enjoyed diplomatic tacticians and, frankly, on several occasions we caught them being prepared to make deals that would have been highly detrimental to our interests. They would have been penny wise, so to speak, and pound foolish.

Q: Hanging over all of the work that you were doing at this time, the Toshiba case had already taken place.

HUGHES: No it hadn't.

Q: When did it take place?

HUGHES: It took place on my watch or at least it came to light on my watch.

Q: I imagine this was a real eye opener to everyone.

HUGHES: Yes, it was.

Q: You might explain what it was and how it came to your attention.

HUGHES: The Toshiba Machine Tools, a Japanese company which made milling machines, and a Norwegian government owned weapons contractor, Kongsberg Vapenfabrik entered into a deal to sell a certain installation in the Soviet Union some milling machines. There were 5-axis milling machines. Toshiba was to supply the milling machines themselves and Kongsberg Vapenfabrik was to supply numerical controllers which would allow the milling machines to cut metal to very high tolerances and in very complex multi-formed shapes. The controllers individually might have been approved, or might even have needed COCOM approval.

Q: You are talking about the instruments?

HUGHES: Yes, the computers that controlled the machine tools operation. I don't recall specifically whether they were permitted to be sold to the Soviet Union simply at the discretion of the Norwegian government or they needed to be passed through COCOM. I don't remember that detail about the Japanese machines either. But in either case, whether they were passed through COCOM or they were just sold on the individual nation's authority, individually they were not problematic but married together they would have been absolutely prohibited to be sold to the Soviet Union because they would have permitted the Soviets to manufacture, among other things, propellers for submarines that would be much quieter. It would reduce their noise signature in the water and make it much more difficult for us to detect them.

Toshiba and Kongsberg conspired, it appeared, to keep from their respective government's authorities, and therefore from COCOM, the true nature of the transactions, that these two things coming from separate places would come together and make a prohibited sale. When it came to light as a result of an intelligence report, and I don't remember exactly the origin of the intelligence report, that the Russians had acquired these milling machines and that they were now turning out new propellers for a Soviet submarine class that would be much quieter in the water, all hell broke loose. The story reached the newspaper. It was reasonable to suspect that someone in the Pentagon found it advantageous that it did reach the newspapers.

It graphically highlighted the very important thing for us, the importance of ratcheting down and tightening the embargo against the Soviet Union. It was a proverbial smoking gun of what can happen when the COCOM embargo isn't taken seriously and administered diligently. It also helped, in a sense, prove the point of the functionaries at the Pentagon that our sister countries, the other partners in COCOM, may have been much more lax than we were about the administration of the controls. At one level it gave us a lot of political leverage but the challenge was how were we going to use that political leverage to really strengthen COCOM and not just get into a round of Japan bashing and imposing economic sanctions or something like that on the Japanese.

Q: You mention the Japanese, what about the Norwegians?

HUGHES: Funnily enough there wasn't really very much of a focus on the Norwegians. No one seriously proposed imposing economic sanctions on Norway. There was a great focus on Toshiba and the Japanese. The Japanese were very defensive at COCOM. They were very much on the defensive in other fora whenever this issue came up. The immediate challenge of Toshiba- Kongsberg was how to, on the one hand, avoid congress going off and imposing economic sanctions on the Japanese as a sort of an excuse for Japan bashing, but at the same time to use the political leverage that this episode gave us to put pressure on our partners to further tighten the COCOM embargo.

In response to Toshiba- Kongsberg we held a thing called a senior political level meeting in Paris in the spring of 1988 in which John Whitehead, the then Deputy Secretary of State, was our head of delegation. The U.S. proposed a series of COCOM-strengthening measures that were supposed to be worked out there as evidence to Congress that we and our COCOM partners were taking this problem seriously and therefore economic sanctions weren't in order. But at the same time it was a kind of double game. At the same time we wanted to pressure the allies to be more serious. That meeting almost was a disaster. We almost walked out without any accomplishments at all because the debate that day was so mishandled. My counterpart, Deputy Assistant Secretary in EB [Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs], Mike Zacharia, who is now in Hong Kong, and myself, but Mike particularly, worked heroically that day to round up individual delegations and get them to agree to a text of a communiqué, a set of steps that would be done to tighten the embargo and give us something to show Congress when we went home so that we could avoid sanctions but also get a substantive result for COCOM. In a nut shell, that is Toshiba.

Q: As I recall it, and somebody will have to check another oral history on this, I think one of the reasons why Norway was not a focus, whereas Japan was, was that the Norwegian government jumped in with both feet...

HUGHES: Yes as I recall they did.

Q: onto the firm that did this. It sort of took things under its own hands.

HUGHES: Yes I believe that's the case. I don't remember the particulars of what Norway did but dismissals of officials and tightening surveillance of Kongsberg's activities I'm sure were part of the picture.

Q: When we are talking about a free economy such as ours and such as they are and our major allies, pushing electronics, pushing other various forms, I would think it would be very difficult for somebody to come up with what would be a dangerous technology to pass on and no -- i.e. telephone technology or things of this nature that maybe we wouldn't think about normally -- but for essentially a rather undeveloped power such as

the Soviet Union in so many fields that they could grab in things off the shelves.

HUGHES: The persistent complaint about the export controls were that they were too comprehensive but the theory, I guess it is fair to say, of export controls as I remember it from those days, and the way the COCOM lists were constructed, was that the lists included everything. You started out with the theory that everything is in principle controlled and then you start relaxing the controls in areas that are judged non-problematic.

COCOM had several levels of control. There was this so-called national discretion level of control where basically it was up to individual countries what to do and that meant mainly they said this is not controlled. You can ship this anywhere without a license. There was the so-called favorable consideration level of control which meant that you needed to inform COCOM that you were prepared to ship this item to a particular destination. Certain information about the proposed sale was required and there was an expedited consideration with the expectation of a favorable result that went with that. Then there were general exceptions cases where basically you had to bring every sale of this nature to COCOM and it was reviewed in detail and voted on. There were some things where it was known that no exceptions would ever be granted, like the atomic energy list, forget it.

The debate and the nature of the negotiation in COCOM was always about where to set the control levels for each individual item. Over time, larger and larger parts of the list were released but not fast enough to satisfy the onward march of technology or the growing interest in trade within our own country. After all, in an export control scheme, exports of controlled items are licensed not just if they were to be destined to the Soviet bloc, but they were licensed anywhere that you can get assurance that they are not intended to be diverted to the Soviet bloc. The burden of the administration in the scheme was a very heavy one on our exports.

Q: Where did COCOM come as far as our delegation to COCOM? Were they under our pol-mil?

HUGHES: No. Our delegation to COCOM was a part of our mission to the OECD in Paris and as such it reported to the Bureau of European Affairs. It received its negotiating instructions from the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs which had an office for COCOM matters. Our habit of negotiating in COCOM had been to, I think, progressively devalue our own COCOM delegation, the delegate and his alternate, by sending out negotiating teams from Washington. Typically the office director or one of the deputy directors of the COCOM office from EB went with a multi-agency team composed typically of someone from Commerce, Defense, CIA, and maybe a specialized technology organ of the government, to negotiate a particular COCOM agreement.

The upshot was that as the Defense Department put more and more pressure on the State Department over COCOM issues with their claims that we weren't being nearly tough

enough and we were giving away the store, turning a blind eye to allies' violations and thumbing their nose at the system, Defense tried to create a parallel group with the agreement of the French Defense Ministry and some other like minded defense ministries in Europe. Because Richard Perle developed a network of contacts to his counterparts in the defense ministries, they sought to create a military alternative to COCOM which might eventually replace COCOM to take over the functions of COCOM which was called STEM, the Security and Technical Experts Meetings. This was a highly contentious thing within the French government because the French Defense Ministry wanted to go along with Richard. The guy who was then in charge wanted to also increase the voice of the French Defense Ministry in these matters.

The diplomats were busy fighting a rearguard action to try to keep this STEM activity from becoming a military COCOM, or kind of a military master for the COCOM marionette. There was frantic diplomacy about what to call it. Experts meetings were very important to the French because meetings were just meetings. They weren't decisional; they weren't a substitute for COCOM. So there was this effort on the part of DOD to outflank COCOM, maybe replace COCOM, maybe manipulate COCOM through another defense organ. Inside the governments of our allies this created some controversies and some, as I say, rearguard actions by particularly the diplomatic services not wanting to let this authority flow to the military.

Q: Looking at some of the countries here, Germany, France, Japan, the UK, major producers, I would imagine your office would be sort of the point person in dealing with these countries when there were problems on technical transfers?

HUGHES: Sometimes. Let me go back and explain a little bit the EB-PM tie. EB, the Economic and Business Bureau, had traditionally been the channel through which the State Department dealt with COCOM matters. As the Pentagon became more critical of the State Department's conduct in this area, two things happened. The Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology was then Bill Schneider, a comrade in arms of Richard Perle, men who were on the same philosophical wavelength. He began to take a larger role in this COCOM business in the State Department. It was a sort of quasi judicial role very often because he didn't really want to mix it up with Richard in day-to-day battles but he did want to make sure that the Department's interests were defended and that reasonable approaches to negotiation were pursued and so forth. The second thing that happened was that PM became the instrument of those in the higher echelons of the State Department who wanted to respond to the DOD criticism and having the State Department live down its reputation.

PM was first dealt a hand so to speak in COCOM matters and then dealt a progressively larger hand at the expense of EB in these matters. EB of course sought to hold on to its core COCOM responsibilities and largely succeeded to do that, but they eventually ended up having to share some of the COCOM negotiating responsibilities with PM. I led several delegations to COCOM which would have been unprecedented previously, but it was the result of this bifurcation of effort. Later there was the creation under the

undersecretary of a special coordinator for security export controls. First it was a guy named Bob Dean and then a guy named Allen Wendt. This very confused structure of the undersecretary, a special coordinator, PM, EB, EUR all in the act, made for I think a less than effective State Department response to the issue.

Q: *During the time that you were there which was '86 to '88, how did you feel about the role in your perspective of Germany for example?*

HUGHES: To go through and kind of characterize individual countries' approaches, I think the Germans were in many cases the most serious about the leakages. There was sort of a little battle with the French about who was determined to be more serious about cracking down on technology leakage to the Russians. The French seemed often very much on Richard Perle's wavelength, at least militarily while the Quai d'Orsay guys were trying to keep the military from dominating the action. I think the Germans wanted to take a tough but reasonable approach. The Brits (remember this was Margaret Thatcher's administration) also wanted to take, I think, a tough but reasonable approach. The Italians were kind of laissez faire. They didn't want to trammel their trade excessively, and they were particularly eager to try to make more of an opening to trade with China in the COCOM arena.

The big difference between ourselves and all of our allies (Canada, Britain, Germany, France and Japan were the main players in COCOM) was that I think we had persuaded all of them that we needed to toughen this up. We got them to agree to a thing called the Third Country Initiative. There were newly industrializing countries that had the potential to manufacture the very same things we were as COCOM countries controlling to the East bloc. These countries could then sell it directly to the East bloc without any surveillance or control or consciousness of its strategic significance. The scheme of the Third Country Initiative was to go to these newly industrialized countries to sound them out and get them to cooperate somehow de facto with COCOM. We got all the COCOM partners to agree to this idea and they sort of intellectually accepted the idea that this was necessary, but they then went about trying to approach these countries for cooperation in what we regarded as a halfhearted sort of way: i.e. "We went and sent our ambassador in to make a briefing to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they said they weren't interested so we haven't done anything else." It was sort of a very halfhearted limp wrist approach whereas we Americans wanted to really tighten this embargo. We really wanted to get these other countries to cooperate de facto with the embargo and so we wanted to go about this in a very thoroughgoing "let's go round them up" kind of approach.

I think that the end result was that we had persuaded, at least rhetorically, our allies that we needed to toughen the embargo. How much deeper than rhetoric that commitment on the part of our allies was probably varied a bit from ally to ally. The big difference between the allies' perspective on this and our perspective is that we wanted to be tough and the allies wanted to be tough but reasonable with the accent on the reasonable. I think their perception was that the American approach was unreasonable. As one of my British colleagues once said in a negotiation: "I could see you typical American ready to jump in

there with both feet." I think that kind of characterized a lot of the way our allies regarded our approach to COCOM as unreasonably tough and I don't happen to agree with that. I think there were elements of unreason in our approach at the time, but that if we hadn't taken the particular approach that we had we would have made no progress.

Q: I think this was a particularly interesting time from '86 to '88. I keep coming back to the years because within a couple of years of this essentially the Soviet Union collapsed. One of the keys to its collapse was that it was unable to keep up with the technology in many fields. Was there the feeling that you had this giant shoulder almost on the mat and will keep pressing or was this just this is going to be a long-term thing and we've just got to keep this up? Was there a feeling that things were moving?

HUGHES: I didn't have that feeling. I did not sense that this was sort of a terminal phase effort and that that was why we needed to do it so desperately. I think rather that the feeling, if you can capture feelings, was that this was something that was long overdue. In the past we had simply not been paying adequate attention and vigilance in this area. As a result, even before we knew about the Toshiba- Kongsberg bust we had seen that the Russians had been successful in acquiring technology, or developing their own technology, in areas that were quite worrisome to us. We really wanted to make sure that as we, for example, began to export super computers to other parts of the world, that one of these things didn't turn up in the Soviet equivalent of the NSA working for the KGB or that one of them didn't end up in a Soviet nuclear research laboratory, or that the Russians didn't acquire the technology and build their own.

I had during my time dealing with this in '86 to '88, a sense that what we were trying to do was put in place a structure for tightened surveillance of the embargo that would endure for as long as we needed it to, that would probably attenuate if there was a change of administration but that in any case the net level of effort would be much higher for our efforts than would have been the case otherwise. Thinking about beyond Reagan, what happens after Reagan? It's to try to put in place something that will at least elevate the level of effort for the future even if future administrations wouldn't put quite the same emphasis on this. As it turned out, this does seem to have been a factor in the demise of communism in Russia and the Soviet Union and we couldn't have known at the time that we were so close to success.

Q: Did the Gorbachev-Reagan growing warmth play any effect on what you were doing?

HUGHES: Not really. I don't think we moderated our approach one iota on that account. China played a bit of a role here because there was a clear desire to find ways to open more commercial opportunities with China. But at the same time there was one particular deal, we could go into it at a later occasion because it takes too long to tell the story now, where we felt we caught the guys in the Pentagon being ready to give away the store vis-à-vis China in their zeal to get one particular sale to Russia stopped in a sort of a three way deal between the U.S., Italy, Russia and China for one deal.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point. The next time we will pick it up when you are talking about a three way deal where you felt the Pentagon was going to give away the store and then after you finish that, then we will move on to the next phase in what you were doing.

Today is the 10th of July, 1997. I'll leave it to you to carry on.

HUGHES: When we last met we were talking about a particular export control controversy that arose in the Reagan Administration. This was just one of many that arose between the Defense Department, State Department, Commerce Department and sometimes the White House. Just to relate the story as I recall it, the Defense Department became aware of a deal that a firm called Selenia in Italy had made with the then Soviet Union to supply aircraft control systems for I believe the Leningrad airport and several other airports in the Soviet Union. These were very high quality air traffic control systems. The Pentagon either feared, or had reason to believe, that these air traffic control systems were going to be netted into the Soviet's ground control intercept system for their fighter air defense or would otherwise enhance the Soviet's air defense capability. They were determined to block this sale.

Secretary Weinberger and other Defense Department officials met with officials in Italy when Vice President Bush met with Defense Minister Spadolini at the time. At the urging of the Defense Department he raised this question with Spadolini about stopping the Selenia sale to Russia. Richard Perle and some of the other officials at the Pentagon entered into some negotiations with their Italian counterparts to try to effect a deal that would stop this Selenia sale. They did this independently without involving the State Department. That was I think their habit because they suspected whether the State Department was really with the program, was really on sides with them, or was frankly very effective in negotiating this kind of thing with their Italian military counterparts.

The Italians on the other hand wanted very much to liberalize arms sales to China. They saw a very lucrative market for weapons in China especially small scale weapons: light arms, maybe some light armored vehicles and things of that sort. It was possible for DOD to strike a deal with the Italians. The Italians would scotch the Selenia sale, somehow wind it down and not go through with it, if the U.S. would back an Italian proposal to liberalize the international munitions list in COCOM for sales of arms to China. The Pentagon committed to do this. Of course the Pentagon didn't speak for the entire U.S. government, it spoke for the Pentagon.

From my point of view, the one flaw in this deal was that the Pentagon had not seen what the Italians' proposed liberalization of the COCOM list for China amounted to. What did the Italians exactly want in exchange for stopping the Selenia sale? The upshot was that when the Italians presented their list, it was far more comprehensive and involved far larger weapons, far more, some of us thought, serious weapons than anybody had any idea of up to that point. Maybe I think it was shock treatment a little bit at the Pentagon, but a deal was a deal and the Pentagon was determined to back this. My colleagues in the Economic and Business Bureau were pretty much buffaloed by the guys in the Pentagon.

Basically they were prepared to back this as well and so we prepared to go to COCOM with the position that we would in fact liberalize the COCOM munitions list for China exactly along the lines proposed by the Italians.

My bureau, the Political Military Bureau, and some of the people who worked for me particularly a gentleman named Jerry Leach, who is very able and our paths have since crossed at both the National Security Council and the National Council of World Affairs Organizations, waged a battle to change our position on this deal and to walk back significantly the liberalization that we were prepared to allow in the China munitions list. In that we had few allies. No one in EAP wanted to see a more liberalized munitions list for China. It was up to technical experts to figure out how liberal, liberal should be. A battle between some technicians at the State Department and some military experts at the Defense Department, it didn't much matter to them. We were very concerned that if we opened the barn door so wide to arms sales to China, that the volumes of weapons that might later then be sold to China, could become such that we would lose all scrutiny over those sales and that we simply would lose a lot of leverage. We basically battled back the DOD position. We got COCOM to adopt a much more conservative position which retained the U.S. ability to take note of and surveil the arms transactions as they unfolded with China regardless of the quantities involved, I mean 50 howitzers or 500 howitzers.

That I think proved very useful to have done when who could have known that two years later there would be a Tiananmen Square episode and the administration would want to ratchet down arms sales to China in protest and would want to make sure that not only we did that but our allies did that. Had we given up our COCOM leverage to ratchet down our allies' arms sales to China at the same time that we were doing so we obviously have left the barn door open.

Q: When you say that you fought the battle successfully, how did you deal with the Pentagon? They wanted, you don't. How does this come out?

HUGHES: I think we basically had a lot of arguments. I argued with Steve Bryan. I lined up Paul Freedenberg of the Commerce Department to argue along with us even though Commerce didn't have a whole lot of stake in this issue. We were adamant that we wouldn't clear on any instructions to permit what was called essentially national description level licensing for practically any munitions list items for China. We made clear we'd only go so far as favorable consideration. We enlisted Ed Derwinski's office's help and the guy who was working for Ed Derwinski named Bob Dean.

Q: Edgar Derwinski was in Congress at the time?

HUGHES: No. Ed Derwinski was the Undersecretary of State for International Security Assistance, Science and Technology Affairs and a respected interlocutor with Richard Perle and Steve Bryan. Before Ed, his predecessor was Bill Schneider, also a guy with a lot of credibility with Richard Perle and Steve Bryan, the two gurus of export controls in the Pentagon. We basically argued with them, and argued with them, and argued with

them until it became clear that we just weren't going to go any further than favorable consideration for these arms sales to China and that they had made a deal that they hadn't the authority to uphold with the Italians. They were going to have to find a way to get themselves off that predicament, off that particular wicket. How did it go? They grudgingly went along with our position because that was the best that they could get out of us. They could bludgeon some parts of the State Department into submission but not all parts of the State Department into submission. That's I guess how that went.

Q: When you talk about the Italians and others, I have the feeling that with the United States playing such a major role in arms control transfers, the other countries (Italy, France and others) didn't really have to look at the big picture because they felt that the United States was doing that. Their whole idea was almost what they could slip over for favorable deals. Did it play that way or not? Maybe that's unfair.

HUGHES: The dynamic of COCOM negotiations in those days was a pretty complicated one. I think it is probably true that most of the COCOM allies relied on the United States to play the heavy so to speak, and to look at the big picture. To sort of look out for everybody's interest and say no this is too far to go with either dual use sales or any kind of munitions liberalization at least when munitions liberalization was an issue with China. At the same time, in both dual use and munitions list negotiations, a lot of the negotiations revolved around countries jockeying for a particular advantage. When we were doing the munitions list liberalization for China, for example, we were prepared to liberalize what we called first generation TOW missile technology.

Q: TOW missile being?

HUGHES: A TOW missile is a tubularly launched, optically directed, wire guided missile that is an anti-tank weapon. We were prepared to liberalize first generation TOW technology. The French however had a missile that was better than first generation TOW but it wasn't as good as TWO II. They wanted to make sure that that missile could be sold to China on fairly liberal terms. We thought this technology was a bit too much for a permissive approach to sales and so we resisted that. We couldn't compromise with the French on this. They wanted to make sure that their product had a niche in the market. We wanted to keep that technology out of the Russians hands. If they couldn't have a niche then we couldn't have a niche. We didn't liberalize at all on that technology because everyone wanted something for themselves. It was part of the nature of those negotiations. Yes, I think it's true that other countries did look to us to sort of be the guardians of the big picture. I wouldn't say so much that they were looking for sweet deals necessarily for themselves, but they were certainly out to protect commercial interests of their particular firms.

Q: Where did you go and what did you do next?

HUGHES: After the State Department in June of 1988 I became assistant secretary of Commerce for export enforcement. This is the enforcement function of the dual use

export control program.

Q: I would like to get the inclusive dates.

HUGHES: I was there from June 1988 until February of 1989 when I went back to the White House.

Q: This job seems like a logical continuation of what you had been doing.

HUGHES: Exactly. I was I think picked at that stage because it was the last year of the Reagan administration. A deal had been struck with congress having to do with the final appointment of an Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration that would involve also appointing two new assistant secretaries respectively for export administration and export enforcement. I was tapped for the export enforcement. It was the last year of the administration. Not many people were going to come in from the outside and they wanted someone pretty expert in this to do this job. I was one of those and I was picked.

The enforcement job was basically running a small federal law enforcement agency charged with stemming leakage of sensitive technology to the Russians or rogue country destinations. It was a small enforcement agency with a couple hundred agents in eight field offices around the country located in major points of exit, or port centers, and technology centers of the United States. The Commerce Department's enforcement arm was dwarfed frankly by the Customs Service which also had jurisdiction here. The Commerce Department's enforcement arm was a full-fledged federal law enforcement agency, gun toting authority, administratively independent over time, all the trappings of a federal law enforcement agency, but small and specialized and in competition with bigger agencies like Customs that had legitimate jurisdiction here.

The question for the Commerce Department here was, really this was more of an agency sort of in crisis. The challenge of taking it over was to help it figure out what niche, what role, it had to play in the overall scheme of things. In federal law enforcement, the goal is criminal conviction. If you are a federal law enforcement agent what you want to do is you want to make criminal cases because by making criminal cases you are then working with U.S. attorneys and prosecuting them. You are putting notches on your gun. You are enhancing the status and reputation of your organization.

There is a pecking order of federal law enforcement agencies and the FBI is at the top of the pecking order. Probably being a postal inspector is something at the bottom of the pecking order. Being a Commerce Department enforcement agent is somewhere towards the lower end of the pecking order. If you are a federal law enforcement agent you want to climb the federal law enforcement ladder. How you do that is by making criminal cases because that is what is going to be asked when you seek to go to the FBI or seek to go to ATF or seek to go to one of the other more prestigious federal law enforcement agencies. Our guys were focused on making criminal cases on export control matters and doing all

the other things that federal law enforcement agents do: carrying guns, preparing to deal with violent or shoot-out situations, those kinds of things. I don't want to sound like an iconoclast or anything of the sort, but I arrived and found an agency that was in explicit rivalry with the Custom Service.

Q: The Custom Service would be under the Department of Treasury?

HUGHES: That's right.

Q: But a power unto themselves.

HUGHES: They are a very powerful agency within the Department of the Treasury. In those days it was just finishing being run by Willie von Rabb, who was a very political, very dynamic, and very strong willed commissioner of Customs. It was about to be in the Bush administration run by Carol Hallett, our former ambassador to the Bahamas. Anyway, I found the situation was very much like one of John Le Carre's novels, The Looking Glass War. It is a novel about a small specialized military intelligence arm of the British service trying to work covert cases behind the Iron Curtain and trying to achieve successes that would bring it institutional success. But it was sort of in the shadow of the much larger M16, where the M16 would sit back and gleefully watch its smaller cousin fall on its face by trying to overdo it or trying to overstep.

That was the kind of agency that I inherited. It was badly organized and it badly needed reorganization. Headquarters was unresponsive to the field. There were several perversities in this whole organization. One was the rivalry with Customs; 250 agents were never going to beat 20,000 agents. That was pretty clear regardless of whether we were totally specialized and totally focused, where as the Customs jurisdictions were all over the map.

Another perversity was that in the enforcement function, how was it done? If a field office got a tip that a particular exporter was in fact violating our export control laws or was diverting technology to a prohibited country, Russia or an East bloc country, Libya, one of the first courses of action was for the field office to start requesting to review all of that company's export license applications as it applied to export technology, or to export products for the future. So now instead of those applications being reviewed only in Washington, they would have to physically be sent to a field office. The field office would look them over and investigate God only knows what. The result was, at a minimum, all of a sudden someone who had fallen under suspicion faced great delays in getting their licenses processed and, of course, good response time as a commercial firm to your customers is pretty critical for your competitiveness. It was easy to fall under suspicion. I mean almost anything could cause you to be suspect. Someone phones in a tip or anything of that sort.

Q: Including I suppose rivals knowing how this game is played.

HUGHES: You've figured it out. It was easy to fall under suspicion but it was almost impossible to fall out of suspicion because in the federal law enforcement game, if you think you've got a suspect, you just keep looking and looking and looking until you find something more to confirm your suspicion. There is no point at which you can fairly say well I'm never going to find any evidence on this guy so let's let him go. The result was that the system was vulnerable to exactly what you suggested. A malicious competitor tipping off someone that XYZ Company over here is doing something shady and you better take a look at them. All of XYZ Company's licenses all of a sudden start taking three times longer to get approved than previously. XYZ Company can't peer into this black box to find out why because they are under investigation and no one is going to tell them that they are under investigation. That was another perversity of this process.

A third perversity was that the relentless quest for criminal prosecutions was in fact the quest for the Holy Grail. When I went around to my field offices and then had a chance to talk to U.S. attorneys who were prosecuting or who would have to deal with these criminal cases that would be brought, they would basically tell you we're not going to prosecute these cases in any event. If you guys succeed in finding a Russian spy and catch him red handed in his black cloak and black hat smuggling blueprints out of the country, that is one thing. But if you find a white collar executive or set of executives in Acme Tool Company who have shipped some assembly line equipment that they think fills cereal boxes with corn flakes to Romania and find out later that that equipment has been incorporated into some assembly line that fills cardboard boxes with ammunition or something like that, we are not going to prosecute that. Why? Because the regulations are so technical that no one understands them. Even juries can't be made to understand them. Judges can't be made to understand them. If you can't make a jury understand it, the defense is going to have a reasonable case that the defendants didn't have any actual intention to violate the law because they didn't understand it. This relentless quest for criminal prosecutions was kind of a quest for the Holy Grail, I thought.

Another perversity of this particular organization was that because it was a federal law enforcement agency and it recruited its personnel from federal law enforcement agencies, they wanted to do all the things that their counterparts did. They wanted to carry shotguns. They wanted to carry guns. They wanted to carry handcuffs. They wanted to be able to hurl someone up against the wall and handcuff them and drag them down to be fingerprinted and so forth. At one stage we discovered that our agents in a certain office had requisitioned a number of shotguns. When I found this out from the director of export enforcement, I basically said to them, let's take these away. What are we going to do with shotguns here? Are we going to have a technology diverter barricade situation, or a riot of technology diverters that we're going to deal with? This could be absurd. This is white collar crime. This is really all about something that is very un-sexy in law enforcement. It is going through piles and piles of shipping documents and piles and piles of orders and matching model types to catalogs, to technical capabilities and performance specifications of mask aligners, or multi-axis numerically controlled milling machines and so forth.

So what did I do? We reorganized the headquarters to eliminate bottlenecks in the

passage of cases back and forth between the field and headquarters to try to again get exporters' cases dealt with more expeditiously. We never did figure out a good way to draw a bottom line under when was a company no longer under suspicion, but certainly tried to push the organization to draw a bottom line. There has got to be a point at which we say we're not looking into this any longer.

Q: I would think that it's just mathematic progression or something. If you never have an end, all of a sudden you have your 250 agents doing nothing, the list gets longer and longer and never goes away.

HUGHES: We pushed the agents and the field offices hard to spend their time concentrating instead on two things other than criminal prosecutions. One was outreach and compliance. Make their presence known to the corporate community in their respective operating areas. Be instructors and acquaint the exporting community with the law and with compliance procedures and basically be focusing on compliance not after-the-fact prosecution. Secondly, focus on the administration law part of our jurisdiction. The Export Administration Act gave the Commerce Department both criminal prosecution capabilities and also an administrative law process that was entirely internal to the Commerce Department. Significant fines and significant penalties could be leveled without going to court, without going before juries and judges and instead going before administrative law judges. Admittedly these are administrative penalties not criminal penalties. They don't put as many notches in your federal law enforcement gun but they might be more effective at achieving compliance if people feel that they are being hailed before an administrative law judge and being fined a significant amount as a result of an infraction as opposed to a gigantic criminal violation.

The thing about the administration law process at the Commerce Department was that the Customs Service did not do those cases and they were at the time exempt from federal judicial review. It was in a sense a kangaroo court that had been set up in our law for companies that violated the Export Administration Act where basically the prosecutor, judge and jury were all inside the Commerce Department. If you got a decision from an administrative law judge that you didn't like, you could appeal that decision to me but it was my agents that brought the case in the first place. If you didn't like my decision on appeal, then you could appeal to my boss whose decision was final. It was a total kangaroo court in those days. That was basically the nutshell of the management challenge at Commerce.

In that time there was a second side to that responsibility which was the enforcement of our anti-boycott compliance legislation to discourage, to prevent, American firms from complying with the Arab boycott of Israel. It was a specialized function that sort of operated on its own track. In the time that I was there Congress levied what was up to then the two highest fines ever on two major companies for complying with the Arab boycott of Israel de facto. One of those was Sara Lee Corporation who was fined about or more than a million dollars as I recall.

Q: Sara Lee is the bakery isn't it?

HUGHES: Actually funnily enough it is a bakery but it also is a major clothing manufacturer. They actually are probably more important in textiles and apparel than they are in the baked goods products that you know on the supermarket shelf.

Q: The Arab boycott against Israel was sort of an off and on thing all the time, wasn't it? Was it a very important factor in Commerce by this point?

HUGHES: Yes, but less because of the severity of the boycott enforcement. Even today, it's quite surprising with post-Cold War and everything, the boycott is still not completely eliminated nor the need for a boycott compliance office. Clearly there were times when the Arabs placed more emphasis on boycott compliance than others but it was important to Commerce because anti-boycott compliances and others split jurisdiction. There is Treasury which has a portion of the anti-boycott compliance problem and Commerce. Both of those anti-boycott compliance efforts are regarded by the American Jewish community as key elements of their edifice of protection of the interests of Israel and the protection of the interests of Jews worldwide against all manner of discrimination, of aggressive behavior.

That function was, I learned right away, stepping across the threshold that far from being just a stepchild function attached to export enforcement, there was a very active constituency there that wanted to know right from the get-go what did the new assistant secretary intend to do about boycott compliance. Was this in fact going to be a priority? Were cases going to be pursued and what kind of public posture did we intend to maintain on this issue? It was substantively important but it was also important from a constituency point of view.

Q: I would image that politically it would be probably number one as far as congressional concerns and all.

HUGHES: Actually yes. I think there were not so much congressional concerns as I would say constituency concerns. There were outside of the government a series of very active Jewish organizations focused on this problem who monitored basically, carefully, how the federal government was performing in these several areas. Those constituency relationships were absolutely key to maintaining and doing right by, the law and policy were set, no question. They were right and appropriate laws and policies. They were implemented in what had by then become a very well established, well oiled, well lubricated way. We just wanted to make sure that process continued and that the constituency saw this was a continuing emphasis of Commerce.

Q: In a way, maybe there is a difference but we had a policy because of basically political constituencies. One don't let Israel be boycotted and two make sure that Cuba is boycotted because of the Cuban American community in Florida for example.

HUGHES: It has been years since I've worked on the Arab boycott of Israel so I apologize if my memory here is dim. It's one thing that Arab countries refused to do business with Israeli companies. It's another when Arab countries tried to blacklist American companies from doing business in Arab countries because those same American companies do business with Israel. In other words to try to force them to choose as it were between the larger, rich, populous market and the tiny state of Israel also wealthy from a per capita GNP point of view, but small relative to the rest of the Arab world. That was the part of the boycott that we were concerned with. Trying to prevent the Arabs from succeeding in blackmailing American companies from avoiding business with Israel or even disclosing information about their business with Israel. There were very strict limits on what American companies could disclose about the nature of their business dealings with Israel to the Arab countries because that would tend to further compliance with the boycott. Arab countries would circulate questionnaires asking do you do business with Israel? They were prohibited from answering those questionnaires.

We have argued that it is regrettable that Arab nations consider themselves at war with Israel or whatever, and have put restrictions on their companies being able to trade with Israel. That doesn't conduce to peace and so forth. But we have never argued that it is not within their power to do that, or that it is not within their jurisdiction to do that if they want to impose a primary embargo on Israel, and Egyptian or Iraqi or Syrian companies can't trade with Israel. That is within their legal ability to do. We made it illegal for American companies to comply with Arab efforts to make them boycott Israel.

There is a Cuba analogy here you might say in that we maintained that it's thoroughly within our rights to prohibit American companies from trading directly with Cuba. When we have tried to extend that prohibition to subsidiaries of American companies operating abroad in an extra-territorial context, not unlike the pipeline sanctions issue in the early '80s, we typically run into a buzz saw of opposition from our European and Canadian allies. They maintain that these are companies that are chartered in their nations, and their laws should govern whether they trade with Cuba or not. Generally speaking we've tried in those kinds of cases to skirt frontal legal confrontation and instead sort of work something out really within the companies themselves about what their foreign subsidiaries do or don't do vis-à-vis Cuba. Helms-Burton has raised a new kind of conflict.

Q: This was something that was passed during the Clinton administration by the Republican congress back in about?

HUGHES: It was June of '96. Just about a little bit more than a year ago in May/June of '96. The Helms Burton Act imposes certain sanctions on any company doing business with the United States that would traffic in confiscated property in Cuba. The sanctions are potential denial of visas to their executives and the risk of litigation in U.S. courts for claimants here to recover from those companies basically the value of the confiscated assets that they might have acquired from the Cuban government. Controversial but not

quite like the Arab boycott of Israel. We have never gone so far as to try to deny access to the U.S. market for foreign owned companies that trade with Cuba which is what the Arab boycott of Israel purports to do. There are some analogies but they are not perfect analogies.

Q: We're using a Marantz tape recorder right now. I'm Mr. Marantz and I've decided to get into the export business. Looking at the market I might well make the decision that I'm not going to send a salesman to Israel. Let me go after a larger market. That would not fall within your purview, would it?

HUGHES: If that's a commercial decision, no. But if it became known that in making that decision the Marantz Company received a questionnaire from the Arab boycott office, and there is such a thing that coordinated the Arab boycott. Without bothering to get proper legal advice or checking with the Commerce Department or whatever, he proceeded to fill out that questionnaire. If he took notice of the fact that its existing sales or prospective sales in certain Arab countries were likely to be jeopardized if it engaged in commercial activities in Israel, and evidence emerged that he took that evidence into account and decided not to pursue any business in Israel or to turn away initial solicitations from Israel let's say, or interest in the product you're offering, I think that would be interesting to the boycott compliance office. There is a good risk that the Marantz Company under those circumstances would be complying with the Arab boycott of Israel. That would be of concern. Let's not dwell too much on this feature of the whole process.

Q: You were in Commerce as an assistant secretary, what was your impression of Commerce as an organization because it does have a foreign policy thing? There was a logical reason for you to go there because you had technical knowledge and you moved in so you weren't part of the normal political process. Commerce has this reputation of being a place with very high turnover and sort of where you stick political people from both administrations. It is the most political of all departments and also has a reputation, at least from the Foreign Service and in general, as being ill run and sort of a mess. You were off to one side, but did you have any feel for that?

HUGHES: Yes. I am not sure what is going to be done with these tapes and how this all emerges in public, but I think that a lot of the stereotypes about the Commerce Department are extremely well deserved. It is first of all an unwieldy institution when you think about it. It's not a department. It's a mélange of functions that have been assembled under one big roof because in one way or another, they have in the past pertained to business and trade. At one stage part of the function of the Commerce Department was maintaining lighthouses until that function went to the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard went to Treasury for revenue purposes, because the lighthouses were important to Commerce.

I often reflected on this and used to joke a little bit about this. What a ridiculous scenario it is for the Secretary of Commerce to hold the daily staff meeting or to hold a regular

staff meeting because what does he do? He goes around the table and says to the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs "How is the economy performing now? What are the economic statistics telling us about economic performance?" "Well that's terrific. Thank you very much for that report." To the Undersecretary for the Technology Administration, "What's cooking at the Bureau of Standards these days? Are we changing standards and setting standards? And by the way, what are we doing to promote the development of new technology?" "Fascinating report." "What's happening at the Patent Office? What are the number of patents being issued?" "Fascinating." "And what about the Weather Service? What's going on in the weather area and ocean exploration?" "Wonderful." "And national telecommunications, what are we doing with the national telecommunications system?" "Fascinating." "You folks at the International Trade Administration, what have you done today to promote exports for the United States?" "Great." "And you guys in the Export Administration, what have you done to prevent exports from the United States today?" He'd go around the table.

There are a bunch of functions and you wonder what do they all have in common? What is the common policy thrust here? How do you give any coherence to this? In some cases, literally, the trade promoters and the trade preventers are set off against each other in two conical bureaus under two different Under Secretaries. Export control isn't about trade prevention per se but fundamentally it does prevent trade for strategic reasons. That is kind of funny. This is kind of weird.

The secretary that I was privileged to serve under, Bill Verity, came briefly to the department after Malcolm Baldridge's untimely death. He came to the Department in the last year of the Reagan Administration and I think that he believed fervently that he would be invited to serve in the Bush Administration. He was interested in trade with Russia and behind the Iron Curtain because of his experiences with Armco (American Rolling Mill Company) Steel. He was a senior executive from American industry. I think that he was bitterly disappointed that he didn't get invited to stay on in the Bush administration. He served for basically about a year or a little bit more than year as Commerce Secretary and then he left.

What can one say? There is a high turnover. There are a lot of political appointees. That's been a problem for this administration. The current Secretary Bailey came in saying that he would reduce drastically the number of political appointees in the Department. It has been known in the past as a political dumping ground. Its policy role and its policy voice are not particularly clear. It has been regarded as kind of an echo chamber but not a very effective echo chamber for the interests of American business. A kind of totem if you would for American business in the administration but not necessarily one that even American business respects and turns to and says "these are our champions. These are the people who are going to fight and win our battles for us." American business I think ends up either working around or battling with the Commerce Department as much as anything else.

My personal view is that the Commerce Department probably should be completely

reshaped. It was more than surprising when the Republicans took control of the House and Senate in 1994, to see one of the proposals be to eliminate the Commerce Department. Eliminating a department of government has long been a Republican objective. To try to cut down the size of the cabinet let's get at least one of these. It seems to have been a fixture of a lot of Republican thinking here. But to focus on the Commerce Department was very surprising because it is supposed to be a repository of business interests. I think eliminating the Commerce Department is probably not a very good idea. Completely reforming it and trying to strip away as many ancillary functions, peripherally related functions as possible and either spin them off into independent agencies or other departments or put them somewhere else and try to finally achieve what I believe Malcolm Baldridge aimed to do when he was Commerce Secretary, which was to turn this into a trade ministry or more like a MITI of the U.S. government bringing perhaps USTR and Commerce together.

Q: MITI is the?

HUGHES: MITI is the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan.

Q: Which had been a very effective instrument.

HUGHES: I think that Baldridge had in mind a Commerce Department that was more like MITI that brought together the USTR and the trade functions of Commerce but without the heavy handed industry planning that MITI often has for its industry, that would have been a better way to go. I don't know if we can ever get there but no, the Commerce Department I think deserves serious reform.

Q: The Bush Administration came in in 1989 which came as sort of a surprise for those involved because here was the Vice President taking over from the same administration and all. This should have been a continuation of things and yet, at least from the people I've talked to, it was more akin to a Democrat taking over from Republicans or Republicans taking over from Democrats. In other words, there was not a continuation. You had of course your ties. Could you talk about how the Bush administration both affected you and those around you? What were the dynamics? Why was this sort of a shock to the system?

HUGHES: I think that after eight years of Reagan Republican rule, that many people who had risen through the ranks of the Reagan Administration and in the last years of that administration had pretty predictably risen to positions of senior responsibility, expected that look, we were all Republicans and we're here doing a good job for President Reagan. If President Bush is elected he will probably keep us on or keep a lot of us in our respective positions because we are all good Republicans here. I think that may have been partly reinforced by some of the themes of Bush's election campaign which implicitly more than explicitly promised an element of continuity with Reagan policy. It did so by contrasting mainly how Mike Dukakis differed from the Reagan Administration on so many issues. Characterizing Dukakis implied what Bush would be all about in relation to

Reagan.

When the actual transition occurred, I think that there was surprise at several levels. First of all there were certain cabinet members, Nick Brady, Lowell Cavazos, respectively secretaries of Treasury and Education, and Dick Thornburg, the Attorney General, at the end of the Reagan Administration where those cabinet appointments had been made it seemed with an explicit eye to the possibility that George Bush might well be elected President and that therefore they would be his cabinet members so to speak. They seemed to have been backed by Bush and so in that sense there was this element of continuity. But below that level, while there were a number of people in the Reagan Administration who had ties or had played roles in the Bush camp that were with Bush and his circle, there were many people who expected to stay on and were surprised. Why? I think they misunderstood that first of all George Bush had his own circle of political supporters. People who had been financial supporters, personal supporters, long-time loyalist and backers. He had his own network of people. He would naturally want to see those people in positions of responsibilities in his administration. There are only so many positions.

I think they underestimated also how much the Bush Administration would differ in ideology from the Reagan Administration. Many in the Reagan Administration, particularly at the beginning but even at the end, put a very high premium on their fidelity to ideological conservatism. I don't think that is necessarily bad. I think it is actually in many cases pretty good in the right circumstances. What I don't think they anticipated is that Bush's Administration was not going to be an ideological administration at all and so strong ideology didn't necessarily win you high marks here. My personal belief is that Mr. Bush is himself rather anti-ideological. I think he thinks that ideology is something that gets in the way of finding the right answers because it closes you off to certain information, it predetermines or predisposes certain conclusions. It truncates your thinking. I think that is the way he approaches it. If I am right about that, he wouldn't have put a high premium on ideology and he wouldn't have put a high premium on people who thought of themselves as mainly ideological conservatives and Republicans and least of all Bush loyalists.

I happened to have the good fortune to be invited to be the Executive Secretary for the National Security Council and to leave the Commerce Department and go back to the White House to the very job that I most wanted in the Bush Administration. Many others including my boss, his deputy at the Commerce Department, my colleague assistant secretary for export administration, expected that they would be invited to play roles in the Bush administration.

They just didn't find those opportunities. The Bush presidential personnel operation tended to inform people, I don't know how exactly this was done because I wasn't on the receiving end of this. I had been informed that you are welcome to stay as long as you want in that particular role, but I was also bidding to go to the White House and lo and behold was successful. I gather that people were informed that their service was appreciated but they wouldn't be continuing in those roles. I think people were invited to

indicate if there were other roles in the administration that they would be interested in playing. Some of the Reagan appointees indicated those interests and through their own networks and contacts perhaps succeeded to get themselves there. Others indicated those interests and nothing happened and they went out to the private sector.

Q: Before we conclude this thing, you said you wanted to be back at the National Security Council, how does one make that known? How did you sort of say look at me?

HUGHES: That's an interesting question. Of course the particular job that I wanted in the National Security Council was a rather exceptional one, the executive secretary. It is sort of unique. You could say it's the job of chief of staff.

Q: I've interviewed Richard Kennedy on this who had that type of job.

HUGHES: When did Dick Kennedy have that job?

Q: This was under Kissinger.

HUGHES: I thought Jean Davis was the only person Kissinger had who played the role of staff secretary.

Q: He ended up with a job doing this type of thing.

HUGHES: In any case, clearly there was going to be one key decision maker here and that was somebody whom I didn't know and had never met. Brent Scowcroft was named as the National Security Advisor. Once it was plain that Bush won the election, I contacted my friends and colleagues from the Bush vice presidency whom I had worked with and people on the Bush campaign whom I had worked with. I particularly contacted people who had worked on the foreign policy of the campaign and the chief of Bush's transition team, the deputy chief of Bush's transition team, the foreign policy guy on Bush's transition team and the guy who was in charge of presidential personnel in Bush's transition team and eventually in the White House, also other friends and colleagues. All of which to say I would very much like to continue serving the Bush Administration. Those of us who had been in the Vice President's office, I think it wouldn't be right that we presumed or had any right to presume that we would be chosen to carry on in the Bush Administration, but I think we had a reasonable expectation that we would be having roles of some sort in the Bush Administration. The question was what role?

I made clear that there was one role above all others that I wanted to do. In fact I didn't say that there were any other roles that I wanted to do. I wanted, if possible, to be the Executive Secretary on the National Security Council. Of course I will serve wherever the President would find it most useful but I think that I would be particularly helpful to him in that role. Why? I had quite a number of years of accumulated experience of working for Bush in the national security area so I knew what he had done, where he had been, whom he had met with, what positions he had taken on various issues over the course of

the Reagan Administration. I also knew whom he liked internationally, whom he didn't get along with internationally, what his style was or what I understood his style to be in terms of writing, corresponding, interacting with foreign leaders.

I may have described in an earlier tape my assignment one day had been to set up a series of calls while Reagan was in the hospital for a cancer polyp operation or something, to leaders around the world from the Vice President that he planned to use to reassure them. It caused instead a panic in their offices because they all feared that he was calling to tell them that Reagan was dying. I had come to understand a little bit what his style was. At the same time, at my age, experience level....

Q: How old were you then?

HUGHES: 34, 35. I wasn't going to be chosen as National Security Advisor. Depending on who the National Security Advisor was, I probably wasn't going to be chosen as deputy National Security Advisor. I didn't think my background up to that point had really given me quite the breadth, the depth of scope, that would have made me an ideal deputy National Security Advisor. But where would I fit in on a quite overall level to put all of that experience from the Bush vice presidency to work best? I wanted to be out of the line of fire not having to face the klieg lights of the camera, not having to face the press, not having to face Congress, not having to face a lot of public scrutiny or be the public advocate for the administration but in a behind the scenes role where you can be very useful. To me there was one logical answer, Executive Secretary for the National Security Council. It gave full vent to my most generalist capabilities without requiring me to be Bush's point man on Russia, or Bush's point man on Latin America, or Bush's point man on Africa in the specialized portfolios at the NSC. There was no particularly specialized portfolio that I would be able to take over.

How did I do it? I made known my interests and a number of people recommended me to Brent. It took a long, long time to get in touch with Brent. Actually we never succeeded to make contact until the eve of the inauguration when I was at home putting on my tuxedo to go to the inaugural ball. He rang that evening and we set up a meeting for a few days into the administration. I went over and interviewed for the job. I was quite convinced that I would be the last person in the world he'd hire for the job because he conceived the job completely differently than the way it had been done in the Reagan Administration and more along the lines of the way it had been done in Kissinger's NSC with Jean Davis. This was more a clerk like figure pushing papers basically and coordinating agendas, sort of non-substantive procedural stuff. I remained interested in the job anyway and lo and behold a few days later he called me out in the middle of a staff meeting that I was running at the Commerce Department. After some preliminaries about "have you talked to the President" and so forth, he offered me the job so I went over to the NSC as Executive Secretary.

Q: We'll pick this up the next time in about January 1989 when you became executive director of the NSC. We've talked about how you got the job but next time we will pick up

what you did. You had already mentioned that there seemed to be a certain split in that you thought of the job originally as being one way, and he thought of it being more of a clerk type function. We'll talk about how the job developed and all that.

We're in January 1989 and you've talked about your perception of what the role of this job on the NSC is going to be, how did it develop? Then let's talk about the personalities and issues. Can I get the dates you were there?

HUGHES: I came to be executive secretary of the National Security Council at the very end of January or early February 1989 and I left in March or April of the following year to enter the ambassadorial seminar in anticipation of going out as ambassador to Barbados.

You asked at the end of our last session how I came to the job and how that came about. In a very curious way. I had my eye so to speak on being Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for some time. If anyone had asked, and a few people did ask actually, well before the election that brought George Bush to office what role I would like to play in the Bush Administration, I readily said I would like to be the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. Most people wondered why, because it was a pretty awful job in Washington. It has that reputation, at least among some of the insiders, because unlike the Executive Secretary at the State Department who's got a couple of Deputy Executive Secretaries, the director and deputy director of the secretariat line, the line, and a number of other offices supporting him, here it is basically you and your deputy, a few clerical assistants, and of course the White House situation room. There is not much more to support at least as enormous and varied a set of tasks as the Exec Sec at the State Department. It was one of those around the clock, on call all the time, rather thankless behind the scenes jobs.

Several of my friends wondered why I wanted to serve in that kind of role in the Bush Administration. The answer from my point of view was very clear. I thought it was <u>the</u> place in which I could best deploy all of corporate knowledge from when I was Mr. Bush's deputy foreign policy advisor for more than half of the Reagan Administration: who knew where he had been, what he had done, what positions he had taken on the issues, all of that sort of thing. That might be very useful to whomever Mr. Bush would pick as his National Security Advisor, as his deputy. I was certain that those were roles for which I wasn't yet, frankly, prepared. I was in my very early 30's and while I've had a fair amount of experience under my belt, I didn't think either looking at people who had been appointed National Security Advisor or deputy National Security Advisor in the past, that I was quite ready for that kind of role or had that kind of ambition. Here was a place where I could serve Mr. Bush with all my corporate knowledge, help the National Security Advisor and also I thought help build the National Security Council staff from a rather out of the spotlight, behind the scenes sort of role.

In the Reagan Administration, the National Security Council staff had gone through, as far as I could see, a number of you might say additions or convulsions. There were a number of different experiments in how he managed his staff. There was of course a lot

of turbulence when the Iran-Contra matter broke. Many people were sort of swept out and many people were brought in. There was a sort of new model of staffing that emphasized very senior, perhaps ex-ambassador or flag officer types and senior most ranks. That had pluses and minuses. I thought I had witnessed that all, seen that all, and could possibly help bring a measure of stability and pick from the best management styles that had worked with the NSC and contribute that to the Bush Administration.

In the Reagan Administration the role of the Executive Secretary hadn't always existed. In the beginning there was a staff director who was a regular member of the NSC staff, who was a senior economic analyst and dual-hatted as staff director. That didn't work because you couldn't have somebody directing staff who was staff. The next effort was to have a staff director who was only a staff director. A military officer actually as I recall, two different military officers, were brought in for that. The military officer style worked fine. It imposed a measure of discipline and kind of kept the wheels turning but it was less than satisfactory I think from the standpoint of the substantive interaction with the staff. Many members of the staff didn't view the military administrator as anything more than a functionary, not as an intellectual co-equal and as someone that they could end run or get around or wouldn't necessarily have to pay heed to.

Finally Bob Kimmitt, who himself came out of a military background and who in the Bush administration became Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the State Department, persuaded Bud McFarlane that what really needed to be done was that the Executive Secretary's job needed to be reestablished. Henry Kissinger had abolished it. When Kissinger had arrived in the White House in the Nixon administration, there was a very powerful figure who was occupying the position of executive secretary of the NSC staff. I am trying to remember his name. It is not a household name but it is rather famous inside Washington. He was among other things a mentor of Dick McCormick, former Undersecretary for Economic Affairs at State Department. Kissinger, I was told, didn't want to see a powerful, entrenched, independent figure there in the White House sort of astride the line of communication between him and his staff, and eventually between him and the President. So he abolished the role and installed a clerk, a woman named Jean Davis, whose job was basically to push paper around. To staple together the agenda for the NSC meeting with the accompanying documents and make sure that they were at everybody's place and make sure that paper moved on time, and nothing more. She played no substantive role at all in Henry Kissinger's arrangement.

It was from that experience that this whole evolution that I was describing evolved. When Christine Dodson was the staff secretary, as I think she was called, of the NSC staff in the Carter Administration, her role was sort of an evolution on the Kissinger model. The Reagan Administration grappled with these different approaches. Kimmitt finally persuaded Bud McFarlane, hey, we should have an Executive Secretary, someone whom the staff respects substantively as at least their substantive equal. Someone whom the National Security Advisor can lean on, not just for ministerial functions but also for some substantive advice and if you would kibitzing on policy. Someone who quite conceivably could end up carving out, or bearing responsibility for, particular portfolios within the

range of things that the National Security Advisor and the deputy were grappling with. Bud bought on to that. Bob became the first Executive Secretary under this new dispensation. He stayed for about two-and-a-half years and then in rapid succession after him came three other Executive Secretaries, Bill who would become deputy secretary of energy, Rob McDaniel, Grant Green, and then I'm also forgetting the last Reagan executive secretary before I came to the job.

How did I get this job? When Bush was elected, once the election was over I was at my post at Commerce. I began to let it be known basically through my friends in the campaign and in the circle of Bush advisors that I had been working with for many years that I really would like the job as Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. I would like to serve in the Bush administration. I was asked what roles I would like to serve in and I had specified that role particularly. I didn't specify any others. I called on a number of people in the quest: the person who was in charge of presidential personnel transition, Chase Untermeyer; Dennis Ross, who had been foreign policy advisor during the campaign; Craig Fuller, who was sort of chief of staff of the transition effort; Boyden Grey, who had been counsel for the Vice President and then would be eventually counsel for the President; and so forth.

Along the way in the transition process, fairly early on, it was announced publicly that Brent Scowcroft would be the National Security Advisor. Not long thereafter that Bob Gates would be named his deputy. My friends and my colleagues passed along to Brent and recommended to Brent that I would be a good candidate to be the Executive Secretary to the NSC and sort of put me forward. Brent and I made a number of efforts over the phone to get in touch during the transition. At one point we scheduled to meet and then his schedule was such that it got blown off. We actually didn't talk about this job until literally the night of the inaugural ball. I was getting dressed at home in my tuxedo when a phone call came from Brent's office and he said something like I gather that you're interested in being Executive Secretary and so forth. On the phone even he said "you know I had in mind a different role for this thing than in the past. I had in mind that it would be a rather low level clerk type job and I'm not sure that it would be something that you would be interested in." I said that "I would like to talk to you about it." So he said that we'll set something up shortly. I went to the ball.

Very early on the next week he called me over for an interview. I went to the interview with Brent and Bob. I had never met Brent before. I knew Bob rather a lot from the Reagan Administration. We had an interview that I would say was so discouraging that I left the room thinking I'm the last person in the world that Brent Scowcroft will pick for this job because he described the role that was very much Jean Davis style. In fact, he alluded to Jean Davis: a paper pusher, non-substantive, bureaucratic. Quite honestly I couldn't imagine that the Executive Secretary's role at the NSC staff would ever go back to being that. It may be youthful arrogance on my part or determination, or call it what you will.

As I listened to what he had to say as we talked through the interview, as I knew how the

NSC had worked in the preceding eight years, what I was thinking was: general, you've been out of the White House for a long time, 12 years at least. Scowcroft Commission and all that notwithstanding, the way this place works has changed a lot in those 12 years. I didn't say this of course to Brent but what I was thinking was, once you get here and once you dig into this job, you are going to, I think, find out that the role of an Executive Secretary as Bob Kimmitt carved it out and what turned out to be my predecessors were carrying it out, was going to be so valuable to you that that is exactly how you will end up using me. I told him that I remained interested in the job and so forth and I left the interview thinking I was the last person in the world to get the job.

I really needed to think then about other roles in the administration that I hadn't been thinking about because I wasn't going to go to the White House. I had in the meantime a talk with my old boss, Don Gregg, who had been Bush's foreign policy advisor in the vice presidency and had done that role for nearly seven years, six-and-a-half years and through some very troubled turbulent times. Bush stuck with him and he stuck with Bush through the whole Iran Contra thing. Don had made a bid to Brent to be Deputy National Security Advisor or have some senior role in the White House national security establishment. I knew Brent had sort of brushed him aside or ruled that out in ways that Don didn't think were very flattering through all these years of service to George Bush. Anyway, I left the room thinking I'm not going to work in the White House. I've got to think of other options. What about DOD? What about State? Do I want to stay here at Commerce? I knew that I did not want to continue in that particular role in Commerce other than perhaps on a short term basis. A couple of days later I was conducting a staff meeting of my crew at Commerce when a call came from Brent. To my total surprise he said "I talked to the President about you. He speaks very highly of you. Are you still interested in that job?" "Well, yes, I am." "Well it's yours. When can you report?" I reported on the first of February.

How did the job evolve? I would say that it's hard to describe. In fact why don't I pause there and let you pepper me with some questions and that will sort of frame up how I describe how the job evolved.

Q: Brent Scowcroft had been on the National Security Council way back. You are really catching him quite new on the job. How did he initially sort of deal with his staff and see it going? What sort of picture was he giving you? Then I think we can talk from there about how maybe there were some changes.

HUGHES: Brent of course was inheriting a staff from the Reagan Administration. I think he made clear that he wanted to put his own people on that staff. You could think about the NSC staff a little bit like a layer cake. Top is the National Security Advisor, his deputy, the Executive Secretary and the secretariat structure that sort of manages the staff. Then you have the senior directors, or special assistants to the President, the directors and the deputy directors, and then the support staff. So you could think of it like a layer cake. Within the staff that Brent inherited I think he made it reasonably clear that he intended to have all new senior directors. These would be his guys, his picks. He intended to have a

lot of the directors and deputy directors remain holdovers from the Reagan administration. Most frequently they were detailees from other agencies: from CIA, Defense, State, sometimes from USIA.

We were under an edict, I guess, (it seems like every White House begins with this) to cut back the number of White House staff. One thing that was done was some fancy footwork and a little bit of juggling of the books to make the NSC staff smaller, leaner, meaner than the last Reagan staff that Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell presided over. How to do that? One thing Brent decided to do was to combine some of the functions of senior directors so you could get kind of double duty out of one or two senior directors. A second thing we decided to do was basically change the counting rules for how we dealt with support personnel like from NSA and so forth who were detailed to the situation room so the rolls didn't look quite as large. I don't think that was necessarily sort of intellectually dishonest. I will let other people decide whether it was dishonest. The Clinton Administration has done the same thing. Every administration does this.

Brent's picks for the senior director roles in the NSC staff started to dribble out into the press well before he and I ever talked about my being the executive secretary. I knew who many of the people were whom Brent was going to lean on as his senior directors on the NSC staff: Bob Blackwill as the senior director for Europe and Soviet Affairs, Richard Haass as the senior director for Near Eastern Affairs, David Miller as the senior director for Africa Affairs and also for what you might call drugs and thugs, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics. David had been ambassador in Tanzania as I recall and in Zimbabwe. Ginny Lampley, who had long been associated with Brent (she had an ex-military background) was to be his senior director for legislative liaison or the congressional things. There were several areas of the staff where it seemed Brent had people in mind and he wanted to fill those roles.

Then it seemed there were other parts of the staff where Bob Gates had more say about who was picked. For example Bill Working as the Senior Director for Intelligence Policy or eventually Dean Hoffman who was brought from the Agency. Dean had been NIO [National Intelligence Officer] for international economic matters and he was to be the senior economic officer on the staff.

It seemed like at first Brent didn't have sort of crystal clear view of who they wanted to run the Latin America shop. Bob Pastorino, at that time out in San Francisco, was a holdover from the late Reagan Administration in the senior director's role for Latin America. He was (inaudible) and so were the rest of the crew who were working under him including a great guy from the CIA. Another of the guys that Brent clearly picked for a senior director's role in the staff was Arnie Cantor to be the senior director for the defense function. Brent picked a number of senior directors. He also picked a couple of director positions under them of people who he was particularly close to or regarded particularly highly professionally. One of those was Condi Rice, who is now the Provost as I recall of Stanford but who was an extremely bright, extremely able, young black Soviet specialist. That was sort of the structure of the staff as we came into the Bush

Administration. These people arrived quite quickly right with Brent and we got down to work.

Many of the other directors I should say on the staff did remain as holdovers from the Reagan Administration. In the Near East area Shireen (I can't recall the last name) and Sandy Charles stayed with Richard Haass and his group and so forth. Some stayed, some went, many were Brent's picks, a few seemed to be Bob Gates' choices. The choices Brent made seemed to be in the areas of his particular interest and concentration and people whom he had worked with or known, or come to regard highly professionally through his years as a defense intellectual.

Q: One of the things as you talked about the composition that seems to be missing here is the conservative representative from the Senate or the House that had been in the Reagan Administration. Somebody who was you might say from the right wing intellectual or something of this nature, or at least a political animal if nothing else. You really are talking about pretty much a professional group.

HUGHES: That's exactly right and I think that is exactly the way Brent wanted it.

Q: It could be that Brent wanted it but there are other considerations. Sometimes you have to throw some meat to particularly the conservative wing of the Republican Party but this doesn't seem to have been a matter.

HUGHES: If you look at the National Security Council staff as sort of a curve or development over the course of the Reagan Administration, I think you would see at the very beginning of the Reagan administration this point of contrast with Brent's and George Bush's approach. I think you would see at the very beginning of the Reagan Administration a much more highly ideological National Security Council staff from Dick Allen and Doug Mann, his deputy, through the choice of senior directors. People like Richard Pipes, who had well known views about the Soviet Union, and director level people like Smetty Kramer on arms control in the staff.

You also saw a pronounced shift in the way detailees were used in the NSC where probably at the end of the Carter Administration most of the detailees on the NSC would have come from the State Department. There was scarcely a single State Department detailee in the first Reagan Administration NSC staff. The detailees were drawn from the intelligence community and from the military services. These were institutions that were regarded as more politically reliable and ideologically correct. Institutions with more backbone.

While that pattern persisted over time, I think a general trend that you can see in the Reagan Administration is that it was progressively diluted over eight years. I would say that it reached its zenith, that style of the NSC staff, with the period of Bill Clark as the National Security Advisor in the second part of the third year of the Reagan administration. Then with Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter and then certainly with

Carlucci and Colin Powell it eroded, so that at the end there were very few identified ideological conservatives that were sort of imbedded in the Reagan NSC staff. For example, Constantine Menges who had been for a time senior director for Latin American Affairs and before that the national intelligence officer for Latin America at the CIA, was certainly a well identified figure in conservative circles and very well regarded and respected in those and many other circles intellectually. Constantine found favor in the later stages of the Judge Clark regime but found, I think, professional difficulty in the later stages of the Bud McFarlane era with the NSC staff. By the time Frank Carlucci arrived on the scene, I don't think Constantine was any longer on the staff. That just gives you an idea of how that has gone.

I think that it was partly the tone set by President Bush. I don't think he wanted his NSC staff to be loaded up with ideological people or political people or people with political preconceptions about policy. He was very much a respecter of professionalism and professionals and even though some of these professionals were not drawn from the ranks of career services (Arnie Cantor came from Rand, Condi Rice came from university), they were clearly all professionals in the national security business.

Q: Before we talk of issues we might finish off with the staffing thing. Did you find yourself stapling agenda? How did your position evolve?

HUGHES: I might say by the way just as a last comment on that last point, that if you actually looked over that staff you might say that even though I consider myself to be a national security professional first and foremost, I may have been the person on the staff with the most political, if you would, kind of experience. That political experience wasn't what you had described, being the darling of conservative circles or the protégé of conservative Congressman Y.

Q: Usually the typical one would be the special assistant to Senator X from Georgia or something who wanted his person and the President would feel compelled to do this in order to assuage that particular wing of the party. But Bush didn't play that gambit?

HUGHES: No. There was only one occasion on which something akin to that game was played and it didn't last long and it wasn't particularly successful. We can get into that. It had to do with the staffing of the Latin America function.

To answer your question: did I end up stapling agendas and pushing papers? The role evolved into I think a particularly difficult one partly because of the approach to managing the staff that Brent had, and partly because of just the pace of the way the Bush White House operated. What do I mean by particularly difficult and what are we talking about? Brent as an operator tends to from my experience, operate very much as a lone practitioner. He is the wise man with years and years of accumulated experience. He knows his mind about most of the issues that he is going to grapple with, particularly if they are in his main areas of expertise: Europe, security, U.S. Soviet or U.S. East bloc relations at the time, perhaps China, Japan relations.

My perception was that he made it his priority to develop a particularly tight personal relationship with the President. Whenever you were with the President he saw his job, as far as I could tell, as oriented totally on serving the President, serving the President's needs, responding to the President's wishes. Here you have a President who wasn't at all passive about what he wanted to do in foreign policy. He was very active. The morning briefing of the President which began an hour earlier than President Reagan's did, frequently ended with the President giving Brent direction to get so and so, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Thatcher on the phone. He wanted to talk to them now. He I think worked very much toward the President.

Bob Gates worked very closely with Brent. They went almost everywhere together whereas very often it's a case that a principal is working with the President and the deputy is handling things back in the office. These two men went to almost virtually every meeting together. They did almost everything together. Brent also tended to work not, I think, very closely with other members of his staff.

At the time, except for a couple of what I would say favorites or intimates on particular issues like Condi Rice or Bob Blackwill or perhaps from time to time Richard Haass, I thought Brent tended to use the staff like a library. That is a set of references, or a set of resources that was sort of on the shelf and when he needed them for something he would pick one of them down off the shelf. He would have them come over to give him a briefing. He would give them some taskings, put something in action and then put them back on the shelf. The staff's interaction with the National Security Advisor was actually very limited. We had a morning senior staff meeting every morning. I had to persuade Brent that it would be useful to reinstate the Reagan Administration habit of having a general staff meeting at least once a month held in a big conference room on the other side of West Exec so that the rest of the staff, the directors and the deputy directors who also felt that they were part of the National Security Council and often did a good deal of the grunt work, could actually see their boss. They could actually hear what he had to say and get a little bit of a briefing about what was going on in the West Wing.

Regarding my role, yes it had a lot of administrating to it, there was no question about that: getting the National Security Council meetings set up, scheduling them, distributing agendas, getting papers in on time and so forth, but that all comes with the territory anyway. It also turned into a particularly difficult mediating role if you would between the staff and Brent because the staff in the early months anyway became, I think, very frustrated that paper didn't move. It was sort of like "we sent Brent a memo on this two months ago and there is no action" or "we sent Brent a memo on this two weeks ago and there is no action. We've had no response. Can you get something out of him." In fact I had very little personal access to Brent. I myself worked mostly with Bob Gates because Brent was mainly either with the President or closeted in his office behind closed doors. Through Bob or through his secretaries we would keep trying to get action on different things that the staff had proposed to Brent but where he had not yet gotten around to attending to them.

The staff I think felt very much out of touch with what was going on day-to-day in the West Wing except for a handful of intimates that Brent tended to rely on, the favorite references that he pulled off the shelf most frequently because they were the hottest issues that he had to grapple with or that the President had to grapple with. I ended up trying to play the role of the shock absorber as it were between the staff frustrations and the realities of the front office. It was a very uncomfortable role particularly without the kind of personal access to Brent that would have made that so much easier to do.

What else can be said about the role? I didn't, unlike my predecessors, have the privilege of attending the National Security Council meetings themselves. The effort was to shut down the number of people who were actually in the room because among other things the Bush Administration was very, very concerned about leaks. President Bush was practically phobic about leaks and I think regarded leaks as disloyal. As efforts by lower level subordinate people to essentially make policy through the press or sandbag their superiors on what policy decisions could or couldn't be made through the press. He was absolutely determined that things would not leak. It was one of the dominating mind sets of his White House, and it resulted in frequent exclusion from meetings of people that in the Reagan Administration would in the normal course of things have been there. I was the least consequential probably of the people who weren't regularly in certain meetings.

There were instances where our ambassador to Germany was disinvited if you would, or not invited, to sit in on the President's meeting with Helmut Kohl or our ambassador to, I'm trying to think of a couple of other countries... Germany was really sort of the drop-dead surprise like what do you mean the ambassador to Germany isn't welcome to sit in on the meeting? It undercuts him terrifically.

There was clearly a great concern with keeping the group of people participating in virtually any kind of meeting as small as possible. If that meant either undercutting perhaps someone's official position, like the ambassador to Germany for example, or if it meant even passing by the opportunity to through a sort of a visible demonstration elevate the stature in the eyes of say a foreign visitor of a particular functionary in one of the departments whose job was going to be involved working closely with that government and perhaps trying to extract things from that government, that person might well not be included nevertheless. There was much less discretion actually on the part of the staff, on the part of really anybody in the chain of command, to recommend who would be in that meeting. It was much more a personal decision of Brent, the President and Secretary Baker, a very tight inner core of decision making in the White House.

Q: This is parallel to some extent in the State Department, isn't it, under Baker?

HUGHES: That's what I heard but I wasn't of course there, I wasn't on the State Department staff. But when I was ambassador of course, you get a different feel of this from the field than you do from the Seventh Floor, but yes, that was the reputation in the State Department as well.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the motivation sounds different than under Kissinger. Kissinger seemed to have a relationship with Nixon, but egos seemed to have played a major role. He wanted to control things but also, egos may be the wrong word, he wanted to make sure that he was the central figure. Whereas I take it that this was not coming from Scowcroft trying to cut other people out but it was coming both from Bush and also just the personal style that Bush and Scowcroft had developed.

HUGHES: I think that is right. Unless I misjudge, and I certainly hope I don't, I don't think that Brent's motivation or Bob Gates' motivation was at all sort of ego driven and I don't think that either of those men were power tripping here. I think that this was much more of a shared personal style and a tone that was probably set at the top by Mr. Bush himself: I want it to be tight; I want it to leak-proof; I want it to be my intimate trusted advisors whom I know and regard highly.

At times in the Reagan Administration there was a sort of ebb and flow of the interaction of the members of the National Security Council staff with the President. When Judge Clark was the National Security Advisor, because he didn't have a deep substantive background, or he didn't have the reputation for such in the national security area, he tended to bring the individual members of the National Security Council staff into the oval office for briefings with the President frequently. In fact he often would bring them in every morning. For the morning briefing he might bring in a different expert depending on what the topic of the day was going to be or what was hot to handle that day.

In the Bush Administration, especially in the early months of the Bush Administration, my impression was that the members of the staff, even senior directors, had very limited contact with the President himself. Brent tended to be the intermediary between the staff and the President. It was he and Bob reporting, advising, and so forth to the President. As time went on and as certain crises unfolded, crises like Panama and some of the events that transpired in the Middle East, certainly when it came to the Gulf War, staff members did become much more intensely involved with the President and were frequent visitors to the oval office.

One of the real ironies is that at a human level, whereas Ronald Reagan as President may not have remembered and recognized the faces of and associated names with all of these NSC staffers who cycled through his office, most of Ronald Reagan's NSC staff felt that they knew him. They saw him regularly in the Oval Office and in action in the National Security Council meetings. Whereas Mr. Bush who had a great memory for names and faces, and a tremendous personal touch with people, probably only knew a very small number of his NSC staffers. Some of them he knew more from the Reagan days when he interacted with them there, than he knew from his presidency because they just didn't have very much contact with the President.

Q: We will come to the developments during this time that you were with the NSC later. One thing that always strikes me is when you have a president who is very conversant

with foreign affairs, and the head of the NSC and his deputy director are conversant with this, that you don't use the staffs as much. This is all fine but there is always something that is going to come out of left field and they really don't know the territory. Problems will show that sort of in an open discussion somebody will say but this isn't going to work in Ouagadougou or something like that. Did you see any cases where the President and Scowcroft would head off in one direction and yet you or somebody was trying to say wait a minute, this is fine but what you're doing won't work because of the situation in such and such a country?

HUGHES: I guess I could think of a couple of examples in the direction that you're referring to. I am not thinking so much as country specific examples as I am thinking of issue examples. Maybe I should say a little bit more about Brent and Bob as a team then this point will make more sense. Brent Scowcroft clearly has been around the national security world so long that in a sense he is what in cricket terms is called a good all-rounder. He clearly has greater depth of expertise in certain areas, or had at that time, than in others. He was profoundly steeped in military affairs, arms control, strategic questions, NATO issues, east-west security issues, Russia as I mentioned. Those were mostly Bob Gates' areas of strength as well. Neither of them was probably terrifically deeply expert in Africa, or Latin America. They probably had shared considerable expertise in the problems of the Middle East since we had been grappling with these for decades and they were always front burner issues. But I suspect that neither of them was particularly deeply expert in any of the functional areas of activity that came up from UN issues, to international environment issues, to export control issues, things of that sort that I had worked on.

In fact one of the ways that their areas of strength and some of the areas where they may have been not so strong showed up was in the National Security Decision Directorate Number One that the President issued on something like the first day that he was in office. It set up the NSC structure as he intended it to function and established a number of what we used to call senior inter-agency groups. Those groups were basically on every region of the world plus arms control and disarmament.

There were a whole number of inter-agency groups that functioned in the past and that needed to function in the future because we needed a mechanism to handle them. No provision had been set up for an inter-agency mechanism to adjudicate export control matters or to adjudicate international organization or environment, or drugs, terrorism, or those kinds of issues. I persuaded by a memo working with the other parts of the NSC staff that were responsible for those areas and noticed that all of a sudden the inter-agency mechanisms that had existed before to adjudicate their problems disappeared. We put up a recommendation to Brent that another directorate be established that would set up several additional committees to deal with these functional areas that perhaps Bob and Brent didn't have clearly in mind when they started out. He eventually approved that and I gathered suggestions from around the staff and wrote that particular decision directorate. It went out in I forget what number it was, maybe it was 12 or maybe it was 11. That was how we rounded out the inter-agency process.

When it came to an issue like what the President should do with respect to the Brazil environment problem or the Rio Conference which came later of course in the administration, or what posture the President should take on various international environmental initiatives, my perception was that the NSC front office tended to not take a view on this. They tended to want to let that issue go because it wasn't front and center in their scheme of things. As a result the action tended to be driven by parts of the administration that were mostly vested in that agenda, particularly Riley in the EPA. They tended to want to chart a much more, if you would, liberal or environmentalist oriented course than some of the conservatives who were either in the administration or in the Republican fraction on Capitol Hill. What ended up happening was, on for example many international environmental issues, the position of the administration was sort of pulled along by the environmentally sensitive elements of the administration. The NSC didn't play much of a role in this even though it may have concerned an international conference undertaking. The position that would be sort of heading toward the president would end up getting headed off by John Sununu, who was more of, if you would, an ideologically centered figure in the administration. He was Bush's Chief of Staff. He'd short stop that issue. That may be partly also an artifact of not having an NSC staff with people on it who had ideological or conservative ideological moorings. They were more policy professionals, national security gurus. That's an example.

Another example of a different sort is more in the personnel area. Latin America had been an explosive, contentious issue between Congress and the presidency over Central America. When Bob Pastorino was recruited from the NSC staff by the former deputy National Security Advisor John Negroponte, who was designated to be ambassador to Mexico, to go down to Mexico as his DCM, the question became who would become the head NSC guy on Latin America? Brent and Bob Gates didn't seem to have particularly strong views about this. My impression was that they didn't have an Arnie Cantor or a Bob Blackwill specifically in mind and they were looking for ideas. Various candidates were proposed. One candidate that surfaced was someone who actually had a political background, or a campaign background, but he proved unacceptable to Bernie Aronson, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the time. They almost got a candidate, then the position was sort of left hanging.

Then I got a call from my director of administration telling me that Bob Gates had called her, not me, (this will give you an idea a little bit of how the staff worked) to say that she should put on the NSC roster the name of a particular officer from the State Department who was going to be the new senior director for Latin American Affairs. I assumed that this was a nomination of the Foreign Service or that somehow Brent after talking to Larry Eagleburger, or someone from the State Department putting it up through Larry Eagleburger to Brent, had said that this would be a good idea. At my next meeting with Bob Gates I said "I understand that this person is going to come on board. You realize that there will probably be a problem with this." He said "no, I don't know what you're talking about." Then I told him what little I knew about this officer, and I didn't know very much at that time but I knew enough. This officer had a very difficult relationship

with a number of the conservative senators and congressmen on Capitol Hill who were deeply involved in Latin American issues. It would be sending at a minimum a signal to them that we were sort of turning sharply left in our Latin America policy or Central America policy, that it was not going to be run by rock ribbed conservatives and so forth as in the past. This was not Jose Serrano or Constantine Menges. It was not the sort of people who had been running this part of the NSC in the past.

Bob didn't profess very much concern about it, but within about 48 hours my phone rang as I was sitting at my desk, informing me to take this officer off the rolls. He never actually arrived in the compound. What I understood subsequently had happened was that as soon as word filtered around, and it does filter around in this town, that he was going to come to the NSC staff, Senator Helms and perhaps others called Sununu, not Scowcroft. At least I understood that they called Sununu, not Scowcroft. They basically raised hell about it. He got so hot that the preferment was canceled.

There was then a quest for a new person. The new person that was finally settled on was someone who had credentials. This was one of the few times that I ever saw a semi-politically motivated choice of an NSC staff senior professional in that period. He had some credentials and some credence with Helms and the very conservative Republicans in Congress. That officer came on board and was there for about four months.

Q: Who was that?

HUGHES: Ted Briggs, who had been our ambassador just before in Panama. He came on the staff and was there for about four months. He ran into various battles with Bernie Aronson at the State Department over the way we would conduct Latin America policy. He was very much in the framework of the Reagan approach to Central America. Clearly the Bush Administration intended to turn in a very different direction on Central America and cauterize this issue and get it off the table politically so the administration didn't burn up endless political capital in Congress wrangling over lethal aid to the Contras and all of those issues. We did not talk about this is detail but I am sure Ted dissented from the path that the administration was taking. How he expressed that dissent, with whom he shared it on Capitol Hill or whatever, I don't know but I am sure that it filtered around. I am sure that as a result, Bernie Aronson and maybe Larry Eagleburger and others at the State Department decided that this just wasn't working to have someone with that strong a personality, with such strong convictions on this issue, pointing in a different direction inside the NSC staff. My understanding is that basically the State Department dictated that there had to be a change there so Brent made a change. It was something that I also had never seen a National Security Advisor do.

Q: Let's move to the issues. During this time, the ones I can think of was the Gulf War was sort of developing. No, it hadn't developed.

HUGHES: No. It started after I left. The invasion began in August of 1990. I was in

transition actually to the embassy at that time.

Q: When you were going through the expertise of Scowcroft and Gates, one glaring omission was Asia. Did you feel they also did not quite have the same feel for Asia as they did for other areas?

HUGHES: That's hard for me to say. In fact I was trying to remember whom they chose as the senior guy on Asian affairs. It was Carl Jackson, as I recall, who came from DOD. Carl then went on to be Dan Quayle's National Security Advisor in the second half of the Bush term. It is hard for me to evaluate, for what my judgment is worth, how comfortably they dealt with the range of Asian issues. They clearly knew their mind about who they wanted to pick as their senior Asia person. They kept on Doug Paul from the CIA under Carl in the Asia shop. I am trying to remember who else they brought on in the Asia shop. Maybe it was just a two person Asia shop now that I think about it, for a time anyway.

Whatever their depth of expertise, they clearly knew whom they wanted to draw on for expert advise so I wouldn't say that that was like an area of weakness or myopia or anything like that. It is clear that you knew where these men's heart was, what were the things that they really knew about and what were the things that they were really, really interested in. The job of the other staff members on other issues was largely to tend those fields, to keep those issues off the President's desk so to speak, and handle them themselves so that they did not burden the upper echelon at the White House.

Q: The problem is that the world is not a tidy place so that if you are really interested in one thing there is always an outbreak coming from somewhere else. Anyway, during this year that you were there, what were the major national security issues?

HUGHES: The first major issue if you would that came up was that there was of course to begin with the reviews of our policy. We did a policy review on practically every major substantive area of the world and every functional issue.

Regarding the relationship with the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was in power. There was a period of change; glasnost and perestroika were going on and new leaders like Yeltsin were starting to emerge. The President and Brent Scowcroft were trying to define what should be our relationship and what should be our posture towards the Soviet Union. One of the early decisions of the Bush Administration was to have a kind of pause in the relationship with Moscow while we did an assessment. At a recent conference on the Bush presidency, Gorbachev actually spoke about this and said that he was surprised. He expected when George Bush was elected the pace of rapprochement and of working together with the U.S., interacting with the Soviet Union and with his efforts to bring about change, would pick up. In fact he was surprised he said and disappointed that there was this pause in our relationship while we did this review for 60 or so days.

Once the review was done there were a series of initiatives toward the Soviet Union. One was the offer of an Open Skies Agreement, another was the offer of an early meeting with

Gorbachev and it was arranged for, as I recall, November in the Mediterranean. The idea was having it on board ships on nobody's territory, not on land. Bush had a naval background so they thought this was kind of interesting with a Russian ship and a U.S. ship doing trade visits and so forth. It didn't work out that way in the end but it sounded interesting. The relationship with Russia was one key issue.

The Middle East was a perennial issue and we almost have to sort of go line by line through where we were in the Middle East peace then. Shamir was in office and the Bush Administration had clearly decided that it wanted to advance the process of Middle East peace substantively. They saw the Israeli government, then a Likud government, as being one of the major impediments to further peace progress, in particularly the settlements policy. In Shamir's earliest visit to the White House, Bush pressed Shamir, as I understand, to desist settlement activity which was creating a fait accompli. At least I think the administration regarded it as creating a fait accompli on the grounds of just complicating the possibility of a peace settlement. I understand in his meeting with the President, Shamir said things that were taken to mean yes we will cease and desist, and he didn't. Bush felt betrayed and double-crossed by Shamir, and that colored the relationship from there and led the administration to actually do some very courageous things to try to pressure Israel to stop the settlements process and to engage in serious peace efforts with its neighbors.

Central America was a significant issue but it tended to be partly because of personnel turbulence in the NSC, partly because of the way that Brent, the President and Baker wanted to handle it. More of the initiative shifted over to the State Department under Bernie Aronson to craft a sort of a way out of our dilemma over Contra aid and Nicaragua. Hence was crafted the set of meetings that led to the Esquipulas Agreement and that led to the holding of elections in Nicaragua which turned out to be free and which turned out to produce a non-Sandinista victory.

Along the way the administration faced a series of if you would, crises or opportunities. Probably the first major one was Panama. I am trying to remember the exact sequence of this, whether Panama came first or the Philippines came first. The Philippines imbroglio or crisis as I recall came in August if I am not mistaken. It certainly came at a time when the President was away. It was largely managed by the Deputies Committee involved under Gates, meeting in the White House situation room. We received word that a coup was under way against Cory Aquino. We received a request from the Philippine government to intervene somehow and stop the coup makers. Deliberations were organized very quickly in the White House Situation Room among the deputies. Decisions were recommended to the president that we couldn't intervene directly but what we could do was basically keep the Philippine Air Force on the ground by flying CAP over Manila which would be a demonstration of support for Cory Aquino. It wouldn't be belligerent. It would keep the Philippine Air Force on the ground and therefore kind of confine the resources available to the coup makers. It proved to be an extremely wise decision. The coup failed, Cory Aquino remained in office, and for the remainder of her term was forever, of course, in our debt.

We went through a couple of episodes with Panama. A major issue was what to do about Noriega. It was blatant drugs trafficking. It was clear that he was an unsavory character. He had promised elections, held them and then disrespected the results. The candidates were brutalized in the streets and very ugly public ways. At one stage we were actually in the middle of preparing for a White House arrival ceremony, I can't recall for which dignitary, when information arrived in the Sit Room. It was actually an appeal from some officers in Panama for assistance because they were in the process of having a coup. We received a little bit of advanced information about this earlier as I recall, that such a thing might happen and these officers were mounting a coup.

The question was what to do? They didn't actually ask for assistance as I recall. They just told us what they were doing. We scrambled around. I spent most of my time making sure that this arrival ceremony actually occurred believe it or not, because without any longer someone responsible for protocol functions in the White House, those things fell to me to do. I was trying to juggle two things. Making sure that the Sit Room kept information flowing to the NSC staff members, Brent and the President about what was happening in Panama, while we set up this ceremonial function. The coup quickly collapsed. It became clear that the coup wasn't going to succeed. It was not the opportune time to intervene. I think from that episode, the administration began then looking for what would be the next opportunity to intervene. I think it probably put on the mind set that we would not want to miss the next opportunity to somehow get Noriega out of the way. That was my impression.

That opportunity came several months later, as I recall in September or October, when Noriega's troops began a campaign of increasing harassment against Americans in Panama. They picked up a sailor and his wife. They beat up the guy in front of his wife and threatened his wife with rape or something. This story got to Mr. Bush and he was very livid about it, very clearly. It was almost a metaphor for his experience at the prep school where he saw some boys beating up on some underclassman and as a respected and physically strong upperclassman, he got them off of him. He said that we're not going to take this. We are not going to have our people in this kind of jeopardy. So there were a series of deputy meetings and National Security Council meetings that led in very rapid order within a few days to the intervention in Panama. Again a major issue that we faced.

Another issue that we faced is the whole issue of counter-narcotics strategy. The President, from the days of heading the south Florida task force and the National Narcotics Board interdiction system when he was Vice President, clearly wanted to do something about the drugs problem in Latin America. The drugs law enforcement agencies working with the NSC staff under the office of the drug policy czar, Bill Bennett, developed an approach, a strategy to focus on the kingpins of the Latin America drug trade. Bush decided that one of the things that could be done to give impetus to this effort was to propose a four presidents' summit in Colombia. It was a very brave thing to do, to go to Colombia.

He actually went to Cartagena, one of the places that was sort of safe in Colombia, to the Colombian President's summer house there on the bay. He went down for a one day summit with the presidents of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, as I recall. No, maybe it was just Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. Out of that grew, among other things, the Andean Trade Preference Act, sort of a decision directorate that there would be a multi-pronged attack on the drugs trading which would include an enhanced interdiction effort, a kingpin enforcement strategy, pressures on the governments to do as much eradication as possible, and economic incentives to try to give the countries other economic outlets beyond illicit drugs. Hence the birth of the Andean Trade Preference Act.

Q: On the Panama incursion, invasion, takeover, intervention, what was the role of the NSC at this point?

HUGHES: A very good question. I am even trying to remember who was in charge of our Latin America operation at the point that Panama came down. I think that it was probably by then Bill Price because I think that Ted Briggs had come and gone. He had brought Bill to the NSC staff, his old DCM from Honduras and from Panama. He had brought Bill to the NSC staff and Bill was sort of the acting-senior director and then became senior director and stayed on for the rest of the period.

The role of the NSC staff, having said I didn't attend the National Security Council meetings or the deputies meetings but I did read all the minutes and look over the outcomes that came out, my sense was that this was very much a top-down operation. Again that tight circle of decision making - Bush, Brent, Gates, Baker, perhaps Aronson, certainly Eagleburger - decided that something needed to be done. They were relying more on the NSC staff people, (in that case I think it probably would have been Price and Checelli) to be sources of fine tuning device, filters of information or interpreters of information, and transmitters and guiders of direction to the agencies to implement what basically was decided at the top.

My own mental model of this is that it was not the case of Grenada. In the case of the Grenada rescue operation, I wouldn't describe it as an entirely bottom-up exercise. I did have the opportunity to participate in the crisis pre-planning group meetings and some of the special situation group meetings that led to the decisions to go into Grenada. In that case, it was clear to me anyway, the President and the Vice President had not made up their minds about what they were going to do. They were taking advice from the military, from the State Department, and from the NSC staff about what to do. There were advisors in those roles, people on the NSC staff, John Poindexter himself, and others, who were urging or suggesting that this was a ripe opportunity because we were of course protecting the lives of American students and responding to the call of the OECS and all of those nice legal formalities. But it was also a ripe opportunity to rid the Eastern Caribbean of the Maurice Bishop Marxist government threat, and to send a powerful signal to Nicaragua and Cuba on the cheap, and again cauterize a little regional security problem and keep it from festering into something bigger. It could probably be done very

quickly and relatively cheaply in terms of cost of human lives and everything else.

Through that process of sequential decision making, learning that there was a task force on the way to relieve one of the carrier battle groups that could be diverted south for "evacuation" operations and then eventually the intervention operation, the President came around to supporting the idea of yes we should go in. Part of the reason I think that was done was because George Bush and George Shultz in this Special Situation Group expressed the view that this was something that should be done.

In the case of Panama, without unfortunately the advantage of being in the room when these sessions occurred, my impression was not that members of the bureaucracy at lower levels were pushing the senior most levels in the administration to take advantage of this opportunity, but rather that the President had made clear that he didn't want the next opportunity to depose Noriega to go by. He certainly didn't want American service people being brutalized and beat up by Noriega's [inaudible] battalion. It was rather that tight circle of people saying that if now's the time, then now's the time. Taking advantage of I forget what the specific provocation was, I think it may have been Noriega's forces blocked access impermissibly to some U.S. facilities or the use of our transit of certain areas in Panama that gave us the excuse to say well now is the time to lead the intervention.

I think there were two different decision models and I don't have the impression, I hope it doesn't do Bill a disservice, that Bill came to Brent with the idea that here's the perfect opportunity to intervene to cauterize the problem in Panama. I think it is rather the other way around, that Bill provided expert advice, Checelli may have provided expert advice about some of the parameters. The military people would have provided a lot of advice about the situation on the ground with our facilities and what we could do, what we could bring in and so forth, how we could get it in. But the decisions were driven from the top.

Q: What about the way the NSC was structured when you were there, did they have a narcotics person staff or not?

HUGHES: Oh yes.

Q: What sort of a role did that play in the Cartagena meeting and structure?

HUGHES: We had a sort of drugs and thugs unit if you would, that dealt with counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and I guess you might say international crime related problems. David Miller headed it, Randy Beers, I think he might still be on the NSC staff, two or three other guys, detailees from DEA and from the military staffed it. David was dual-hatted as the senior director for this global issues director and the senior director for African Affairs. Brent very much wanted it that way and David tried to get relieved of one or the other of those hats on a number of occasions but Brent very much wanted it to be a dual-hatted role.

I would say that was a unit that had more latitude to plan, direct and initiate policy, than say the folks who were working Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was an area where clearly there was an important administration priority but where at the same time I don't think Brent or Bob claimed particular depth of expertise or absorption in those issues. So David Miller and his crew were able to take a lot more initiative in planning policy. If they didn't actually themselves propose, they certainly had an important hand in developing the idea for the Presidents' Summit in Cartagena and of this drugs strategy that emerged from that. They worked very closely at the same time with the staff of OMBCP, the national drug control policy office at the White House, Bill Bennett's staff and John Walter in particular. This is one of those cases where a unit of the NSC staff reached out and worked very, very closely with another unit at the White House in OMBCP to craft the administration's policy. The NSC staff would write up the directives that drove the international side of that effort, monitor the implementation of those directives, and kind of drive the agencies to fulfill and be responsive to the policy that the President laid down. Does that give you a little bit of a sense of it?

Q: Yes. I would think the overriding thing during this time was the great changes that were going on in the Soviet Union. Here is our mortal enemy doing almost a 180-degree turnaround and although we probably weren't as sure then as we knew later that they were basically headed for collapse and dissolution. This was THE issue. How was the NSC used to deal with this?

HUGHES: Here I will have to share impressions with you because my detailed memory is a little hazy on this. My impression is that events were changing more rapidly in Russia, in the Soviet Union, than practically we at the NSC staff could keep up with it. Frankly, again this is my impression, I think that through much of the first year of the Bush Administration anyway, we were playing catch up ball so to speak. We began as I said with a pause to assess relations. We then decided to go forward with some initiatives to try to hold out something to Gorbachev, to seize opportunities like open skies. This was supposed to be capturing the high ground.

Q: Open skies meaning what?

HUGHES: Open skies was a probably unnecessary initiative in my view but it was a proposal to negotiate a treaty that would permit fixed wing reconnaissance overflights of U.S.- territory, Russian territory, NATO and Warsaw Pact territory by all the participants of the treaty. We would work out some scheme that somehow (there were obviously a lot of technicalities involved, and pre-clearance and flight safety and so forth) we would be able to basically overfly the territory and photograph, observe and so forth. It was supposed to be a confidence building measure and a way to leverage our inherent openness into greater openness on the Soviets' part.

Q: This incidentally was proposed by Dwight Eisenhower back in the '50s.

HUGHES: Yes, it wasn't a fresh idea, was it? In any case we proposed this notion and

began to try to get closer to Gorbachev. At the same time we had visits. There was a first visit by Yeltsin to the White House. I forget exactly what role Yeltsin was playing at that time.

Q: Mayor of Moscow.

HUGHES: That's right. He was pegged by many as an up and coming leader. He was received in the White House. He was then publicly derided by some nameless NSC staffers as a drunk and a not very serious person. This struck me as a very strange way to do business with a country that was changing so rapidly that we couldn't really predict events. Today's mayor might be tomorrow's leader.

Q: Did you get involved with this because this is not a minor issue? This was an effort to make Gorbachev THE person and to knock down any opposition to him. It struck me as I was on the outside and out of government at the time, what the hell was happening, because doing this, and particularly coming apparently from the NSC?

HUGHES: I'm not sure, I'm not in a position to say. I absolutely don't know how calculated that particular remark to the press was from the unnamed NSC source. My own interpretation was very much like yours, that it was a combination of trying to reinforce Gorbachev as the leader we were betting on and the leader we wanted to work with. To also maybe downplay a little bit any sensitivity that there might have been in Moscow about anybody else but Gorbachev being received in the White House and at the same time just an expression of what particular individuals perhaps thought as their impressions of Yeltsin on first viewing. I gather that he didn't seem like he was entirely with it when he came to the White House.

Q: Let's say he has a drinking problem.

HUGHES: It didn't seem like very calculated statecraft to me. I had no involvement in the episode. I read about it in the newspapers like everybody else. I just scratched my head, like why in this environment do that or allow that to be done? It did not make sense to me but I think your and my guesses about the logic of it were pretty on target. I do believe that the Bush administration made a very calculated bet. They bet that Gorbachev was the guy to back. Why did they do that? They bet on him because he was bringing about reform. He was willing to move with us on arms control issues and bargain evidently reasonably. He was the leader we knew and they bet I think also on stability in Russia.

I'm not expressing this very well so let me try a bit different tack. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were two multi-ethnic, multi-national composites that were coming, both at the same time, under great strain with international division, factional fighting, and so forth. What was the Bush Administration's reaction to these? I think in both cases the reaction was to do whatever we can in a situation where we may have little leverage, to try to keep the country together. Not to have it fragment or fracture into a bunch of

warring little nationalities and/or warring nationalisms. Try to preserve the status quo. Try to reform the status quo so that it is freer, it is less threatening, it is less repressive, it is more congenial to deal with. But certainly not to try to bring about a fundamental change in the geo-strategic order like the dismantlement of the Soviet Union.

Let's imagine that there might have been someone in the Reagan White House, the Reagan NSC, whose views would have been such that they would say here is a great opportunity to actually foster the dismantlement of this artificial creation of the Soviet Union into a series of independent nationalities and permanently reduce the capability of this entity to ever threaten our security or world security again. I think that view would have been very unwelcome in a Bush White House because it would have been regarded as oh heavens, opening Pandora's box. Where would that have led? How would that have been seen by the rulers in Moscow? It would have been seen as aggressive, belligerent and threatening and it would have excited all the wrong reactions that we would want to excite. No, we should not be seen at all as fostering anything but stability of the leadership and continuity of the Soviet state.

I think that was sort of our approach and the result was that I believe that we ended up playing catch-up ball constantly. I think that we were playing catch-up ball when the Berlin Wall came down. I don't remember anyone anticipating it. I think we all watched it on CNN as I recall. I don't remember anybody getting more than 24 hours advanced notice that this was likely to happen. I think we were playing catch-up ball when we saw other countries in Eastern Europe even before the Wall came down (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) start to let people out including letting East Germans out through their borders, events that made the collapse of the Wall practically inevitable. As far as I could tell I think through this whole initial period from the review onwards, events were outpacing all planning in the East Bloc and Russia and we were reacting. Reacting to Vaclav Havel's rise in Czechoslovakia and bringing him to the White House at an early stage. Reacting to the fall of the Berlin Wall and so forth. I think it was a very reactive mode.

Q: In the NSC at this time, could you sort of compare and contrast at whatever sort of get-togethers you and some others, or people that you were aware of, to sit around and say what would happen if Germany unified? This is the type of almost academic exercise that sometimes it at least gets the brain cells working towards something. If people are so busy, they don't' have time to talk about this.

HUGHES: Actually when I took my first job in Washington and had the idea that the NSC was this institution way off in the clouds that I might be lucky enough to come into contact with but probably would never be lucky enough to actually work at, I thought that that was part of the routine and part of the reality of the NSC staff. That these were a bunch of very wise deep thinkers about national security and foreign affairs issues who took the time in the White House to sit down and think about what would happen if..., or what should we be doing here. The reality is that it is an unending fire drill. Every day in every way it is an unending fire drill and if the drill isn't about something sublime, it's about something ridiculous. Clearing the text of the President's speech for the next event,

getting a bunch of letters out to the President's frequent correspondents overseas, and so forth. Between the sublime and the ridiculous, it is an unending fire drill.

I never had, and I don't believe anybody else on the NSC staff ever had, the kind of little brainstorming session that you are referring to. We had some informal staff gatherings, it is true. One started off very early in my time with a sort of an ambush gripe session about why things weren't moving faster in the NSC staff. Why paper wasn't moving? Why things didn't flow more smoothly and efficiently? Those were natural growing pains of a new administration coming in and also a factor of personal style. I used that initial gathering to then basically offer a series of regular Friday afternoon open door meetings in my office to staff members who wanted to talk about what was going on in the staff. But that was more related to staff morale, internal communications, keeping people happy, understanding what problems staff were facing so that we could try to alleviate them. Actually taking time out of your day to think about what would happen if Germany unified and how we would react to that? Unthinkable.

Q: I think this is important to get this on the record for people to understand how these places work because there is too often the idea that you had, and that I had, that these are people thinking the unthinkable and to have a plan for it.

HUGHES: The reality of life at the NSC staff is that the work probably all makes sense, or can be made to make sense, to the National Security Advisor who is on top sort of directing things and working with the president. It may make sense that individual staff members are working on their particular account in their particular field. But the staff members worked in remarkable isolation. Many of them don't interact a great deal with their compatriots up and down the hall. There is not a lot of cross-functional interchange. Many of the staff members I found, both during the Reagan and the Bush years, didn't know each other as well as I knew them because in my Bush assignment I was working with all the different parts of the NSC staff. Often the economic people didn't know the defense people or the intelligence people and didn't have any contact with the regional people and so forth.

It is also a place where as I said the range of work runs from the sublime to the ridiculous. It's hard to describe to anybody the range and variety of different tasks that a typical NSC staff member has to undertake, the rapidity with which they have to be done, and the never-ending flow of this stuff. What am I talking about? Cables to be cleared. There are established guidelines at the State Department about what cables going out to post dealing with what issues, at what level of policy, need to be pre-cleared with the White House. When those cables come in, they have to be routed to the appropriate staff member. A clearance has to be got within basically a deadline period of time. Changes have to be sometimes accumulated from several different parts of the staff and then they have to be given back to the State Department authoritatively through the executive secretary to get the cable cleared. That is one distinct process.

Presidential speeches have to be cleared by the NSC staff if they have anything to do with

foreign policy. They have to be received from the staff secretary. They have to be farmed out to the members of the staff and they have to be gotten back on time. The input has to be authoritatively given by the National Security Advisor to the speech writers. This is what it should say: we don't want it to say happy, we don't want it to say glad. That has to be done.

Presidential notifications, treaties and agreements have to be sent to Capitol Hill on time in a certain legally prescribed procedure. A typical National Security Council staff member, particularly in areas dealing with aid, dealing with counter-narcotics certifications, dealing with reports on military procurement items and so forth, may have a number of annual reports that they have to make sure are transmitted by the President timely to Capitol Hill or funding is cut off for a particular program automatically perhaps. Those things have to get done.

Presidential correspondence. George Bush had pen pals all over the world. He received a huge number of Presidential letters. Not that we sent him the ridiculous, but one of the most persistent, and sort of vexing, irritating problems that we had in the early days of the NSC of George Bush, was just getting a handle on his correspondence with foreign leaders. He was so frequently on the phone and so frequently personally in touch with foreign leaders that he didn't want to be in the embarrassing position of getting on the phone with Helmut Kohl and having Helmut Kohl saying, "Did you read my most recent letter?" and he had not seen it and had not known that it was there. He wanted to see his letters.

In the past in Ronald Reagan's Administration, correspondence from a head of state would have been handled in actually a routine way. It would have come in to the State Department or the NSC. It would have been routed to an NSC staff person and a Presidential reply would have been drafted. It would have been cleared with the State Department and so forth. It would have been sent up to the President through the National Security Advisor to be autographed, if you would, and it would go out. The process might take several weeks and the President might not see the incoming correspondence until he saw the outgoing correspondence.

George Bush wasn't going to have it that way. He wanted to see the incoming correspondence when it came in, immediately when it came in. The President received correspondence from everybody imaginable in the world about things ranging from how to conduct arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to congratulations on your dog's birthday. But he wanted to see it all. He wanted to see it now. Rounding it up was no mean task so that he could see it now because correspondence for the President actually doesn't come into one mailbox, it comes into a whole bunch of different mailboxes through a whole bunch of different means. It can come in a cable through an embassy. It can come directly physically in the mail to the State Department somewhere, to the National Security Council, or the White House personal correspondence office. It can come to a whole bunch of different places. Just trying to round the stuff up so that we can give the President a compendium on a reasonably timely basis like twice or three

times a week of who had written him what and giving him some kind of little summary of what it said so that he doesn't have to read every letter, was a major challenge to adapt to George Bush's style.

It was a major challenge to adapt the White House to the style of a President who might literally pick up the phone, at one case he picked up the phone and it rang right at my desk and he said, "Philip get so and so on the line for me." This President might be anywhere in the world. Maybe he's in France and there is six hour's difference but what if he is making a state visit to Japan? It might be 3:00 in the morning. These were the kinds of challenges that we faced. What I'm getting at with all these anecdotes is that this never-ending flow of work from the sublime to the ridiculous, even clearing routine Presidential correspondence to citizens who've written about some issue of concern to their congressman, occupy every imaginable hour of every NSC staff member's day. My starry-eyed illusions as a youth that there was time to sit around and operate the NSC staff like a think tank, that is just not the reality.

Q: On this, you have a President who is a telephoner and major issues are developed on the telephone. How did the NSC handle this because policy is made on the telephone?

HUGHES: Sometimes. It certainly was during the Gulf War.

Q: Yes but also at other times. If the President is talking to another President or chief of state or something, this is pretty committed. How did you handle this?

HUGHES: Basically totally differently from in the Reagan Administration. In the Reagan Administration a Presidential phone call would be scheduled in advance. Even if there was an incoming from another country there was always a stall: "The President isn't available right now but we'll get back to you." Then there was a mad scramble and I participated in several of these on the NSC staff. It was a mad scramble to find out what is this person calling the President about? Call the desk, call the embassy, call the foreign embassy. What's up with this country that is precipitating this call? Get talking points to the President before the call goes. Schedule the time with the foreign government when the call will happen and then get the two leaders on the line. On our President's end there would be a scripted conversation for him to have and he might or might not draw on it.

In one episode that I went through with President Reagan, the President of Mexico was calling about something that had nothing whatsoever to do with Mexico. It had to do with world events but we had written him a script that had only to do with Mexico so the President kept returning to the issues on Mexico even though they were kind of non sequiturs in the conversation.

With Mr. Bush it wasn't that way at all. The President didn't necessarily have a script. In fact he usually didn't have a script for his conversations. The script was in his head. Our challenge was to get an interpreter there and to get an NSC staff member to monitor the call. Brent and Bob would typically be with the President when the call went down in the

White House or in their offices. Also to get minutes done of the call and then to do implementing and follow-up actions that were necessary. Either they would be self-evident in the call, or Brent or Bob would be given directions by the President, or they would themselves give direction after the call about what was to be done. That is basically how we handled it but in a sense it simplified the whole Presidential phone call business because there was a whole part of the Reagan scenario that was cut out, called preparation. All the concentration was on monitoring the follow-up. Not to say that there weren't some Presidential phone calls that were prepared and scripted and all the rest.

Q: Yes, because this was his style and the fact that here was somebody who his Rolodex, his telephone listing, was renowned. Over the years he had developed a contact and a style that catered to this.

HUGHES: I think that it really was an exercise for the situation room and the White House operators, the WAPA operators particularly, in compiling sort of frequently dialed numbers list for the President because the rate of phone calls was just so much greater than in the Reagan administration.

Q: Did you find that his style of doing this prompted other leaders around the world to call him too so we were getting more backwards and forwards?

HUGHES: Yes, clearly. Also I would say that from my experience, incoming calls were handled differently than in the Reagan Administration. Whereas in the Reagan Administration the call would invariably be stalled, (I didn't work on European issues on the Reagan NSC staff, but maybe it is possible that Margaret Thatcher got through immediately) everything else would be basically short stopped while there was preparation, research, and so forth. I believe that for Mr. Bush there was a much longer list of people who if the President could possibly physically do it, he'd take the call right then and there and not go through some elaborate hoo-ha about waiting. He would take the call right then and there.

I might not have mentioned this, but I know we've gone through five tapes so I may well have said this earlier, but in the vice presidency I recall him once coming back from a hospital visit with President Reagan when President Reagan had been operated on for polyps in his colon in cancerous or pre-cancerous condition. He came back and the President was well, recovering well and so forth. Mr. Bush thought after his morning briefing that it would be a good idea for him to call the major western leaders and tell them that the President was doing fine. My boss came into my office after the morning briefing and gave me a list of people and said set up these calls with the Vice President, I actually knew many of the deputy diplomatic advisors in the respective leaders' offices. We did a little bit of time line with the time differences to figure out what time is it in different capitals and where will people be. We got WAPA working on the calls. In no time flat my phone was ringing off the hook from all of my counterparts in these other offices basically either apologizing that their man wasn't available right then, he's in a cabinet meeting but we can draw him out if this is an emergency and what is this about?

It became clear that these calls coming at that particular time, far from being reassuring were scaring them because they thought that Mr. Bush was going to tell them that the President was dying. It had exactly the opposite of the intended effect.

Q: This might be a good time to stop. Is there anything else we should cover here before we move on?

HUGHES: I think we've pretty thoroughly covered the NSC staff. There are probably other issues that came up during the course of that first year-and-a-half of the Bush administration but I think we've hit most of the highlights and certainly the style of the NSC staff as it operated then. I can't think of anything else.

Q: Just one final comment. From what you are saying, because of Scowcroft's style and the way it developed, it sounds like yes this was an interesting job but in a way a year might have been enough.

HUGHES: Yes, in fact I wish I had asked for another job in the administration because, to be honest about it, it wasn't nearly as significant and meaningful a role as it had been in the Reagan Administration. There the Executive Secretary was looked on as like a third deputy and frequently substituted for the National Security Advisor on trips or things of that sort, minor trips, domestic trips with the President. The Bush Administration cut down on the President's entourage very drastically so there wasn't always someone accompanying him necessarily. That was something Brent and Bob did themselves. There were some aspects of the role that were frankly disappointing: not to participate in the NSC meetings themselves; to being the shock absorber so to speak between a staff that was often not very much in touch with the people higher up the line but somewhat frustrated; and between them and a boss with whom you actually didn't have that much communication and where you worked mainly through Bob Gates' deputy. Yes it was not exactly the role as Brent described it, but it was so very different to the way the role was performed in the Reagan Administration that it was in a sense almost a waste of time to do the job. So when the opportunity came to take an embassy, needless to say, it was a welcomed opportunity.

Q: We've really covered the NSC. Unless there is something that occurs to you at our next meeting we're going to talk about how you left the NSC and how you got an embassy.

Besides picking up the Barbados thing, off mike we realized that we had forgotten completely about China and Tiananmen Square and the perceptions there of dealing with China during that year.

Today is the 27th of October 1997. We were sort of doing a tour of the horizon and we did not cover Tiananmen Square, China and all of that.

HUGHES: I was of course then Executive Secretary at the National Security Council and

I think it is fair to say that we watched with interest, both through reporting and the vivid news coverage, the growing protest gathering in Tiananmen Square, the students who sat in in 1989, as I recall, who built a Statue of Liberty model in the square and protested for democracy for several days. We watched also in horror as the Chinese authorities moved in the armed forces. We got reports of movements in the Beijing area just before the armed forces basically put down the student demonstrations in that bloody and fiery nighttime raid. We saw the same thing that everybody else saw, the dramatic footage shot from the Beijing Hotel of one lone student standing in front of a tank moving down Chang'an Avenue.

Both the protests and the aftermath of the protests put the Bush Administration on, it seemed to me, the horns of a dilemma about what to do. With the protest I think that there was sort of a silent hope in many breasts that maybe this would lead somehow to a liberalizing reform by the Beijing government. But at the same time I believe that in the minds of the Presidential policy advisors that I was aware of, there was sort of a hope or a belief that the liberalizers wouldn't go too far or that the government itself would never go too far in compromising with them. Far from this being a revolution it would certainly not end up being the end of the communist government but rather maybe some kind of reformist accommodation would be worked out by the Chinese government and the student leaders. That was what I thought I saw people around me imagining as the furthest things could go.

Once the Chinese government cracked down on the protest and put an end to it, then the Bush Administration was, it seemed to me, in a very serious dilemma. There were forces in Congress, Nancy Pelosi, a Democratic Congresswoman being one of the most vocal, who were very vocal. Partly for partisan reasons, partly because of their sincere convictions about democracy in China, and partly because they I think recognized that President Bush's ties to the Chinese government and friendships with people in Beijing would make it difficult for him, in fact it would be quite contrary to both his advisors' advice and to his own principles, to sever relations with China, to sanction China strongly or brutally, to sever trade ties with China, or to take some other drastic action as a result of Tiananmen. They felt that he might be vulnerable on this issue, and therefore to push for trade sanctions or trade embargo or something like that would be advantageous.

In any case it was clear that the Bush Administration realized they had to react somehow to Tiananmen but yet they regarded the China relationship as so important and fundamental that we couldn't overreact. I would say that avoiding overreaction was something of a hallmark of President Bush's approach to crises like this. Fashioning a response then that was a reaction to this stunning worldwide event and yet not an overreaction that would be misread or misunderstood by the Chinese authorities or in turn overreacted to by them in some way that brought a spiraling down of our relations, was the task of the day for our China people.

Q: Did you have the feeling that George Bush having been our representative in Beijing not too long before, was taking an active role to try to craft something to deal with this?

HUGHES: Yes, I very much had that feeling. I can't point to specific indicators at this stage. Actually he had been the head of our liaison office in Beijing, in a sense quite a while before because it was at that stage at least 12 years and possibly 14 or 15 years ago. I don't have specific actions or directives that he gave that come to the top of my mind but this was not policy that would be made without his active involvement. I'm sure his judgment certainly help set the limits of what we could do and what we wouldn't do in response to Tiananmen.

Q: Why don't we move to your next job. You've already told your reasons why you wanted to get out from under where you were. Could you tell me how the process worked as far as heading off?

HUGHES: I was talking to people around the White House, the director of White House personnel, Brent, and others about upcoming assignments that might be interesting. The President's nominee for Barbados at the time was Joy Silverman, a woman who was both a wealthy campaign donor and whose husband had made large donations to both the Bush campaign and the Democratic Party. Her nomination had run into trouble all year long in 1989 in the Senate. She was someone whom Senator Paul Sarbanes [Democrat from Maryland] was making an example of. He tried to characterize her as not properly qualified to be an ambassador and so forth. As we came to the very end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, it was clear that Sarbanes wasn't going to let her go out to post without a further hearing. The first hearing was calculated to be an embarrassment both to her personally and to the administration. He was going to put her through that again and she didn't want to go through it so she withdrew the nomination.

The post came open and I was asked by the director of White House personnel and by Brent if I'd being willing to go to Barbados. I said yes. I reckoned that this solved the problem because I was pretty much invulnerable to all the criticisms that the previous nominee was subjected to and had worked on the Caribbean. My thought was that this confirmation was going to be a virtual slam dunk just like my previous one and that would be a good valued service for the administration. Who knows, it might earn me some points down the road. The President announced his intention to nominate and I went off to ambassadorial training school, or whatever the knife and fork school was in early 1990, in perhaps the April or May class. Then I had been offered by the French government a sort of international visitors program that they run out of the Quai d'Orsay. It's a much smaller and in a sense more targeted than our own International Visitor Program. I took the International Visitor Program.

By the time I got back home, the announcement of the attention to nominate had been done followed by the formal nomination. My nomination went up to the Hill I think in May and I was waiting for my hearing. Very soon, however, after I accepted the nomination to Barbados and after my nomination was announced, the administration decided to nominate a Foreign Service Officer for another post somewhere in Latin America, very small and very poor country. I knew that this particular Foreign Service

Officer had some strong opponents in the Senate, particularly in the person of Jesse Helms. I knew it first on the grapevine and secondly because he had previous problems getting a position on the NSC.

Earlier on in 1989 the NSC was searching for a new director for Latin American Affairs. A number of candidates who I considered quite likely candidates had been in the mix and had been actively talked to by Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates. Some fell by the wayside for very understandable reasons and others seemed like they might get the job. Right out of the blue one day I learned that George Jones was to be added to the NSC roster as our new director for Latin American Affairs. I told Bob Gates right then I suspected there would be trouble over this. I didn't know for sure but I suspected it because I knew something about George's relationship with certain people on Capitol Hill. Indeed within 48 hours I was informed that George wasn't coming to the NSC. I sort of heard through the grapevine that there had been many calls from Capitol Hill, or at least enough to make a difference, to Sununu himself, the Chief of Staff, objecting and protesting and so forth and requiring this assignment to change.

Frankly when I heard that George was being nominated I thought quite honestly, here's trouble. If he had difficulty with the Senate in a non-confirmed job in the White House how is he ever going to get confirmed? This is probably going to spell trouble for anybody who is in the assignment mill with him. Indeed that is what happened. There were about four or five of us, maybe six of us, who were ambassadorial nominees to Latin America at that time who had a devil of a time getting a hearing during the summer. We couldn't get a hearing in fact up to August. Our hearing was scheduled for June or July and then it was postponed.

A very funny thing happened on the way to the hearing when the day my "murder board" was scheduled. I went into the practice session in the State Department with someone from the legal advisor's office and several experts from ARA.

Q: Could you explain what one of these sessions is?

HUGHES: It is a session to anticipate what questions are likely to be asked by the committee members. What are hard questions about your region, to evaluate your answers and to make sure that you are ready, that you are prepared for your hearing so you'll do well and the Senate will be informed, the hearing will go smoothly and everybody will be happy. The murder board session was of course a snap. The issues weren't particularly deep. I knew them like the back of my hand. I knew many of the leaders in the region. This was going to be easy.

As we finished the session the representative from the legal affairs office said "By the way, we've gotten a request from the Iran-Contra special prosecutor's office for you to appear at a grand jury hearing. They don't want you as a target or a subject of the investigation; they want you as a background witness." Earlier in the year, while I had been at the NSC and the Iran-Contra investigation was going on, Judge Walsh's

investigators had me (I was typically accompanied by an NSC lawyer) over for a couple of sessions with them on background stuff. I told the guy from L that sure I would be happy to cooperate in any way I could. But in light of the fact that I was being confirmed, if he was serving as the intermediary, I'd appreciate receiving a letter from the investigator's office indicating that I was being asked to testify but that I was not a subject or target of the investigation if that is in fact the case.

Lo and behold we got the letter which turned out to be very prudent and very useful. We got the letter and I went and did my testimony. On the way out of testimony someone asked me, a stranger whom I didn't know, who I was. I gave him my name. It turns out that the stranger was a reporter who hung around the courthouse. The next day a report appeared in the press saying that a Bush White House aide, or ambassadorial nominee, was questioned by the Iran-Contra grand jury. I knew this wasn't going to be very helpful in my cause but at the same time I had my letter that said I'm not a subject or target of this investigation. Summer dragged on.

The nominees for Latin America were all hung up because of Jesse Helms' refusal to have a hearing. Even though he wasn't the chairman he kept objecting to the scheduling of hearings and so forth because of his difficulty with George Jones. He may also have had some problems, I'm not sure, with Jack Leonard who was nominated at the same time. In any case, come the August recess George's nomination was returned to the White House. All it took was one senator to object and his nomination came back, and so did mine. Now I was deeply worried. Why did mine come back? Because Senator Dodd, the Chairman of the Committee, wanted to play tit for tat. If Senator Helms was basically going to beat up on a Foreign Service Officer, then Dodd was going to grab the only Republican whose nomination was pending before the subcommittee at the time and do exactly the same thing. Now I was deeply worried.

In late August or early September I had a session back in the White House with my friends in Presidential personnel saying basically, look we're going to have to do something or this nomination is going to die and I don't want that to happen for me and I don't want that to happen for the administration. They in turn had some discussions with the President. The President indicated "I want this nomination to happen." Through our legislative affairs operation he sent the word to the Hill that he wanted the Hughes nomination to move. All that did was increase the price to be paid for getting the nomination to move. All of a sudden different people who did not care at all about who went to be ambassador to Barbados stepped forward with: "well, I think I could see my way clear to do this if my special interest was granted here, or if my staffer got a job in USIA, or if this happened over here."

So in other words, one of the major lessons of this is that getting the President to personally intervene to try to move a nomination forward often has chiefly the effect of raising the ante for everybody on Capitol Hill. Raising the political price that is going to be paid for the nomination. We got into September and October and we still hadn't had a hearing. Finally I believe sometime in late September or early October Helms was

maneuvered into, or finagled into having a hearing for George Jones, myself and Jack Leonard.

By this time George Jones and I had become explicitly linked in the confirmation process. The staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to take an interest in my nomination on the Republican side in trying to make sure that it moved, and on the Democratic side in trying to make an inquiry into it. If this nomination of such a qualified person is stalled there must be something wrong. Let's dig into this. Maybe there is an opportunity to embarrass the President. One staff member had me up for a couple of informal chats, interviews if you would, and in the course of this he discovered, because I freely told him, that I had my appointment calendars from the whole 1980s. I kept them as a file. "I'd like to see them for a certain period of time." Fine, I had no problem bringing them up.

Off we went with the appointment calendars up to Capitol Hill and I got asked a whole bunch of silly questions. "I know here you have on your calendar write check to Fred Bush. What was your connection to Fred Bush?" Well, Fred and I were on a trip to China and I saw a lamp in a certain store that I didn't buy but Fred went back to China a few weeks later on a further trip and I asked him to buy it. When he bought the lamp, it turns out it was the wrong lamp but he bought it anyway, I had to pay him for it. I wrote a check to him and that is what it was for. Because much of the line of questioning was about the Contras, I was tempted to say that I had been tempted to give the lamp to the Contras but realized that it would be a violation of the Boland Amendment. I decided that being quiet and businesslike was more appropriate.

Another staff member who worked for Dodd was intent on falsifying President Bush's claim that there had been no quid pro quo during the 1980s with the government of Honduras of aid in exchange for the Honduran government freeing up and funneling CIA assistance to the Contras. Bush had maintained this publicly from the beginning of his term in 1989, and no one had found any evidence to contradict it. This particular staff member on encountering me, a rather low profile official up to that point, I think sort of figured it out. Well the reason that we haven't found the smoking gun on quid pro quo is that nobody's talked to him. He obviously knows. So she began to zero in on this quid pro quo issue demanding documents from the White House. All kinds of document production had to be done for them. She would show me these documents in interview sessions. I for the most part had never seen them before in my life during my time in the Vice President's office. One that she regarded as particularly telling, a document that Ollie North authored and that was sent by the National Security Advisor to the President or some such thing, "have you ever seen this?" "No, I've never seen this." I'm reading it. "It's a very interesting document. I'm reading it now for the first time but it isn't addressed to me, it isn't copied to me, it doesn't have my initials on it. There is nothing about this document that suggests that I've seen it and I'm telling you that I've never seen it before." That sort of little adversarial process went on for a while.

Finally we got a hearing. In the hearing Helms stonewalled the hearing. He only asked

questions of Jack Leonard which were of a very biased sort regarding Jack's time in Nicaragua and never allowed questioning or any such thing to be done with George or me. We left our hearing and we were still dead in the water. Now we were getting close to the end of the session and what were we going to do? I was asked to work closely with the White House Legislative Liaison office. We put our heads together to figure out what could we do to appeal to Senator Dodd's better nature and prevail on him to let me be confirmed. We asked a couple of prominent people from Connecticut whom he knew. They were from the Republican side of the aisle so how much ice they cut with Senator Dodd was doubtful but we asked a couple of people from Connecticut to intervene. The White House Legislative Affairs office worked these various issues of other demands in a very creative way and got most of those cleared away.

Finally I was up on Capitol Hill to meet with one of the legislative strategists. I walked onto the Senate side and I was meeting with this colleague from the White House West Wing. The first person I ran into was an old colleague from the NSC staff. We kissed and said hello, we hadn't seen each other in a long time. We walked down to one of the Republican offices where we were going to try to have a skull session. It was very occupied but I walked into the room and in walks another prominent lobbyist and we kissed and greeted each other. I greeted a couple of other people there. All of a sudden, I've got my handler if you would on Capitol Hill for the White House, he sits me down on a bench in the Senate lobby and says "You've been up here for about five minutes and you're obviously on intimate terms with a whole bunch of people. Who else do you know who might help us get this nomination moving?"

My wife and I had a conversation a few nights before and she had come up with the idea of asking if Pamela Harriman could be helpful. We had only met Pamela at lunch. Pamela Harriman was of course the wife of Averell Harriman and the former wife of Randolph Churchill and a major donor in the Democratic Party. In 1980 when the Democrats were defeated by Ronald Reagan in a landslide election and the party was in the doldrums, it was Pamela Harriman who formed a thing called Pam's PAC that raised money for Democrats and largely resuscitated the Democratic Party. She had been an activist for the Democratic Party and sort of a doyenne of the Democratic Party before and since then. She was clearly very influential. We had the chance to meet her. She had invited us to lunch once it became clear that I was nominated to be ambassador to Barbados because she had a house there, and she wanted to meet the new ambassador and get on friendly terms with him. I think we hit it off very nicely. So I mentioned to my handler who is a very able guy, "Well, we know Pamela Harriman slightly." He looked at me and said "Where has that been all this time?" He immediately said get in touch with her and see if she can help. I did make an appointment and went over and saw her. She said she'd be happy to call Senator Dodd and see if that would make a difference.

I'm sure it made a tremendous difference because it turned out that in subsequent contacts between the White House and Senator Dodd's office they worked out a deal to let my nomination go through on what is called a discharge list at the very last part of the Senate session before the Senate recessed sine die. The White House felt confident they had a

deal but they weren't sure. This is one of life's little ironies. We had arranged to go to the theater in Baltimore with a friend of mine who is an executive of an aerospace company on this particular night. It was an old classmate. We had gone to school together. We had been looking forward to this theater outing. The White House called me, this was the night of the vote, and said listen if you possibly can, don't be out of touch with us. Be at your house. If something goes wrong with this deal we may want you to call Pamela Harriman at home. Get her number at home, get her number at her farm out in Middleburg, Virginia. Make sure you've got her numbers because you may need to call her and get her to make a last minute intervention. Okay fine, we'll sit home and sit by the phone.

We watched the Senate debate that night on *C-Span*. The Senate didn't take up the discharge list until the wee hours of the morning. By that time we had gotten so tired that my wife and I had gone to bed. No one called from the White House indicating any need to call Pamela Harriman. We went to bed. About one or two o'clock in the morning I got a call actually from a friend of mine who was the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Legislative Affairs, an old colleague, "saying congratulations Mr. Ambassador" because I had just been voted out on the discharge list in the wee hours of the morning. Soon a congratulatory call, a notification call, came from the White House and then eventually there was some kind of notification from the State Department. I don't remember.

The next day we talked to our friends who had invited us to the theater in Baltimore about the play and what we missed. They said it was a wonderful play. They thoroughly enjoyed it and so forth. Many luminaries were there. In fact Pamela Harriman was sitting in the next box. I couldn't have gotten her at her home if I had to. I'd have been better off actually to be at the play. With confirmation in hand we went to Barbados.

Q: Here you are, and you are not a person with great personal wealth, what the hell do you do between the time that you leave NSC and you're waiting for this? This is true of an awful lot of people.

HUGHES: I don't know actually how this worked but since I was being nominated by the White House for this role and I was the executive secretary of the NSC, I was carried on the NSC payroll through the entire time of my confirmation. I was over at the State Department preparing endlessly to go to Barbados. Boy was I well prepared to go to Barbados. At a certain point Bob Gates gave me a call and said "What's it look like because this is making a dent in our budget." I was carried on the payroll as Executive Secretary of the NSC until I became ambassador to Barbados.

For somebody who is not someone of great personal wealth and someone who may have left their agency, or had to leave their agency and wait in limbo, I haven't a clue what they do. The Department has some limited ability to pay you a limited number of days as a consultant for I think it is $90 or $250 a day or something like that. It is a very minimal amount and it is for a very short period of time. This process of keeping ambassadorial nominees holding in limbo, it basically means that under normal circumstances it would

pose an extraordinary hardship on anyone who actually worked for a living, so to speak, worked for a wage, to serve in this kind of capacity if they were held in limbo for a long period of time. It tends again to confine the jobs to people of wealth and privilege or people who are in the career service.

Q: George Jones didn't make it?

HUGHES: He was not discharged at that time, no. His nomination may have been returned and sent back again to the Senate in the next session. In fact I think technically when they recess sine die, all nominations have to go back and then they are renewed. His nomination was renewed at the end of 1990 and then finally he was confirmed, as I recall, in the fall of 1991. On his way to his post, Guyana, he stopped in Barbados and spent the night as a guest in our house. He did go but George's nomination took almost two years.

This is I'm sure an inconsiderable hardship even for someone who is in the career service and collecting a salary because you're not regularly employed in a sense. There is no regular assignment for you. You are sort of a floater. The Department may offer you things to do but mainly there is a strain on your family. What does your wife think of this? Why are you going through this? Why are you being put through this? What did you do to deserve this? These kinds of questions have to come up and have to be very, very vexing. That's why this constipation, if you would, of the nomination process and politicization if you would of the nomination process - whenever political people are involved it is inevitably going to be somewhat political - is so very corrosive and damaging I think.

Q: Now to actually talk about Barbados. You served in Barbados from when to when?

HUGHES: I served from November of 1990 until July of 1993 so just a little bit shy of three years.

Q: When you went out there obviously you've been knowledgeable and all, what was the political situation in Barbados and American interests there at that time?

HUGHES: Barbados is a regional embassy that covers a slew of islands. Nowadays Bridgetown, as I like to think about it, has been put back together in the sense that it's natural geographic turf is back under one ambassador. When I went to Bridgetown, as a result of an adverse inspection report that had been done on the post some years before I arrived, there was a plan of the Department to break up the embassy in Bridgetown and put mini embassies on several islands in the Eastern Caribbean. There was a proposal to put one on Grenada, well there was one in Grenada, one on St. Lucia, one on Dominica and one in Antigua. There was some rather hazy notion that the different specialized agency missions that were required to cover the region, would be somehow distributed over these mini embassies. Maybe one embassy would have the military attaché mission, another embassy the Peace Corps mission, another embassy the USIA, another embassy the defense attaché, and another embassy the legal attaché. Somehow all five or so of

these embassies would sort of share these personnel. If I needed some help from the legal attaché I needed to call the guy on Dominica perhaps and if they needed some help from the AID people, they needed to call me. This looked like a gigantic Rube Goldberg scheme to me mainly to create useless jobs and useless establishments in county sized countries. These were countries with populations of a few tens of thousands of people where our own strategic interests were rapidly waning, frankly, in the post-Cold War period.

In the '80s our relationship with the governments of the Eastern Caribbean had been extraordinarily close for a whole bunch of reasons. They felt their democracies threatened by Cuba with the Maurice Bishop Government existing then in Grenada. After the Grenada rescue operation when they had joined us in the ouster of the Cord government that overthrew Bishop and this sort of Marxian anarchy that gripped the island for a few days or weeks, we grew especially close to them. This was through the ties of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, through our aid relationships to build up their own special security services and coast guards to give them some capability both to reinforce each other and to keep their own little governments from being toppled by a coup of a handful of plotters maybe landing in some dinghies from another island. Through also their access of the prime ministers of the region to the White House which was regular, intense and close and our interactions with these governments through conferences like the Miami Conference on the Caribbean and our extensive aid to the region that was flowing in those days. They were just used to having extraordinarily high levels of attention from Washington. Extraordinary access, a lot of resources. As we came into the early '90s it was just plain with the Berlin Wall falling, the Cold War ending, with perestroika and glasnost being policies of Gorbachev in Russia, and then Gorbachev passing from the scene in a coup attempt and Yeltsin taking over, these small island countries were increasingly marginal.

What was the political atmosphere like? On Barbados the Democratic Labor Party government of Erskine Sandiford was in power when I arrived. Sandiford had not been elected so to speak in his own right but he had inherited the mantle of the prime ministership when Errol Barrow, the very popular leader of that party who had led the country to independence in 1966, died. Sandiford was a rather dour, inscrutable and very opaque sort of individual, not unfriendly or unkindly disposed toward the United States but just very, very hard to read. His government was facing increasing economic problems that were being masked by the government's accounting of its economic performance and he was on his way to calling elections. I didn't know that. Elections were called in Barbados within less than month of my arrival.

I was covering directly Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Grenada which had an independent chargé since the rescue operation had been detached from the responsibility of Bridgetown formally in 1983. Antigua St. Kitts, as the first step in this new posts process that the Department was considering, had been detached from Barbados's responsibility in 1988. I regarded it as one of my challenges to try to persuade the Department that this business of establishing all these mini embassies around the region

was a terrible way to go and that what really made sense was to coordinate policy for this little archipelago with a total population of less than a million people, from a regional embassy.

Q: Did these mini embassies have ambassadors?

HUGHES: No, they had chargés d'affaires. At one time we had an ambassador in Grenada. Two people served as ambassador in Grenada: Tony Gillespie at first and then Laurie Lawrence before Laurie passed away. Then the post was downgraded to that of chargé and there were a series of chargés d'affaires in Grenada. Frankly they turned over about every 18 months. Vice President Bush and President Reagan made trips to Grenada in '85 and '86. If I am not mistaken there were different chargé d'affaires on each occasion. They reported directly to ARA. They didn't report to Bridgetown. One of my goals was to try to persuade the Department that it was wrong to go and establish these mini embassies all over the region and in fact that it made much more sense to consolidate operations somewhere - Bridgetown made the logical sense to me - and make sure that at least someone, because it probably wasn't going to happen in Washington, was looking out for what our policy interests were with these small islands in a reasonably coherent way. With respect to the other islands, mainly I think they were thinking that they were feeling more and more neglected, abandoned, ignored and downgraded and marginalized.

What were the guiding ideas if you would of my mission going out there? The guiding internal objectives were to revitalize the embassy itself which had been without an ambassador for two-and-a-half years, to try to upgrade personnel in the embassy to attract some brighter, younger, more talented people because Bridgetown had become one of these posts that tended to attract people who were in twilight tours or who had some problem or other that brought them to Bridgetown. My DCM and I had an idea of how to do that, by trying to make as many assignments as possible stretch assignments. If we could somehow work with personnel and manipulate the personnel system a little bit and we could stretch more assignments in Bridgetown, we would get higher caliber people who would be looking at this as a leg-up on their next promotion if they were serving in such assignment.

We also needed badly to refurbish the physical facilities in Bridgetown. We internally also needed to get the mission focused on what the hell were we trying to do here in the Eastern Caribbean? What was our hierarchy of objectives in the post-Cold War period with aid levels declining, with drugs problems increasing, with security problems probably not very much on the horizon but having made a tremendous investment in the '80s in a security infrastructure for the region that was going to crumble literally to rust if we didn't make some investment in sustaining it? We had to pull the mission together and coordinate it, because with different agencies pursuing different agendas on several different islands, and also reporting in some cases to two different chargés and the ambassador in Bridgetown, there was just infinite opportunity for agency freelancing, i.e. we're sort of doing our own thing here and we can justify it because we're responsible for

two or three different masters and therefore we're responsible to no master except our one back in Washington.

Externally the goals were pretty straightforward, too. We needed to reconvince the tiny governments in the neighborhood that they did still matter to us and that they were not completely marginalized. That was a largely symbolic exercise done through a regular program of visitation to the islands, reporting on the islands and building close relationships with the prime ministers of the islands to try to get focused on the top priorities of the day. What were those top priorities? Drugs I think had supplanted security at that stage as a top priority. Investment in security efforts was more and more being thought of in terms of how can this reinforce our counter-narcotics effort. Our aid mission, our aid effort, was clearly tapering off so we faced an investment challenge of where were we going to make the wisest final investments in our aid program to equip these economies to sustain themselves into the future. These are economies that are marginal at best.

Politically our interests were less and less in sort of Cold War era, free world and democratic solidarity, but more in areas like cooperation in the United Nations and multi-lateral organizations, encouraging economic reform so that the countries would be able to get ready for entering into President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas initiative, sort of a forerunner of our current Free Trade Area of the Americas effort. Also I guess you could say on the political front, trying to work with these countries to see where they could contribute at the margin to helping us foster democracy in other parts of the world. With the Creole speaking islands, could they do anything constructive in Haiti? With the English speaking islands, might they through UN agencies make a peacekeeping or police contribution, or police training contribution to countries in Africa that were becoming independent (I'm thinking of Namibia) or that were undergoing some kind of democratic transition? So those were the kinds of things we were working on.

Q: Most of these islands had been under Great Britain hadn't they at one point?

HUGHES: Yes, actually all of them had. That was their last colonial master.

Q: Was there any Great Britain connection there or had the United States pretty much supplanted them?

HUGHES: No, there was still a very strong British connection. But it used to be said by people who studied the region, that Grenada was a watershed event because it really signaled the shifting of primary responsibility for the Eastern Caribbean region from the shoulders of Britain to the shoulders of the United States. I think that was very much true.

Q: The British oddly enough under Margaret Thatcher had really ignored the problem. It was an interesting development.

HUGHES: Thatcher was of course surprised by President Reagan's decision to launch the

Grenada rescue operation. Supposedly the Queen felt somewhat affronted that a member of the Commonwealth was being rescued by the United States without much consultation with Britain. The British High Commission was a strong presence in the region.

British Development Division (BDD) assistance to the region was an important part of virtually every government's budget planning. The BDD did its aid for the region very differently to our aid program. In a sort of thumb nail comparison, the BDD basically gave the islands a five-year projection, or a multi-year projection, of what they planned to budget for assistance to island governments in the region. Government by government they would ask the islands for their spending priorities for this money. The island governments would then basically express their priorities and the British would serve as arbiters of we won't do that but we will do this, or if you work with us on this project and we modify it and refine it, we might do that. They became more the arbiters of how their money would be used to fulfill the island's expressed wishes.

Our approach seemed to be rather different and a little bit more Olympian. We seemed to come up with the ideas of projects we thought the islands needed for sustainable development and then our AID mission task seemed to be to sell those projects to the islands because they were what we wanted to do. Much of the challenge was often trying to repackage what we wanted to do in terms that made it palatable, political or otherwise, to the islands but nevertheless left it substantially what we wanted to do. What we wanted to do was often dictated by what one might call political fashion back here in the United States, certain hot button issues like in the area of population or in the area of environment. It was evident to me that there was a certain amount of pressure, for want of a better word, on every AID mission to show that they had some activity going on in each of a series of politically fashionable areas: in the environment, population control, in perhaps education or certain kinds of health, or women in development. They were kind of trying to build a portfolio that made a certain display to Washington and sell that portfolio to the island governments. I think on the whole it was a less successful approach than the British approach and that on the whole we probably would have been better able to get what needed to be done, done, following a more British model.

The British were less overwhelming and overweening in their influence among the islands, partly because they perhaps exercised it in a little bit more discreet fashion. The British had a resident agent on virtually every island except Dominica but that resident agent reported back to their high commission in Bridgetown. I would say that in Barbados, because the British traditions were very, very strong and British cultural influence was pervasive, the British exercised if not policy influence certainly a kind of cultural and moral influence quite out of proportion to the size of their establishment or interests. In the other islands I'd say the strong, strong presence of the U.S. was felt but I always had the feeling that when the islands felt overexposed to the overwhelming influence of the United States culturally in communications terms, in tourism terms, and so forth, they could kind of take comfort in their relationship with the British.

Certainly on the issue of bananas, the British influence was pervasive. The islands trusted

the British there to look out for their interests and if the British said that this was a good idea then the islands tended to believe that was a good idea. If the British said this isn't a good idea, the islands tended to follow that advice and had little capability when it came to the banana issue to make an independent analysis or judgments of their own.

Q: What was the banana issue as far as we were concerned?

HUGHES: It stated out as not much of a much and it has become in the last several years a pretty big deal. The British had always maintained a protected market for West Indian bananas in the UK. The trade in bananas ended up being dominated by, oligopolized by, two companies, Fyffes and Geest, which operated banana boats between Jamaica and the eastern Caribbean islands and Britain. These companies had ripening rooms there and they basically supplied the British market with bananas from the West Indies as an aid scheme. British housewives paid much higher prices than anybody else on the continent or in the world for that matter, except maybe in France where France had a similar scheme for their overseas departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe and so forth, and former French territories. There were estimates that the implicit subsidy to the islands of the Commonwealth from which they got these bananas was up to 50 million pounds a year. That was a lot of money coming out of the pockets of British housewives.

That system was fine as long as the Europeans were not maintaining a unified market. Once the European Union set the goal of achieving a unified internal market by as I recall 1992 or 1993, now a scheme had to be developed that would protect British suppliers of bananas, French suppliers of bananas, Spanish suppliers of bananas, in their previously separate markets while at the same time accommodating the fact that the rest of the continent, Germany in particular, basically bought their bananas from world operators, dollar fruit operators like Chiquita and Dole and Del Monte, and paid lower prices for them and got bigger, higher quality fruit. Higher quality at least by some lights. The EU had to devise a protection scheme for the banana trade that satisfied the requirements of the unified market and at the same time protected the traditional banana suppliers.

They came up with a scheme which American suppliers regarded as highly discriminatory, through a scheme of licenses to import dollar fruit bananas. The European Union devised a scheme to protect the so called ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) banana market that encouraged operators to operate in the ACP region by giving them a bonus in the form of a license to import dollar fruit. Dollar fruit is cheaper and more profitable fruit from Central America or other large sources of supply. They would give them a license to do that for every box of bananas that they brought in from so-called protected markets. American companies regarded this as just a straight out reallocation of market share away from the American suppliers and to their European competitors. They objected to the licensing scheme strongly.

Earlier even before that in the Uruguay Round, the bananas were one of the last issues to be resolved, because the Europeans were holding out for a quota system for bananas. We objected highly to the idea of a quota system because the whole Uruguay Round

negotiation was predicated on the idea of tariff based, not quota, regulation of trade. We felt that admitting an exception for bananas would just be the thin edge for their reintroducing quotas on rice, beef, and a whole range of other agricultural products, so we were dead set against the introduction of quotas.

Finally we proposed to the Europeans a formula called the tariff rate quota which would use tariff mechanisms but differential tariffs at different quantity levels of importation of bananas to achieve through a tariff mechanism fundamentally the same thing that they wanted to achieve through the quota scheme. When we proposed this to the Europeans they weren't initially very receptive. When we briefed the islanders on it, they were decidedly negative. I remember briefing prime ministers on the idea of a tariff rate quota for bananas and they were wholly negative to it and it was plain why. They British had told them that this was not something that was in their interests and they were holding out for a quota arranged in the Uruguay Round. If they just stuck with the British the British would protect their interests. So our tariff rate quota idea was a real lead balloon in the Eastern Caribbean. Then we had some further discussions between the USTR and the Brits and persuaded the Brits that the only thing we would go for was a tariff rate program and a tariff rate quota would work.

There was also at the same time a lot of background noise discussion about other ways to handle the banana problem. The World Bank put out a couple of reports which someone said were the only two humorously titled reports in the history of the World Bank. One was called EC Bananarama I and the other was EC Bananarama II. These reports basically suggested a totally different approach. The idea was to free up the market in Europe for bananas and put some kind of tax on the bananas. Accumulate a sort of compensatory fund from the banana tax and rebate the proceeds of the fund to those former banana producing islands that now would be uncompetitive and basically be out of the banana business. They would get a sort of largess out of the world banana trade. That idea didn't find favor but those were kinds of things that were debated in the background.

USTR had some conversations with the Brits and persuaded them we would never go for a quota scheme in the Uruguay round, that a tariff rate quota would do the trick for the Eastern Caribbean. We persuaded the Brits that a tariff rate quota would do the trick. The British sent a delegate through the islands in as I recall late '91, or early '92, or late '92 to brief a new idea that the British had come up with for how to handle the banana problem in the unified European market. The scheme was a tariff rate quota and the island suppliers to a government thought the idea was a terrific one and signed onto it. Point being it had everything to do with who was the messenger and much less to do with what was the message. They had really bought into the idea that the British would always protect their interests in the banana area and the U.S. was always going to sell out their interests in the banana area because of the power, if you would, and market dominance of companies like Chiquita, Dole, Del Monte and so forth.

Q: How did you bring yourself up to speed on bananas and the banana market? I don't imagine that this was something that you picked up at school.

HUGHES: No, not at all. A certain amount of misinformation was available locally by listening to what was said by the politicians and the people active in the banana trade. The rest was basically briefings that we received from Washington on this, the studies like the Bananarama studies from the World Bank and the investigations of a very able economic counselor and political counselor that I had at the embassy at the time. The combination of those things left me reasonably well informed about the banana trade issue while I was there. I got even better informed about it once I got back as the debate deepened.

Q: You have the chargés on all these islands but were they under you or not?

HUGHES: No.

Q: *How did you deal with other governments?*

HUGHES: There were two chargés. There was a chargé in Grenada and a chargé in Antigua and they were not responsible to the embassy in Bridgetown when I got there. Very soon after I got there, we had our inspection in Bridgetown. This is my interpretation, but I believe that the inspection team that came to Bridgetown had come with an instruction from one of the senior deputy inspectors general who had been responsible for the earlier adverse inspection report on Bridgetown, that whatever you do don't put Bridgetown back together again. Don't allow the extension of Bridgetown's authority out to more of the islands. My DCM and I set it as our goal that if they were going to leave with no other message, they were going to leave with two messages. One that we were rapidly turning this embassy into a first class professional operation with a very definite plan for doing that. And two that the only sensible arrangement for managing our affairs among these tiny island countries, of as I said county sized proportions, in a post-Cold War era of increasing Washington uninterest was indeed to coordinate policy toward these countries through one embassy for the region.

I believe we succeeded in persuading the inspectors of that but because of, I believe, a constraint they faced with their boss back home they couldn't go so far in that inspection report as to recommend that Antigua and Grenada be folded back under Bridgetown. But they could go so far as to recommend that Bridgetown be made responsible for coordinating policy for the whole region in certain identified areas. The identified areas as I recall were counter-narcotics policy, security policy, aid policy, and there may have been another. In any case, that gave me a measure of coordinating responsibility now over those two embassies which was, from my point of view, a step in the right direction. Eventually Bridgetown would get back together and that indeed happened for my successor when we decided to close Antigua and the Department put Grenada with a chargé under her aegis. The Department tried to close Grenada as an embassy but some political forces on Capitol Hill within the Black Caucus particularly opposed that, so it was necessary to keep Grenada open but it is nevertheless now under the responsibility of Bridgetown.

Q: Prior to your being there, do you think the rationale to disassemble Bridgetown and to come up with a really very awkward situation, had to do with just a bad situation in Bridgetown when they arrived and thus trying to defang Bridgetown or something like that?

HUGHES: I will give you my personal interpretation. I think it had a lot to do with personalities. When the inspectors arrived in Bridgetown for their earlier unfavorable report in the late 1980s they, I think, encountered a politically appointed ambassador who they may have felt was not particularly qualified. They encountered an embassy that had a lot of morale problems and complaints about particular habits and foibles of that ambassador. There were some personnel problems inside the embassy of people refusing to talk to each other and refusing to communicate like, so I'm told, the ambassador refusing to communicate with his secretary and removing her to some other assignment and bringing another secretary from another part of the embassy to his office. It gave the impression that things were not running smoothly.

These complaints joined with others about the embassy's leased aircraft at the time. The aircraft was leased by AID but used by the mission as a mission aircraft and sometimes used in ways that people criticized. These all gave the inspectors plenty of ammunition. There was also pleading from the other islands for more attention, particularly from Dame Eugenia Charles of Dominica, probably my best personal friend in the region. I haven't spoken to her for a whole week now I think. She was very sort of keen on "we need to have somebody here in Dominica to look out for us and our interests. I'd like to have somebody to talk to who isn't over in Bridgetown." She may have had in mind what the British had, that is these resident agents.

I must also say that I think the guy who was leading that inspection team was an admin officer. He had had an embassy. It was a minor embassy. I think he would like to have had another embassy. I think he regarded the number of ambassadorial assignments particularly for people who are admin counselors to be not very numerous and shrinking and that it's harder and harder, and more and more competitive to get embassies. The more ambassadorial assignments you can create the better it would be for people who wanted another ambassadorial assignment, or others like them coming in their wake. He is in absolutely perfect happy hunting ground for those kinds of opportunities. I think all of those forces, the pleas of the islands, some of the management problems that could easily be pointed to in Bridgetown and the personal interests, or a set of institutional interests reflected in the personal experience of the senior inspector, all went into that recommendation. I happen to think it was a terrible recommendation.

Q: Let's talk about drug prevention. This I imagine was probably your highest priority.

HUGHES: Yes, definitely. It was hard to get systematic intelligence on the drugs flow through the Eastern Caribbean but anecdotally everybody was convinced that it was becoming more and more of a problem. That is not to say that the main highway for drugs traveling from the producing countries of South America toward the United States wasn't

still through Mexico or wasn't becoming more and more through Mexico and up the isthmus. There was a lot of suspicion of drugs trafficking through the islands in the Eastern Caribbean on several fronts, with a DEA office that was fairly newly established in Barbados before I arrived and with a legal attaché office that was restaffed for Barbados just as I arrived. The first legal attaché had had some problems there of a legal nature and he was replaced by a first class professional. With our security operation there, that is to say our military attachés and our military assistance group increasingly focusing on trying to help the countries equip themselves to deal with the counter-narcotics problem and frankly with, if we can talk about that on these tapes, the station.

Q: We can talk about the station. It is unclassified but obviously we're talking about the CIA and how helpful it is.

HUGHES: With our station's activities being reoriented from bloc targets, the Cuban target, the threat of insurgency and so forth, to the drugs problem. Much of the mission was refocused on the drugs problem. What were we talking about? We were potentially talking about several things. The drugs problem manifested itself in the islands in several ways. First there was a local smuggling, local consumption problem which concerned every government because of the corruption potential, the health impact on the society and productive parts of the society, and the drain on the tiny economies that it would represent. It was clear that there was a danger of increased drugs use on virtually every island.

Most of the islands had no tradition of drug use unlike Jamaica where there is a tradition of growing marijuana and smoking ganja and so forth. Most of the islands do not have strong Rastafarian communities, certainly not in Barbados. Most of the islands did not have a tradition of growing ganja and smoking ganja for pleasure and so forth, with the exception of St. Vincent. In the northwest corner part of that island where it is truly trackless and mountainous, there is no road that goes to that part of the island, Rastafarians and others would go up in the hills and walk there out into the bush a few miles and carve out plots on the sides of hills that you think couldn't support anything. They would make a clearing and grow marijuana plants and they'd sell them or smoke them or whatever. There was that small tradition in St. Vincent. That was really the only local growing problem of any proportions that one had to deal with. There may have also been a small enclave of such habits in the very southern tip of Dominica, in an area called Grand Pay. Otherwise, growing was not a habit in these islands and using was not a habit.

As drugs like cocaine began to be transshipped up the island chain or shipped into the islands, use was increasing, dealers were starting to appear and the islands started to feel threatened by this. Of course the governments were very vulnerable to corruption. We were all so worried that if drugs corruption became entrenched on any one of these tiny islands it would be almost impossible to root out because in the governments one is dealing with a few dozens or hundreds of people at the most senior levels. A few of them get corrupted, they make all the decisions. You'll never find out about it and you'll never get them replaced. They would be easy to buy off. Just lots of problems will surface from

that.

In each of the islands we concentrated on helping to build up their drugs enforcement units. We concentrated on helping them to share intelligence about traffickers and trafficker movements. About getting a hold on who was moving in and out of their territory, the name of boats, the name of individuals and cross checking them against data bases to see if traffickers seemed to be moving through the region so that they could notify the next island or whatever and grab someone.

Each island's drug problem manifested itself somewhat differently. In Barbados what we mainly encountered was a local importation for use problem, not very much of a transshipment problem. Barbados didn't make much sense as a transshipment point. It was sort of out of the chain of islands and you had to go out of your way to get to Barbados. It wasn't a very convenient place for transshipment. We worked there with the police force and with the counter-narcotics units to strengthen their enforcement capability both against smuggling and against local drugs dealers.

In Dominica the problem was a different sort. There were known drugs dealers on the island who were importing and transshipping through the region. There was a notorious little place toward the northern tip of the island called Tan Tan where a woman and her family were involved in drugs. The police were quite convinced they were involved in cocaine shipment but they could never quite get the goods on them. Everybody knew who the police were, even plainclothes police, because these are little communities. In fact the habit was if you were from the north part of the island you got assigned to police duty in the south so people might not recognize you. Or if you were born in the south part of the island you might get assigned to police duties in the north so people might not recognize you. But everybody knew who the police were so by the time the police got there all the evidence was invariably gone of a boat landing drugs. The Dominicans tried to keep after the people at Tan Tan and they never succeeded I believe in shutting them down.

They did succeed in finding through our aid a major cache of cocaine on a boat that had been brought into Roseau harbor. They did a search of the boat and they found I forget exactly how much but it was a huge amount for the region of cocaine. As I recall the crew of the boat were Colombian merchant men and I think that had come into Roseau because their boat had gotten into trouble. Eventually the crew were let go. After a trial it was found that they really were innocent of where this stuff was hidden in the boat; it had been welded into the bow of the boat. The cocaine was found and destroyed by the Dominica police in a big ceremony. That was Dominica's big drugs bust while I was there. Eugenia Charles was petrified as long as the cocaine was on the island because of the fear that somebody would take it off, somebody would sell it, or otherwise.

St. Lucia's drug problem was still different. It was more of a transshipment problem. I am trying to remember if we had any significant drugs successes in St. Lucia. I think maybe only minor seizures. We never found anyone who was a systematic trafficker in the way we did in Dominica.

The really interesting activity occurred in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The St. Vincent government had become very close to a family called the Non-no family. They came from Italy and they owned a bank that was originally called the Owens Bank until the Owens Bank showed up on our surveillance list for strange, suspicious institutions. Someone rearranged the letters on the facade of the building which was more or less diagonally across the street from the new government headquarters, to New Bank Ltd. It was the same building, same people, same everything. The Owens Bank, or New Bank Ltd. in St. Vincent was strongly suspected, in fact we had information that it was used for drugs money laundering by the Non-no family.

There were also some major drugs hauls. We had a ton seizure of drugs in St. Vincent in an operation done by the drugs squad actually without higher authorization from the police commissioner whose two sons had mysteriously died outside of the island in drugs related violence incidents. One was in New York and one was somewhere else but both of the police commissioner's two sons had died violently in things connected with drugs. We had no reason to doubt Toussaint's fortitude in fighting drugs. In the ton seizure episode that I was mentioning the main guy involved in the seizure somehow got away and got off the island. He was found in St. Lucia and returned to St. Vincent to stand trial. His lawyers in St. Vincent were notorious drugs defense lawyers who were brought in, hired guns so to speak, from neighboring islands. There was some guy named Richelieu who was one of his defense attorneys who came down from St. Lucia. Actually the opposition leader, Ralph Gonzales, was one of his defense attorneys.

The government's attorney in this case, the prosecutor, wasn't the normal prosecuting attorney but an attorney named Karl Hudson-Phillips, as I recall a Trinidadian, who was the attorney of choice for the Mitchell government when it came to a lot of things. It was Karl Hudson-Phillips who ran the government's commission of inquiry on police commissioner Toussaint when he was suspected of involvement in drugs matters, and he found no evidence. The commission of inquiry had been ordered some time after, in the midst of a drugs investigation, a portion of the police headquarters that was right in the same compound as the main fire station caught fire and burned down destroying all the criminal records. Toussaint was investigated by Karl Hudson-Phillips and found utterly blameless. Then Karl Hudson-Phillips was put in charge of prosecuting this guy Cottle and the other chief culprits in this ton cache of cocaine that was discovered by the drugs squad but not by the whole authorities of St. Vincent. As I recall the prosecution was unsuccessful.

There is just a lot of suspicion of the depth of drugs involvement in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in those years. There was an island in the south of the chain, very close to Grenada, called Union Island, which was a wide open place. The owners of the Union Island yacht club and hotel were suspected of themselves being involved in drugs trafficking. I believe one of the owners turned up dead under mysterious circumstances on Union Island. The Mitchell government made a substantial improvement in the airport at Union Island though Union Island received negligible visitors. There was probably a

legitimate tourism reason for the airport improvement but just the whole scene in St. Vincent reeked with there is something wrong with the drug scene here.

We put a good deal of pressure on the Mitchell government to crack down on drugs. We did some aerial surveys of the northwestern part of the island where the ganja was grown and so forth and found vastly expanded marijuana cultivation. We flew the prime minister and the attorney general up to see these marijuana fields. You could pick them out of the terrain even though it is very mountainous and undulating. They were just shocked at the extent of the marijuana explosion in northwestern St. Vincent and so they immediately agreed to cooperate with us. We ferried their special forces teams up there and they pulled up thousands and thousands of marijuana plants and burnt them. They burnt the shacks where the ganja men were growing this stuff, drying this stuff and so forth.

It quickly became a matter of political comment, and press comment, and debate in St. Vincent that what the government was doing was basically cracking down on all the little guys to please the Americans. The little guy who is growing a little marijuana for recreational use or earning a little money in a place where you don't have many opportunities to earn some money up in the northwest part of the island, and letting big fish go free. That is letting people smuggle drugs on boats and whatnot in and out of the island quite freely. That was sort of the theme of the commentary about the anti-drugs campaign there.

There was one episode, I was trying to remember, with respect to St. Lucia that was fairly significant. But that gives you a flavor for our efforts.

Q: You mentioned Eugenia Charles. She played quite a role in the Grenada business as sort of the leader of the movement to do something about Grenada. This was during the Reagan administration where she carried an awful lot of weight in Washington. Can you talk about your relations with her?

HUGHES: She was a delight to deal with and probably even among many able leaders of the Eastern Caribbean which for the most part were cultivated leaders who were bigger intellectually, in personality terms and in every other sense, than the countries that they led, she certainly fell into that class. She was the only prime minister of the region, who in my judgment, was of course herself a strong national leader with a very definite vision for the further development of Dominica.

I've often thought of her as maintaining a mental checklist of projects that Dominica as a little nation needed to advance and that she was going down that checklist one after another checking off accomplishments. Need new maternity wing at the hospital, go talk to the French. The French agreed to build a new maternity wing at the hospital. Check. Need new electric supply for the island, we need more generating capacity. Talk to British Development Division and get a couple of hydroelectric dams built on the island and distribution. Check. Need new streets in Roseau. Talk to the Canadians and get them to agree to re-pave the streets. Check. So she had this sort of little mental picture of what

she wanted to develop in Dominica and she went about it methodically, aggressively, meticulously.

Her government was very well run. She ran the governments accounts. I think she was herself finance minister, she held that portfolio, and would recommend that I think any prime minister in the Eastern Caribbean also hold the finance and defense portfolios. I think that would probably be her advice to leaders. She ran the country's finances like she would run her own checkbook. She will tell you stories today about how every month at the beginning of the month she'd call the controller and ask how are we doing this month and are we going to make payroll? If they weren't going to make payroll, she'd call the port. What can we do to get customs revenues up or what can we do to juggle finances so that we always had the civil servants checks in their hands on time. We did this with PC's and very limited equipment but we always paid the civil servants on time and we always paid our obligations. That's a very serious minded leader.

She was and is sort of a grandmotherly matron figure to the island. She helped foster the preservation and conservation of the island's native traditions. Dominica has, unlike most of the other islands, some deep rooted native Creole culture with distinctive ways of native dress for the women, two different customs in fact, and dance, music and so forth that have deep folkloric roots. She helped, I'm sure by a lot of her own personal effort, conserve these things. She would be personally responsible for launching the year of the environment which was basically about something in Dominica as simple as picking up trash and putting it in containers rather than leaving it by the side of the road. That makes a tremendous environmental impact in Dominica.

She was of course widely respected in Washington because of her role in the Grenada rescue operation, even though she really was not THE leader of the rescue operation. Tom Adams convened all the prime ministers on Barbados. She was one of the prime ministers that said we, the Eastern Caribbean, must act about Grenada regardless, and we must tell the U.S. that we are acting and ask that they come and reinforce us. She was brought to Washington as the spokesman for the region. I'm not sure whether that was Washington's request or her request. She ended up being the only person who could upstage Ronald Reagan and take one of his news conferences away from him when she stepped up to the microphone and sort of pushed Reagan aside. She answered a question about the region that she felt best qualified to answer. She was a sort of grandmotherly figure for the island.

Just before I arrived her government had won reelection narrowly and she had something like a one seat majority in the parliament. She had faced a new opposition party that had just sprung up from business interests there called the United Workers Party. She had a reasonably cohesive government but the only government in the whole area as far as I could see where there was not only a strong leader figure at the center, Eugenia Charles, but she also had very able ministers working for her. Almost every other government was characterized by one man rule with one strong prime minister campaigning with a slate of much, much weaker personalities, none of whom posed any threat to the prime minister

intellectually or in any other way but who were sort of along for the ride. They were given ministerial portfolios as political favors but fundamentally they didn't exercise much authority, any authority practically, without the say-so of the prime minister. The prime minister was the whole show. In Eugenia Charles' case, she had able ministers to help her carry out her plans. She had some divisions in her cabinet with some people who disagreed, some people who were hungry for power, some people who thought she had perhaps stayed on a bit too long but hers was perhaps the most ably run government on the slenderest resources of any in the Eastern Caribbean.

She was also fairly visionary. She had a relationship with the Queen, a relationship with Margaret Thatcher, relationships in London, and relationships in France. She was an internationally recognized figure on the stage and she was a delight to work with because she was so frank. She was absolutely firm, when it came to the issue of bananas, that the interests of American companies and Chiquita were just inimical to the interests of the island and so if the British said it was good for them then it was good for them because 60 or 70 percent of her export revenues came from bananas and she wasn't going to jeopardize that industry for anything. She was absolutely with us on virtually every issue of substance in the UN, in international relations generally, on the Gulf War and so forth. If we would ask her to do something or her government to do something that they just couldn't do, she wouldn't necessarily say no, she would just gradually never get around to talking about it again.

At one stage during one of the Haiti refugee effluxes the Bush administration was flummoxed about how to handle these Haitians. We didn't want to bring them to Miami, we couldn't put any more of them into Guantanamo and we couldn't put any more of them on ships. They were still coming and what were we going to do? The administration came up with the bright idea of asking these tiny impoverished islands around the region, including Jamaica, "How would you like to help the poor United States out by taking on a few thousand Haitian refugees?" Most of the islands responded to this with something on the order of "are you out of your mind?" In Eugenia's case she said "I'll think about it and get back to you," and of course she never did.

The instruction on that that came from Washington, maybe it is worth commenting on. Eugenia had one long standing and still unfulfilled ambition and an ambition that probably doesn't make economic sense. That is to have an international airport on Dominica. She had enough pull in Washington. She had gotten several different military survey teams to come down and examine building an international airport for the 70,000 population island of Dominica.

There was a funny report that we unearthed when we were doing a history of the consulate in Bridgetown for the bicentennial of the consular service. It was sort of our contribution to the bicentennial celebration. It was a report from a consul in Bridgetown back in the World War II years when there was some thought that the British might trade these islands to us for destroyers. He was evaluating their strategic significance. It was basically saying these things are all a liability and they are not of any economic or

commercial value whatever. Part of his assessment was that Dominica was too rugged as an island to support any aviation activity whatsoever.

Now here we were talking about seriously building an international airport on Dominica. I took a survey team myself up to look at it. She paid a visit to the White House and went in to see President Bush. With Bush, Baker, the advisors and Cheney there she made a pitch again for the international airport and the President said that we'd take another look at it. They sent a survey team down and we walked up and down these undulating hills looking at where they proposed to put this runway. It would have involved moving millions of cubic yards of earth and environmental impacts of all sorts.

When the Haitian instruction came from Washington it was phrased in a very different way. It said that we can't promise these governments anything but read them these talking points. Then the last paragraph said basically and let them know they can name their price. The front end of the telegram said we're not offering anything, while the last paragraph said, as I read it, basically they can name their price just to get us out of this mess. Eugenia when I called her had a perfect opportunity to say "Well I think I could manage to take a few hundred or maybe a thousand or 1,500 of these people if I had a flat surface on this island that was about a mile-and-a-half long and about 150 yards and that was graded and lighted properly on which we could erect some tents for them." It would look remarkably like the runway for an international airport. She didn't even rise to that bait. She decided it was just too politically hot to handle to bring Haitians to Dominica and try to explain in local domestic political terms why they got free housing provided by the United States or the UN or something, and they got water, facilities and land while her own citizens in Dominica weren't getting these benefits.

Q: What about Cuba? Did Cuba play any role by this time as a threat or a problem, from your perspective?

HUGHES: Our main challenge in those days was no longer the Cuban threat to the stability of governments. We kept a little bit of an eye on what Cuban activity was. Some governments like Barbados had technical diplomatic relations with Cuba but they were non-resident relations and they had practically no contact. The other islands didn't have relations with Cuba. Cuba in those days was questing more and more for recognition and participation in the Caribbean institutions and breaking down its isolation. We were trying to keep Cuba isolated to the maximum extent possible and to keep the governments from treaties with Cuba and convince them that they had basically nothing to gain from this.

The main issues therefore over Cuba in my time were typically the annual debate at the UN Human Rights Commission over Cuba's human rights record, and whether we would appoint a special rapporteur or upgrade the rapporteur's status and once again call on the government of Cuba to let the rapporteur enter Cuba and actually examine the human rights conditions in Cuba and so forth. For the most part we saw eye-to-eye on Cuba with the governments of St. Lucia and Dominica. More or less also with St. Vincent and the

Grenadines although [Sir James] "Son" Mitchell, the prime minister there, was a very free thinker and might well come up with some heterodox viewpoint out of the blue like you guys would be better off to let the barriers come down and trade with Cuba. The free interchange with the outside world would poison the Castro regime.

The government of Barbados was another matter. They had campaigned for a seat on the UN Human Rights Commission and we had strongly supported them because of their democratic record and right thinkingness and all of that. We had appealed to them to vote a certain way in the UN Human Rights Commission on both Cuba and the People's Republic of China. Both of these posed problems for them. Cuba they wanted to duck because they didn't want to do anything to offend the Castro regime. I think they sensed that the direction the political wind was blowing in the Caribbean was less and less isolating of Cuba and they didn't want to be seen as kind of rubber stamps for, or vehicles for, the U.S. view of Cuba in the UN Human Rights Commission. The PRC was an even more acute problem deploring human rights conditions in the PRC, because the PRC with whom Barbados and Antigua had diplomatic relations (the other islands had relations with Taiwan) was busy building on Barbados a huge gymnasium for the government. It was not for free but for concessional financing that they pay for way off in the future supposedly. The PRC were delivering some very tangible benefits to the Barbadians.

The Barbadian government, after numerous appeals from me, finally decided to duck. They came up with this rather lame idea that their representative at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva had run out of money and had to come home the day before the vote on these critical issues. We were very disappointed and we appealed to them to get somebody else to the meeting. We tried various ways to do this. Send their representative from Brussels if you have to but be there for the vote. They let us down. Subsequently we had a big dust-up with the Barbados government over a travel advisory that the U.S. government felt obliged to issue because there was a very unaccustomed crime situation that had developed in Barbados. The idea got around that the travel advisory was kind of a pay-back for the UN Human Rights Commission thing even though we explicitly denied that, and it wasn't the case. Come the next year the Barbadians found a way to be at the UN Human Rights Commission and to vote the right way.

In the course of that, by the way, I got one of the senior officials of Barbados out for a social outing, actually it was on the golf course. I asked him "Why are we having so much trouble on this human rights thing? This doesn't make sense. We keep making representations to the Foreign Ministry and we kind of get nowhere. The prime minister doesn't seem to pay much heed to us." I learned something very interesting. He said "We in the Foreign Ministry don't have responsibility for human rights. The prime minister has given that responsibility to the Ministry of Justice." We'd never have known this otherwise because there was no reason to think that the minister of Justice had this responsibility. The Minister of Justice was actually a very cooperative guy and a close ally and friend of ours. It turned out that in his earlier days he had had rather different ideas that were reflected in the names of his sons: Fidel and Che. It helped explain why we were having such a sticky wicket on getting condemnation of Cuba's human rights

record out of the Barbados government. We were talking to the wrong people and the right people were somewhat differently disposed.

Q: One other thing that occurs to me, what about American tourism on this place? Did you get involved in that or not?

HUGHES: We did in a way. But let me go back, you asked about drugs. We had one other significant event with St. Vincent that is perhaps worth mentioning because it was the first event that actually, I think, finally got Washington's attention focused on the possibility that St. Vincent may indeed be a mini drugs problem. I happen to be at the CARICOM that was happening in St. Kitts in 1991. While we were at that meeting I received word from Barbados that the navy had encountered on the high seas a concession registered freighter, St. Vincent's a flag of convenience, that was loaded with something like 20 tons of hashish. It was an unbelievable amount of hashish. The largest amount of hashish we had ever found on any vessel up to that time. They asked permission from the government of St. Vincent to board, search, seize and arrest so they would be able to take immediate enforcement action. We made this request through official channels and there was no reply. The government of St. Vincent was taking forever to reply.

The navy through the State Department got in touch with me and asked if there was anything I could do to get the government of St. Vincent to get on with it and give us approval to board, search, seize and arrest. Everybody does this. The Bahamas does it, Colombia does it, Panama does it. Why is the St. Vincent government having so much trouble coming up with this authority? I went and saw Son Mitchell because we were there together at the meeting. I briefed him on the situation, told him all about it and he said he'd call his people and they would get right on it. Well he didn't have an answer for me that day and the next day he flew home but he said we'll be in touch by telephone. The next day I called him and he still didn't have an answer. "Why can't you follow the ship to port and whatever port it enters, ask them for the permission to board, search, seize and arrest?" I said "We can't do that. We want to do it now. We want to do it on the high seas. We want to do it with your permission and we don't understand why we aren't getting cooperation." We went up the escalatory ladder.

I called Son at home on yet another day for permission to board, search, seize and arrest. This was taking about three days. I said that Washington is taking a very quizzical view of why it's taking your government so long to decide this very routine matter. He said "Look, I don't know who's behind these drugs. I don't have anything to do with it. I don't know who's behind this and for all I know it could be the Mafia. If I give you permission to do this, this is a wide open place, somebody might come here and assassinate me. I have no protection. I am worried about myself. They could come over to the Frangipani Hotel in Bequia where I live and do away with me. Go handle this some other way. Take the ship to Hawaii. Follow it to Manila. Do whatever you want but stop asking me for this permission."

I knew he was at his home so I called Bernie Aronson in Washington and said "I've just gone to the limit with Son and he said I can't believe I'm being subjected to this unbelievable pressure. I've never been subjected to this kind of pressure from your government before. I can't move him, Bernie, maybe you can. Do you want to give him a call?" Bernie picked up the phone and called Son Mitchell on Saturday, Bernie was in the office. Someone answered the phone and Bernie asked for Son Mitchell and was told "He's not home". Click. Of course the only person who answered the phone in Son's house was Son.

As it turned out eventually after a long negotiation, it took four or five days, we finally got permission from the Vincentians to go aboard this vessel and board, search, seize and arrest. It finally raised people's suspicions in Washington that there was something radically wrong with this government. This was just not normal behavior. Subsequent to that we found the ton of cocaine through the operation of the drug squad and we saw how that case was handled in St. Vincent.

After coming back from the Eastern Caribbean, I guess it was about a year ago, I was participating in a round table discussion at a think tank here in Washington that was focused on international law enforcement problems. The round table began with a presentation by someone commenting on the drugs situation in the Eastern Caribbean and although we never found the smoking gun really when it comes to St. Vincent and the Grenadines, this person just spoke matter of factly that "well of course the St. Vincent government's given over to drugs trafficking now." It seemed to have finally penetrated that there is something wrong here. We may not be able to put our finger on what exactly is wrong and how deep it goes and just who exactly is implicated, but there is something wrong.

Q: If it had gotten to the point where you felt that the government really had gone over, what could we have done?

HUGHES: What could we have done if we really had a smoking gun that the St. Vincent government had gone over to drugs trafficking? I suppose we could have tried to set up arrest scenarios if we were able to pinpoint individuals in the community, perhaps even in the government, that could have played out when these people traveled overseas. When you came right down to it, we didn't have a lot of economic leverage with the Vincentians. Our aid levels were pretty minimal. Our trade was mainly export trade to St. Vincent. We did not import a great deal from St. Vincent so trade sanctions didn't have a lot to do with it. We could have possibly ostracized them in the international community by sort of calling attention to what evidence of corruption we might have and that would have an adverse impact on their tourism and so forth.

At the end of the day there wasn't a lot of leverage that you really had over St. Vincent. You couldn't go into the country and arrest people. You might have been able to get some cooperation from other jurisdictions in arresting them if they went in and out of the country, as long as you could tie it to a crime that was committed in or directed toward

the United States. We could perhaps have isolated them regionally or help put some regional pressure on them. I think there was a measure of regional pressure put on St. Vincent to clean up its act.

We got surprisingly easy cooperation from Prime Minister Mitchell to carry his special forces units up to the northwest of the island and pull up all this marijuana stuff and destroy it. He may have regarded that as an acceptable political cost. Later on, by the way, when St. Vincent was facing an election year and we wanted to renew the eradication operation, during the election season that was definitely not on. There was just one excuse after another for why it wasn't convenient to have the helicopter come back and ferry people around and so forth. Once the election was over and Mitchell won handily, we were back to eradicating. It was very politically timed.

Q: Let's move to tourism. From your work, did you get involved in tourism? I think of one tourist ship after another cruising in, docking for a day, dropping its people and then out again. I don't know if those islands are on the tourism route.

HUGHES: They are very much on the tourism route. In a good year Barbados could get three times the number of visitors as the population of the island. St. Vincent discouraged the visiting of cruise ships particularly in the Grenadines because these large volumes of people would come ashore and spoil the islands, these fragile little keys south of the main island. Except for St. Vincent and the Grenadines, every island in our area was a regular cruise ship port of call. Even Dominica got a few cruise ships and they were quite important to their economy. Of course stay-over visitors are much more important economically for the islands than cruise visitors.

We were, I think it would be fair to say, involved in tourism in a few ways. Obviously the consulate was involved in delivering services for American tourists and I can talk a little bit about what kinds of things the consulate would encounter in that department. We in the embassy were involved in sort of watching or charting the tourism trends and their impact on the economies of the region. We tried also to stimulate some thinking within the governments about how to get more out of tourism as an economic generator and how to do tourism smarter. Not that we were tourism experts but frankly once you've lived in these regions for a little while it just becomes so apparent, compared to other parts of the world, that there are a number of opportunities that are going begging. Change comes slowly in the region. I was just back in Barbados and a number of things that seemed to me to be wise things to do have been done, but of course it has taken several years for them to have been done. It has probably been a process of people coming to these ideas all on their own.

In terms of tourism services, of course cruise ships were coming to port. Sometimes there would be deaths on board cruise ships. We had repatriation cases. In one case one spouse died on a cruise ship and our consular folks helped get the spouse's body off the cruise ship and repatriated to the United States. The living spouse was reluctant to get off the cruise ship and go home with the corpse. They wanted to know why they couldn't

complete the cruise which was a little bit odd. There were sort of the usual sundry cases of tourists who needed emergency repatriation loans or tourist who got into trouble. Every once in a while there would be tourist problems in the other islands as well. There was the classic arrest situation where a tourist has been found with marijuana or something like that and has been locked up in the local prison and awaiting trial. Our people would have to go visit them, try to ensure that they received a fair trial. The courts were fairly stiff on drugs penalties there but I think they were inclined to be a bit lenient on individual American tourists who might have bought a joint of marijuana or something and weren't obviously engaged in large scale criminal trafficking.

The biggest tourism problem that we were involved in as an embassy concerned Barbados. In the course of late 1991 or early 1992 Barbados had had as I recall six capital felons escape from custody. Four burst out of the Glendairy Prison in an escape from the maximum security wing under conditions that later prompted an inquiry that showed that the TV cameras in the maximum security wing had been malfunctioning for months and hadn't been fixed. A guard was alerted to their tunneling and went to investigate. He was overcome by the escapees, tied up, and put in a cell. He succeeded to untie himself and was about to go and sound the alarm when he heard someone coming. He thought it was the escapees coming back for him so he tied himself up again and waited until they made their escape. So four burst out of Glendairy Prison. These were all people who had been involved in murder or comparably serious crimes like rape, things like that.

Two escaped from the high court. One escaped on one day when he was brought into the defendant's dock in the high court building which was right in downtown. As he was put in the dock, he saw a nearby open window on the second story of the building. He jumped out of the dock, jumped through the window and ran off down the street and escaped. The second person escaped the next day from the high court when he was brought into the same courtroom; this was after the newspapers publicized the previous day's escape. The defendant was brought in and taken to the defendant's dock. He saw the same open window, jumped out of the dock, jumped out of the window and ran off down the street. I think after that they closed the window. It is very hot there.

These guys remained at large on the island. The worrisome part was that they remained at large on the island for several months. The most serious of the felons had actually escaped previously and had been captured in the island of St. Vincent and repatriated to Barbados some years earlier. He had murdered a man in his home in the middle of the island. Some people suspected he got off the island right away or that maybe he hung around for a few weeks until the carnival celebration happened and while everybody had their attention focused on that he quietly slipped off the island. No one ever found him. He is gone. The other five were still on the island and there was mounting evidence of their depredations. One in particular kept mounting attacks mainly on isolated houses in the countryside. He invaded these houses and tied up the occupants. Mainly his victims were white. Rarely was anyone really hurt but there were thefts involved. He might hang around and cook himself a good meal and then leave. There was one case where a very brutal rape of a woman was involved.

The other marauders were either personally implicated in or helped spawn copycats who started creating what for Barbados was a fairly serious crime problem. There were some barricade situations on roads in the interior of the island where it was very popular for tourists to ride around in these little open dune buggy type vehicles called mokes. If you were driving around the island at dusk or even after dark in your moke trying to get back to hotel, you might come across some barrels, or rocks, or tree things strewn in the middle of the road. You stop to figure out how to evade them or whatever and some people would jump out of the bushes and rob you. These kinds of things never happened in Barbados and all of a sudden they were happening with alarming frequency.

We had some discussions with the government about what was going on here and what did they think about this problem. All of the people that we talked to in the judicial and law enforcement side of the house said it was all because of these escapees. They are causing all the problems and once we round them up the problem will be solved. We believed that this was a wrong diagnosis and that it was much more systemic than that. Barbados's economy was in a deep slump thanks to the structural readjustment program that the IMF had imposed when the Sandiford government went to them for help. The economy being so down in Barbados and the government being so lax about some things were leading to an atmosphere of lawlessness and the tourists had reason to worry for their safety. A British tourist, actually he was a Royal Marine, was stabbed in the chest in an effort to save his wife's or girlfriend's purse from being snatched on the south coast tourist road. He lay in the gutter until emergency help came. It started to get very worrying. Fortunately no one was killed but a significant number of people were hurt.

We went back and forth with the Barbados government about this and consulted with Washington about our practices, and also our liabilities, with respect to travel advisories. Barbados made its living off of tourism so one had to treat this with care and discretion. But at the same time we learned that the federal government had been successfully sued in the case of a travel advisory not issued in Kenya for political reasons. Subsequent to the travel advisory being considered and not issued because of political objections from the embassy, an American tourist had been killed in one of the game parks. Weighing all this out we felt something needed to be done; so in dialog with Washington with the Bureau of Consular Affairs we came out with a very mildly worded, not travel warning, but travel advisory. In those days we had a three stage warning, advisory, and all clear kind of thing. We came up with what we thought was a very mildly worded travel advisory and offered even to consult the Barbados government about it. They were just so outraged at the whole idea that they wouldn't really have any dialog about it. Finally the travel advisory was issued. I was called to the foreign ministry to explain this hostile action.

Just before I was called to the foreign ministry, I had been off the island for less than 24 hours in Antigua to make a speech to the Republicans Abroad of Antigua that had been precleared with the State Department Legal Bureau [L]. I had gone through all the necessary hoops to make sure that I'd do this for Democrats if Democrats wanted to hear

from the American ambassador and so forth. The whole trip was totally aboveboard. It was on a weekend, on a Saturday on my own time. It was not paid for by the taxpayers. I was off in Antigua giving a political talk or what could be characterized as a talk to a political group.

I got back and was met at the airport by the regional security officer and my acting administrative counselor. This was unusual. I said "what's up?" They said "We almost lost Terry last night." Terry was the acting DCM, the political counselor. At first I thought that something had happened and he had gotten really pissed off with some situation in the embassy or something and had threatened to leave, that he was going to curtail. They said, "He could have been killed." I remembered an accident that his wife had recently had where she was run off the road on these narrow roads out in the country where their house was so I thought maybe he had been involved in a car accident. It turned out that wasn't the case at all.

One of these escapees had invaded his house. Not to tell the whole long story of how this was done, but basically he ended up being made to kneel down in the driveway of his house execution style with this shotgun at the back of his head. He ended up being hit in the head with the shot gun and knocked to the pavement. He was patted down by the escapee who then not finding money on Terry went into the house and chased his wife and infant child through the house with the shotgun in and out of various doors and rooms while two other children vainly struggled to get security grates open so they could escape into the yard. Terry went running to the neighboring house to try to get help. The wife kept having a sort of almost Alfred Hitchcock experience of pushing the panic button, (both the remote control and the hard-wired panic buttons) and having nothing happen because the salt air had corroded the contacts and the alarm system wasn't sounding. She was trying to work the radio to reach the Marines except she forgot exactly how to work the radio and the gunman was coming. Part of the scene ended with the gunman coming to her bedroom door. She'd thrown the infant under the bed at the time and the gunman was leveling the gun at her ordering her to put the phone down as she was calling the local equivalent of 911. He demanded money and she said "I haven't got any money". Instead of the gunman blowing her away right then and there which he might well have done, he turned and left.

Eventually the Marines were rallied. The Barbados police sent about 30 officers out. They surrounded the house and did some kind of investigation. A neighbor boy offered to show the police where he was fairly confident the gunman was hiding in a nearby gully. He loaded three policemen in a jeep, he was riding and the policemen were driving the jeep. They went down the road past the little bridge that passed over this gully. Further down the road they turned around and came back. As they came back the second time the gunman opened fire on the jeep from the gully wounding three of the four occupants, fortunately not the driver. Despite the fact that 30 policemen were less than a hundred yards away and perfectly able to come scout the gully and try to find this guy, without any further ado or notification to anyone, the driver drove all the way in to the capital town of Bridgetown so that everybody could be treated at the hospital. The gunman escaped and

remained at large for several more months.

Needless to say, going in to see the foreign minister the next day after this whole episode put the travel advisory in an entirely different light both from the embassy's point of view and from his point of view. There really wasn't very much he could say about it. Although in peaceful sunny Barbados we could have had a tragedy on our hands of a diplomatic family of five being wiped out by some shotgun wielding desperado, we and they fortunately dodged the bullet or it could have been a real tragedy. Needless to say I think it wasn't lost on the Barbadians that if Barbados had suddenly in the midst of all this made international headlines by "Acting Chief of U.S. Embassy and Family Murdered in Barbados", this would not be an economic boon for the country. Did we have something to do with tourism? That had a bit to do with tourism.

Q: Was there anything else that we should discuss?

HUGHES: On Barbados and on the embassy? No, not that I can really think of. Barbados as an embassy to me poses some inherent lessons for the Foreign Service and lessons for chiefs of mission taking over embassies like this. There are parts of the world where we really do need to think about doing things smarter, cheaper, better, in an age when we're not going on sailing ships, we are going on airplanes and when there is instantaneous communications with telephone and fax and electronic mail. In small regions like this, our policies towards each of those governments had more in common. We were trying to do the same thing on every island but with governments which each were maybe slightly different. The things the islands had in common with each other and the things our policies toward these islands had in common with each other swamped the very nuanced differences between this island and that island. Therefore there is every reason to think that a regional embassy is the cost effective way to go.

I at the time believed, and continue to believe, that if we looked around the world we might find some other areas of the world where because populations are particularly small or countries have a lot of the same things we're trying to do in several neighboring states, regional embassies might be the way to go. The use of resident representatives or individual officers sort of in a representation context reporting to a regional embassy. Or the more extensive use of consular agents which of course were used quite often in the 19th century but have kind of fallen out of favor today as something to employ. These things might be worth looking at again. From a management point of view I think Bridgetown poses that lesson or that food for thought for the Department.

The other management lesson or grist for thought that Bridgetown as an embassy poses for the Department is the whole question of how do you keep our embassies at a more nearly uniform level of professionalism, recognizing that all embassies are not created equal. Beijing will always attract a different kind of talent than Bridgetown should. Bonn or Berlin will always attract a different kind of talent than Montevideo. Moscow will always attract a different kind of talent than Tegucigalpa. How do we keep some embassies from becoming literally professional backwaters or dumping grounds where

people regard this as the place to go to retire and put your feet up or not do very much, or this is the place you go when you can't get an assignment anywhere else or this is the place where you dump your problems and hope that they never surface again? I don't believe that we should allow dumping grounds or retirement posts and so forth in the service. I think we should try to spread the turkeys, if you would, out more evenly. I think we should have enough respect for every country that is important enough for us to have a resident diplomatic establishment in, to have a first class diplomatic establishment. One that represents the first class, indeed practically the only world class country that exists. My biggest challenge in Bridgetown was how to bring this rather neglected, out-of-the-way embassy, up to that standard. I think we made it. I hope Jeannette Hyde, my successor, is continuing to make it, but it is a challenge.

I guess that would be the two points on which I would close.

Q: You left when?

HUGHES: I left in July of '93 and I came back to Washington and left the service. I went to eventually run the National Council of World Affairs Organizations and then the Council of the Americas. I am now at Manchester Trade.

It may be just a curious story to conclude on. In leaving Bridgetown obviously the Clinton administration was coming into office and I wasn't going to serve under President Clinton, being still an appointee of the Republicans. I was thinking about what I was going to do next and it looked like I had on line one, possibly two, teaching assignments at military war colleges but they were going to take up in July or August and I didn't want a break in all my federal service. Tom Foley, our Speaker of the House at that time, was a periodic visitor to Barbados. Actually I thought of a funny story that I should also tell you, speaking of Foley. I assume that this eventually gets rearranged into something sensible, but I'll tell you the funny story because somewhere in all of this your readers might want some comic relief.

Tom Foley was a regular visitor to the island and I brought the National Intelligence Daily to Foley periodically for briefing. When he came to the island we picked him up and he was always available to do a diplomatic dinner while he was on the island. Anything to promote the interests of the mission he was happy to make himself available for. Knowing that I had these couple of teaching opportunities in the offing when the administration changed and so forth, I was meeting with Foley who happened to be on the island and I said, "If I were to take one of these opportunities and I didn't want a break in service, would it even make sense to inquire whether I could be extended at post long enough so that I would bridge to one of those teaching opportunities and how would I make that inquiry?" He said, "I don't know but I'll check." I think he came back to the island once subsequently and the subject came up and he said he didn't have any further news for me but just stay tuned.

Time passed and nothing happened. My wife and I assumed that we were just going home

as per normal on the first of March which was when all ambassadors who had not been otherwise so notified, which meant all the political appointees and some career ambassadors where the Clinton administration had new people in mind for those big jobs, were supposed to go home. As March first approached, we're obviously going home. We got our tenants out of our house, we ordered the movers up. The moving van came and they started carting up our stuff and we were getting ready to go home. I was at the house watching them crate up my organ and literally push the organ through the front door of the house onto the moving van when the phone rang. On the phone, I don't know if I should tell this story, was Heather Foley. She had been referred out to the house by my office. She said, "What are you doing packing?" I said, "We're packing because we are supposed to leave by the first of March." "You mean they didn't tell you?" "Tell us what?" "You've been extended until July." "No, no one told us we had been extended until July." "Well you have been extended until July." I said, "But we're moving. All of our stuff is packed. I can't possibly stay." Now if I had known a few weeks early, but now I am committed. Our farewell parties have been held. We've done our farewell calls on the islands. She said, "Don't go away. I'll talk to the State Department. You'll be getting a cable shortly."

I called the embassy and said I understand a cable is going to be coming in. Let me know when it comes in. I don't know what it is going to say though. By and by a cable came in and it said basically you've been extended at your post by order of the President until July. Then I got another call from someone who is one of Foley's aides and said, "Did the cable arrive?" I said "Well, yes it has." Then I discussed our predicament with this guy and said the farewell parties and so forth have been done, how can I possibly stay? A few minutes later the phone rang and it was this guy on the phone again. The nature of the conversation was (it was more polite than this) "You don't understand. You have been extended to July. The Speaker of the House has been involved and you are being extended to July so you are going to be there through July." Vicki, who was otherwise committed to come back to Washington for a professional engagement, at that stage left and I was then bachelor ambassador from March through July.

The funny story about Foley that I wanted to share was that when Bush was in Japan for that trip in which he got sick, I was at the airport saying goodbye to my father, who had been visiting us. I got a call from my wife who said, "Have you seen CNN? The President has just taken sick." I said, "No, I haven't seen CNN." We actually couldn't get CNN in the visitors' lounge so I went out to an upstairs lounge where I could get CNN and I saw the footage and so forth. I said we've got to notify Foley. He is in the line of succession. We didn't know what this meant but we needed to notify him.

Q: You might tell what the sickness looked like.

HUGHES: President Bush in Japan sort of keeled over and vomited at a banquet because of strains in his schedule, or a virus he had, or something. It was depicted live, or nearly live, on TV and it looked quite alarming because he sunk under the table and people came and administered to him. We didn't know what it meant. He had been taken off for

treatment. The next task became to advise Foley who was on the island. I called the embassy and spoke to them and then I called Pamela Harriman's house where he had been staying. He wasn't there. At that stage my driver was somewhere near at hand and he said he saw Foley bicycling into town on his way out to pick me up that morning. Speaker Foley frequently bicycled around Barbados. I was dressed for the office in my suit, with my briefcase and I said, "Peter, do you know where Foley usually goes when he goes into town?" He said, "Sometimes he goes to the beach at Jemets Lane and sometimes he goes to Brighton Beach and sometimes he goes to this weightlifting place where he works out." I said, "Okay, let's go to Brighton Beach. Let's start at Jemets Lane and we'll work our way around to all these places and we'll see if we can find him."

We go to the beach at Jemets Lane and pull up in this parking lot. I get out. I am in my suit and I carry my briefcase with me because I didn't want to leave it in the car. I walk out onto the beach and Peter does as well. He walks in one direction and I walk in the other direction. We are looking at the bathers and we're looking at the people in the water for somebody who looks like Tom Foley and there is no one there. We walk back to the parking lot, I have sand in the shoes and everything, and there is this very aged lady there sweeping the parking lot, a black Barbadian of course. I was always trying to be utterly colored blind and never made reference to whether someone was white, black, Asian or whatever. I walked up to this lady and she said, "Can I help you?" I said, "Yes, we are looking for a gentleman who might have come to the beach. He's about as tall as I am or a little bit taller, 60-ish, older with white wavy hair and a sort of craggy face, a bit stooped shoulder, riding a bicycle." She said, "What color?" I said, "Green, I think." Peter spoke up and said, "He's a white guy." Foley's bicycle was green. So anyway, then we went on to the other beach and we went on to the weightlifting place and we couldn't find Foley. Finally, finally he turned up back at Pamela Harriman's house and we were able to brief him on what had happened and so forth. By then it was clear that there was no threat to President Bush and so forth. But strolling the beaches of Barbados in a suit and a briefcase looking for Speaker Foley was one of my more amusing mornings.

Q: We'll stop at this point.

End of interview